IMPORTANT POINT
The expression female Hindu in Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 cannot be given a restricted interpretation of wife only.

ORDER

This appeal raises the question of interpretation of Section 14(1) and (2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, (hereinafter referred as the 1956 Act ). The present appeal is preferred by the daughter of one Khimi Ram who had three wives, namely, Smt. Khunki, Smt. Nengu and Smt. Durga. The appellant is the daughter of Smt. Nengu. The short facts are that Khimi Ram executed a Will, dated 30th September, 1932, giving the disputed property to the appellant, namely, Smt. Vidya, daughter, but also gave the same property to his three wives in lieu of maintenance. It is not in dispute that under the Will, the said three wives had limited right to enjoy it during their lifetime. The said Khimi Ram died on 30th September, 1932 and Smt. Khunki died in 1953, Smt. Nengu died in 1960 and Smt. Durga died on 8th March, 1965. Admittedly, the aforesaid 1956 Act came into force before the last two wives died. At this juncture, the relevant part of the Will, which has bearing in this case, is reproduced below :

"The remaining land and other movable and immovable properties, I gave to my daughter, Vidya. Till the time my three wives are there, they will look after the same and will also maintain themselves out of it. After the death of my three wives, my daughter, Vidya, will have the right in the movable and immovable properties."

2. The said Will was never contested; on the contrary, it was accepted by all including the present appellant. Then came Hindu Women s Right to Property, 1937, which created Hindu women s estate on the prospective application. This estate conferred upon the surviving widow, the same right as her husband had, under the Hindu joint family subject, how ever, to other limitations. It is admitted on the record as a fact that, on 27th February, 1965, Smt. Durga executed a Will, purporting to dispose of the property of the said Khimi Ram, in favour of Nand Ram, to be the son from her first husband. On the basis of this Will, dated 27th February, 1965 executed by Smt. Durga, the respondent filed the suit for declaration. This suit was contested by the appellant. The trial Court decreed the suit holding that Smt. Durga was not the limited owner, as her right matured under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and hence the Will made by her in favour of the plaintiff is valid. The appellant preferred an appeal which was allowed, dismissing the suit of the plaintiff. The plaintiff then filed second appeal which was dismissed by learned Single Judge, but the appeal of the plaintiff under the letter patent was allowed by holding that Smt. Durga became absolute owner and her Will in favour of plaintiff, to be valid. It is against this judgment, the present appeal is preferred.

3. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits, Section 14(1) including the Explanation, will not apply, as under the Hindu Law, one cannot have more than one wife, hence right of maintenance could only be for the first wife. The submission is that, since Smt. Durga was the 3rd wife, her marriage could not be valid; hence she had no right of maintenance; consequently, sub-section (1) would not apply to her. In support of this contention he made reference to Section 2 of the Hindu Married Women s Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946 which speaks about the ground for a wife to claim separate residence and maintenance. This Section confers right of a Hindu married woman for her separate residence and maintenance from her husband if her case falls on any of the grounds stated thereunder. He further referred to the decision of this Court in Beni Bai (Smt.) v. Raghubir Prasad1 in which this Court records that, marriage between the Hindus being sacramental and under the Shastri Hindu Law, it is the pious obligation of the Hindu husband to maintain his wife during his lifetime and after his death, even the widow has to be maintained out of the property left by the husband. We fail to understand as to how, either the aforesaid 1946 Act or this decision, lends