IMPORTANT POINT
The proceeding under Section 91 of M.P. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 is not summary in nature. In view of Sections 93 and 147 of said Act, it was not permissible under law to file a suit for recovery of possession before civil court without resorting to remedy available u/s 91 of M.P. Act. Thus the running of time for acquiring title by adverse possession under Article 65 of Limitation Act, 1963 is arrested once a remedy u/s 91 M.P. Act is resorted to.

Headnote:(i) Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950-Section 91-Re-instatement of pakka tenant improperly dispossessed-Procedure u/s 91-Whether proceedings u/s 91 is summary in nature like that of Section 6 of Specific Relief Act or Section 250 of M.P. Land Revenue Code? (No).
       Held : In view of nature of enquiry which is required to be made by the Court, the proceedings under Section 91 of the Act cannot be termed as summary in nature and akin to Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. Under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, a person who has been dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law can claim restoration of possession without proving his title to the land. He can succeed merely by establishing that he was in possession over the land and has been dispossessed otherwise than in accordance with law. We do not, therefore, find that proceedings under Section 91 of the Act is akin to Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. The Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act was repealed by M.P. Land Revenue Code. In repealing Act i.e., M.P. Land Revenue Code we do not find any provision like Section 93 of the Act. We are, therefore, of the view that Sections 91, 92 and 93 of the Act are not pari materia with the provision of Section 250 of the M.P. Code. It is not sound principle of construction to interpret a provision of an enactment following the decisions rendered on similar provision of an enactment when two statutes are not in pari materia. For the aforesaid reasons we find that Sri U.N. Bachawat is absolutely correct when he contended that proceeding under Section 91 of the Act is not summary in nature. (Para 6)
       (ii) Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950-Section 93-Civil Court s jurisdiction barred in regard to Sections 91 and 92 proceedings-Whether it was permissible under law to file a suit for recovery of possession without resorting to remedy available under Section 91 of the Act? (No).
       Held : The scheme envisaged under the Act which comprises of Sections 91, 92 and 93 of the Act shows that where a pakka tenant who has been dispossessed without due course of law and such a pakka tenant wants restoration of possession, there is implied exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court to grant relief to a pakka tenant. In such a situation a pakka tenant who has been dispossessed is at first instance required to file an application for restoration of his possession before the Tehsildar under Section 91 of the Act. In view of the matter, it cannot be said that remedy available under Section 91 of the Act is discretionary and it is open to a pakka tenant either to take recourse to Section 91 of the Act or file suit under Section 93 of the Act. If such a suit is filed in a civil court at the first instance without resorting to the remedy under Section 91 of the Act, the same would be not maintainable. We, therefore, uphold the contention of Shri Bachawat that unless remedy contemplated under Section 91 of the Act is resorted to, there would be no cause of action to a pakka tenant for filing a suit under Section 93 of the Act. (Para 7)
       (iii) Limitation Act, 1963-Article 65-Suit for recovery of possession-Limitation 12 years when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff-Madhya Bharat Land Revenue & Tenancy Act, 1950-Sections 91, 92, 93 and 147-Exclusive jurisdiction of Revenue Authority-Pakka tenant filing suit for reinstatement u/s 91 of M.P. Act-Dismissed-Then filing suit for recovery of possession under Limitation Act-Whether filing an application u/s 91 of the M.P. Act causes an interruption to the continuity of adverse possession? (Yes)-Whether High Court was right in holding that appellants suit was barred by limitation? (No)-Effect-Appeal allowed-Case law referred.
       Held : For bringing a suit for possession of immovable property the period of limitation is 12 years when the possession of a defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Once a suit for recovery of possession is instituted against a defendant in adverse possession his adverse possession does not continue thereafter. In other words, the running of time for acquiring title by adverse possession gets arrested. (Para 10)
       The legal position that emerges out of the decisions extracted above is that once a suit for recovery of possession against the defendant who is in adverse possession is filed, the period of limitation for perfecting title by adverse possession comes to a grinding halt. We are in respectable agreement with the said statement of law. In the present case, as soon as the predecessor-in-interest of the applicant filed an application under Section 91 of the Act for restoration of possession of the land against the defendant in adverse possession, the defendant s adverse possession ceased to continue thereafter in view of the legal position that such adverse possession does not continue to run after filing of the suit, we are, therefore, of the view that the suit brought by the plaintiff for recovery of possession of the land was not barred by limitation. (Para 14)
       Held finally : For the aforesaid stated reasons this appeal deserves to succeed. We accordingly set aside the judgment under challenge. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. (Para 15)

JUDGMENT

V.N. Khare, J.-This appeal is directed against the judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court whereby the High Court has allowed the second appeal preferred by the defendants/respondents and dismissed the suit brought by the appellants herein.

2. The facts of the case in brief are these:

On 14.5.1954, one Nathe Khan, predecessor-in-interest of the appellants herein, and one Shankar Rao, filed an application before the Tehsildar under Section 91 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to the Act) for reinstatement of pucca tenant Nathe Khan who was alleged to be dispossessed by Najim Khan, predecessor-in-interest of respondents 1(a) to 1(k) in respect of agricultural land measuring. 135 hectare, situated at village Maksi, Distt. Shajapur. The case of Najim Khan was that the land in dispute was given to him on patta for consideration of a premium of Rs. 100/- and he, thereafter, planted trees and constructed two houses over the said land. On 31.8.1960, the Tehsildar allowed the application with a direction to late Najim Khan to restore back possession of the land to Shankar Rao instead of Nathe Khan. Feeling aggrieved, late Najim Khan filed an appeal before the Sub-divisional Officer, Shajapur. Nathe Khan also filed a cross-objection against the order of the Tehsildar directing delivery of possession to Shankar Rao. The Sub-divisional Officer, on 20.3.1963, allowed the appeal of Najim Khan and dismissed the cross objection filed by Nathe Khan. Nathe Khan and Shankar Rao thereafter filed second appeal before the Commissioner, Bhopal, being Revenue Case No. 357/63. The Commissioner by order dated 30.4.1963, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order passed by the Sub-divisional Officer. The revision petition filed before the Board of Revenue, M.P. Gwalior by Shankar Rao and Nathe Khan was also dismissed. It was held by the Board of Revenue that Najim Khan and Pan Mal were already in possession of the land since 1950 and they planted trees and also constructed two houses over the said plot of land. On 9.2.1972, the appellant herein, brought a suit for declaration of title and delivery of possession against Najim Khan and Shankar Rao. Defendant Najim Khan filed a written statement wherein it was pleaded that the suit brought by plaintiff was barred by limitation. The trial court framed various issues and one of the issues framed was whether the suit laid by the plaintiff was barred by limitation. The trial court was of the view that the time spent in prosecuting the case in the revenue court should be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act while computing the period of limitation for the present suit. In view of the matter, the trial court held that the suit was filed within the period of limitation. Consequently, the suit was decreed. The decree of the trial court was affirmed by the first appellate court. However, the defendants/respondents second appeal was allowed by the High Court. The High Court was of the view that the benefit of Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act can be availed by the plaintiff only if the court had not entertained the plaintiff s earlier suit on the ground of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature. Since the earlier application of the plaintiff was entertained and decided on merit, the benefit under Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act was not available to the plaintiff. In view of the matter, the suit stood dismissed. It is against the said judgment the plaintiffs/appellants are in appeal before us.

3. On 30.9.1996, this Court while entertaining the Special Leave Petition passed the following order:

"The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner could not have filed civil suit without resorting to remedies available before the revenue courts and the suit could not be filed only when he fails before the revenue court under Section 91 and 92 of the Act and that being so the question of limitation cannot be rais

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2001 Supreme(SC) 693

Cases Referred (2)