2000(6) Supreme 251
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Punjab and Haryana High Court)
V.N. Khare & S.N. Variava, JJ.
Surjit Kaur -Appellant
versus
Naurata Singh & Anr. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 4701 of 1994
Decided on 13-9-2000
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Ujjagar Singh, Sr. Advocate, Girish Sharma, Devender Verma, Ms. Naresh Bakshi, Advocates.
For the Respondents : (Sunil Gupta, A. Mariarputham, Mrs. Aruna Mathur and Anurag D. Mathur) Advocates for M/s. Arputham Aruna and Co., Advocates.
Held : Both the parties understood that the date for performance was 30th June, 1981. The 1st Respondent sent a notice dated 22nd June, 1981 calling upon the Appellant to remain present before the Sub-Registrar on 30th June, 1981. Both the parties remained present before the Sub-Registrar on 30th June, 1981. The Appellant clarified that she could not deliver possession but that she was willing to execute Sale Deed and get it registered. The Appellant could not deliver possession because the 2nd Respondent had filed a suit had obtained an injunction in that suit. To be remembered that the 1st Respondent was also a party to that suit. This was the time when the 1st Respondent had to elect either to accept part performance and/or to complete the sale by executing Sale Deed and making payment of money. By refusing to accept part performance the 1st Respondent has elected not to accept part performance. To be seen that delivery of possession formed a considerable part of the whole and did not admit of compensation in money. The 1st Respondent had to pay the consideration of the whole without any abatement. He had to pay this consideration on 30th June, 1981. He appeared before the Sub-Registrar. He refused to execute the Sale Deed and pay the consideration. He refused to relinquish all claims to the performance of the remaining part of the contract. By refusing to have Sale Deed executed he was in effect refusing to pay the balance consideration. One he did that he no longer became entitled to claim part performance. This fact was lost sight off by the first Appellate Court as well as the High Court. The first Appellate Court failed to notice that in this case provisions of sub-clause (3) of Section 12 had not been met inasmuch as the 1st Respondent had not paid the consideration for the whole of the contract without abatement and he had elected not to relinquish all claims to the performance of the remaining part of the contract. It is settled law that in cases of part performance of contracts once an election is made then that party cannot at a later date resile or get out of the election. Once 1st Respondent elected not to accept part performance it was no longer open to him, on finding that he could not get the specific performance of the whole, to claim part performance at a later date. If this was to be permitted then all vendees would not pay the consideration amount on the dates fixed for performance. Whilst such dates may not be of the essence of the Contract, they still have some meaning. If this was to be permitted then vendees would withhold payments by first refusing to accept part performance and then after years of litigation agree to accept part performance at the Appellate stage. If this was to be permitted then the sellers would be kept out of their money for long periods of time by vendees. In our view, both the first Appellate Court as well as the High Court have committed a serious error in law by ignoring the fact that the conditions of Section 12(3) were not met in this case inasmuch as 1st Respondent had already elected not to accept part performance. Both these Courts ignored the fact that the 1st Respondent had elected not to relinquish all claims to performance of the remaining part of the Contract and had not paid the consideration. Both the Courts erred in law and on facts in allowing the 1st Respondent to resile from his earlier election. (Para 9)
It is also settled law that specific performance cannot be granted to a party who has not been ready and willing at all stages to perform the contract. Of course, the 1st Respondent was ready and willing to perform the contract in its entirety. To that extent there would be readiness and willingness on the part of the 1st Respondent. But in cases where a contract is not capable of being performed in whole then the readiness and willingness, at all stages, is the readiness and willingness to accept part performance. If a contract is not capable of being performed in whole and a party clearly indicates that he is not willing to accept part performance, then there is no readiness and willingness, at all stages, to accept part performance. In that case there can be no specific performance of a part of the contract at a later stage. None of the authorities cited by Mr. Rao lay down anything contrary. In all those cases the party had been insisting on part performance and/or the time for election had not arrived. In none of those cases an election not to accept part performance had been made. It is under those circumstances that the Courts held that the party could elect to accept part performance at any stage of the litigation. In those cases it could not be said that there was no readiness and willingness to accept part performance. (Para 11)
It must be clarified that this Court is not saying that merely because in correspondence or orally a party has insisted on performance of the whole contract he cannot thereafter elect to accept performance in part. A mere assertion that contract must be performed in full or even a filing of a suit for specific performance of the whole contract without averring that the Plaintiff is willing to accept performance in part may not amount to electing not to accept performance in part. It is only in cases where a party has categorically refused to accept performance in part i.e. he has unambiguously elected not to accept part performance that he will be precluded from subsequently turning around and electing to accept performance in part. Whether a party has categorically elected or not will depend on facts of each case. (Para 10)
(ii) Specific Relief Act, 1963-Specific Performance-Sale agreement-Agreement providing for double the amount as compensation to be paid by vendor in case of failure on his part-Court awarding lesser compensation without assigning reason-Held, plaintiff entitled to compensation in terms of agreement. (Para 13)
JUDGMENT
S.N. Variava, J.-This Appeal is against a judgment dated 15th December, 1992 by which the Second Appeal filed by the Appellant (herein) has been dismissed.
2. Briefly stated the facts are as follows :
On 10th September, 1980 the Appellant entered into an Agreement to Sell, to Respondent No., 1 her 1/2 share in 212K 13M of land at the rate of Rs. 30,250/- per killa. The Agreement to Sell provided that the Sale Deed was to be executed by 30th June, 1981. It also provided that by that date the Appellant was to get her name muted into the record of rights and she was also to give possession of land to the 1st Respondent. A sum of Rs. 20,000/- was paid to the Appellant at time of execution of the Agreement.
Respondent No. 2 filed a suit against the Appellant and the 1st Respondent claiming ownership and possession of land. Respondent No. 2 claimed ownership to the suit land under an alleged will made in his favour by the mother of the Appellant. In that suit an interim order was passed preventing alienation of the land by the Appellant. However, that suit was ultimately dismissed on 7th October, 1982.
In the meantime the 1st Respondent sent a notice dated 22nd June, 1981 to the Appellant calling upon her to execute the Sale Deed as per the terms of the Agreement and informing her to remain present in the Office of the Sub-Registrar on 30th June, 1981.
On 30th June, 1981 the 1st Respondent remained present before the Registrar. He gave an Application to the Registrar which, inter alia, reads as follows :
"2. That agreement deed aforesaid was for the sale of aforesaid land. In favour of Naurata Singh son of S. Sham Singh resident of village Nasrall, Sub Tehsil Amloh District Patiala. That a sum of Rs. 20,000/- in cash was paid to Surjit Kaur with the condition that before the execution and registration of sale deed before 30.6.1981 the possession of the land mentioned in the agreement deed will be delivered to the applicant (Naurata Singh). Today is 29th June, 1981, but uptill now Smt. Surjit Kaur has not taken action for giving possession of the land in question.
It is therefore, requested that my presence may kindly be marked in your office, to enable the undersigned to go to the civil court to get the conditions of the agreement deed implemented therein."
The Appellant also remained present before the Sub-Registrar. She also gave an Application stating that she was not in a position to deliver possession as a suit has been filed by the 2nd Respondent. She stated that she was willing to execute the Sale Deed and have the same registered but that the 1st Respondent was not willing to get the same executed.
On the Application of the 1st Respondent the Registrar passed the following Order :
"The applicant has presented this application. Surjit Kaur d/o Kalu was called. Surjit Kaur stated that she was ready to execute the sale deed but Norata Singh stated that as per written agreement there is a condition precedent and therefore he was ready to get sale deed executed after deliver of possession of land.
In these circumstances no action can be taken on this application. Applicant is directed to seek his remedy in Civil Court. Application is filed 30.6.81."
On the Application of the Appellant the Registrar passed the following Order :
"Today application was presented by Surjit Kaur. Norata Singh is also present. Norata Singh stated that he was ready to get the execution of sale deed but possession of the land has to be delivered before execution as per terms of agreement. Surjit Kaur stated that she could not deliver possession but was ready to execute the sale deed. In these circumstances no action is necessary. Application is filed parties are directed to go to the Civil Court."
Thus, it is to be seen that both the parties understood that 30th June, 1981 was of the essence of the Contract. The Appellant was ready and willing to execute the Sale Deed but the 1st Respondent was not willing to have the Sale Deed executed unless and until all c
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