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2000 Supreme(SC) 1115

2000(5) Supreme 165
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Gauhati High Court)
S.S. Mohammed Quadri & Shivaraj V. Patil, JJ.
Motilal Jain -Appellant
versus
Smt. Ramdasi Devi & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 4315 of 1991
Decided on 20-7-2000
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Sanjay Parikh, Advocate.
For the Respondents : D.N. Mukherjee, Ranjan Mukherjee, N.R. Choudhary, J.P. Pandey, Advocates.

IMPORTANT POINT
Merely because the plaintiff claims damages in a suit for specific performance of contract as alternative relief, it cannot be said that he is not entitled to the main relief of specific performance of contract itself.

Headnote:(i) Specific Relief Act, 1963-Section 16-Specific performance of sale agreement-Delay in filing suit-When would be ground to deny relief-Sale agreement executed on 20.2.1977-Sale deed was to be executed on 19.7.1977-Last notice issued on 26.4.1978-Suit filed within nine months-Delay cannot be invoked to deny relief to plaintiff.

       Held : It may be apt to bear in mind the following aspects of delay which are relevant in a case of specific performance of contract for sale of immovable property: (i) Delay running beyond the period prescribed under the Limitation Act; (ii) Delay in cases where though the suit is within the period of limitation, yet : (a) due to delay the third parties have acquired rights in the subject-matter of suit; (b) in the facts and circumstances of the case, delay may give rise to plea of waiver or otherwise it will be inequitable to grant a discretionary relief. Here none of the above mentioned aspects applies. That apart factually also, the High Court proceeded on an incorrect assumption with regard to cause of action. Ext. 2 was executed on February 20, 1977 and under it the sale deed was to be executed on or before July 19, 1977. The last notice was issued on November 26, 1978 and from that date the suit was filed only after nine months and not after more than a year as noted by the High Court. Therefore on the facts of this case the ground of delay cannot be invoked to delay relief to the plaintiff. (Para 6)

       (ii) Specific Relief Act, 1963-Section 16-Specific performance of sale agreement-Plea as to readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract-Compliance has to be in spirit-Averment of readiness and willingness in plaint is not a mathematical formula.

       The compliance of "readiness and willingness" has to be in spirit and substance and not in letter and form." It is thus clear that an averment of readiness and willingness in the plaint is not a mathematical formula which should only be in specific words. If the averments in the plaint as a whole do clearly indicate the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to fulfil his part of the obligations under the contract which is subject-matter of the suit, the fact that they are differently worded will not militate against the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff in a suit of specific performance of contract for sale. (Para 9)

       In the instant case a perusal of paras 6 to 11 of the plaint do clearly indicate the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff. The only obligation which he had to comply with was payment of balance of consideration. It was stated that he demanded the defendant to receive the balance of consideration of Rs. 8000/- and execute the sale deed. The defendant was in Patna (Bihar) at the time of notices and when he came back to his place the plaintiff filed the suit against him. In support of his case, he adduced the evidence of PW 1 and PW 2. The plaintiff had parted with two-third of the consideration at the time of execution of Ext. 2. There is no reason why he would not pay the balance of one-third consideration of Rs. 8,000/- to have the property conveyed in his favour. (Para 10)

       (iii) Specific Relief Act, 1963-Section 16-Specific performance of sale agreement-Claim for compensation in lieu of specific performance-Would not disentitle plaintiff relief of specific performance.

       The plaintiff s claim was in accord with the provisions of Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Merely because the plaintiff claims damages in a suit for specific performance of contract as alternative relief, it cannot be said that he is not entitled to the main relief of specific performance of contract itself. (Para 12)

       

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points:

  • A claim for damages made as an alternative relief in a suit for specific performance does not negate the plaintiff's entitlement to the main relief of specific performance itself (!) (!) .

  • The delay in filing a suit for specific performance of an immovable property must be assessed in context; delay beyond limitation periods or delay that results in third-party rights or inequity can be grounds to deny relief. In this case, the delay was found not to be a valid ground to refuse specific performance (!) .

  • An averment of readiness and willingness to perform the contract need not be expressed in specific words or in a particular form. The overall substance of the pleadings and evidence should demonstrate the plaintiff’s genuine readiness and willingness to perform their obligations under the contract (!) (!) (!) .

  • The assessment of readiness and willingness should be based on the totality of circumstances, including the conduct of the parties and the facts, rather than strict adherence to specific language or a formulaic approach (!) .

  • The conduct of the plaintiff, such as having paid part of the consideration and demanding the defendant to complete the transaction, supports their claim of readiness and willingness (!) .

  • The fact that a plaintiff claims damages in addition to or in lieu of specific performance does not bar the grant of specific performance if the claim is made in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions (!) .

  • Overall, the legal provisions and principles allow for a flexible and substance-based approach to evaluating the plaintiff’s readiness and willingness, and such an evaluation favors granting specific performance if the evidence and pleadings indicate genuine intent and ability to perform (!) (!) (!) .

Please let me know if you need a detailed analysis or assistance with drafting or advising based on this case.


JUDGMENT

Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J.-This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment of the Gauhati High Court (Assam) in First Appeal No. 43 of 1981 passed on October 22, 1990. The plaintiff in the suit, out of which this appeal arises, is the appellant and the respondents are legal representatives of the defendant - Ambika Prasad Ram. Hereinafter the passed will be referred to as the plaintiff and the defendant .

2. The plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant to purchase the suit property for a consideration of Rs. 25,000/- out of which a sum of Rs. 17,000/- was paid at the time of the execution of the contract on February 20, 1977 (Ext. 2); the balance of the consideration, Rs. 8000/-, was stipulated to be paid within five months from the date of Ext. 2, at the time of execution of registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. Alleging that the defendant was evading to receive the balance amount of Rs. 8000/- and execute the sale deed, the plaintiff sent notices through his advocate on March 15, 1978 (Ext. 5), and again on April 4, 1978 (Ext. 3) and finally on November 26, 1978 (Ext. 4). The plaintiff then filed the suit, T.S. No. 36 of 1979, against the defendant in the court of the Assistant District Judge of Goalpara at Dhubri, praying for a decree of specific performance of contract for sale of the suit property (Ext. 1) and claimed in the alternative damages in the sum of Rs. 38,000/- on August 10, 1979. The defendant denied the execution of Ext. 2, receipt of Rs. 17,000/- as part consideration thereunder, his signature on it and submitted that, therefore, the question of avoiding to execute the sale deed would not arise. He pleaded that the appellant was entitled to neither the specific performance of contract nor the damages, the alternative claim. On considering the evidence produced by the parties, the trial Court found that the defendant executed Ext. 2 and decreed the suit for specific performance of Ext. 2 on July 25, 1981. The defendant filed First Appeal No. 43 of 1981 against the judgment of the trial Court in the Gauhati High Court (Assam). During the pendency of the appeal the said defendant died and the respondents were brought on record as his legal representatives. The High Court confirmed the finding of the trial Court that the defendant executed Ext. 2 but noted : (i) that the suit was filed after two years of the accrual of the cause of action on July 21, 1977 and after about one year of last notice issued on November 26, 1978 (Ext. 4); (ii) from the averment in the plaint the readiness and willingness could not be inferred; and (iii) even assuming that the averment made out the readiness and willingness, there was no evidence to prove the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff. In that view of the matter, by the impugned judgment, the High Court set aside the judgment of the trial Court with regard to relief of specific performance of the contract (Ext. 2) but granted a decree for compensation in a sum of Rs. 22,094/- (Rs.17,000/- + 1000/- + 4,094/-) with costs.

3. Mr. Sanjay Parikh, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, challenged the said findings of the High Court. He submitted that there was no such delay as to deny the relief of specific performance of Ext. 2. He brought to our notice the averments in the plaint to show readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract and argued that to comply with the requirements of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the plaint need not be in Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix A to Code of Civil Procedure and relied upon the decision of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Chandiok & Anr. v. Chuni Lal Sabharwal (dead) by his LRs. & Ors.1 and a recent judgment of this Court of these Judges Bench in Syed Dastagir v. T.R. Gopalakrishna Setty2. He referred to that part of the judgment of the trial Court where the evidence of Motilal Jain (PW 1) and Ahindra Nath Choudhury (PW 2) was discussed














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