IMPORTANT POINT
Order of Single Judge passed on application u/s 17-B of Industrial Disputes Act is judgment within the meaning of Clause 10 of Letters Patent and is therefore appealable.

JUDGMENT

Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J.- Leave is granted.

2. This appeal is from the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna, Ranchi Bench, in LPA No. 177 of 1999 (R) dated 9-8-1999. The appellant is the employer and 28 of its workmen are represented by Respondent 2. The parties are, hereafter, referred to "as employer" and "the workmen" respectively.

3. The facts giving rise to this appeal lie in a short compass.

The Government of India, Ministry of Labour, referred the following question under Section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, "the ID Act") to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal (No. 2) at Dhanbad (for short, "the Tribunal"): "Whether the action of the management of Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd., Ranchi in terminating the services of Shri Naresh Jha and 27 others (as per annexure) w.e.f. 1-7-1992 is justified? If not, to what relief the workmen are entitled?" On 1-5-1997 the Tribunal passed the award holding that the termination of 28 workmen was not justified and that they were entitled to reinstatement and regularisation with 40% back wages and other benefits. The validity of that award was assailed by the appellant before the High Court at Patna (Ranchi Bench) in CWJC No. 2406 of 1979 (R). The workmen claimed relief under Section 17-B of the ID Act in the CWJC. On 26-4-1999 a learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the application and directed the appellant to pay to the workmen full wages last drawn by them on the date of the termination of their services. The appellant challenged the correctness of that order in LPA No. 177 of 1999 (R) before the Division Bench of the High Court which held that against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in terms of Section 17-B of the ID Act, the letters patent appeal was not maintainable because that order was not "judgment" within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent. It is that judgment and order of the Division Bench, which is under challenge in this appeal.

4. Mr Ajit Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the order of the learned Single Judge passed under Section 17-B of the ID Act is a judgment within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent so the High Court ought not to have dismissed the LPA as not maintainable.

5. Mr P.S. Mishra, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondent 2 has contended that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is interlocutory order and is not a judgment within the meaning of clause 10 as explained by the dicta of this Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania1.

6. The short question that arises in this appeal is: Whether LPA No. 177 of 1999 (R), against the order of the learned Single Judge passed on an application under Section 17-B of the ID Act, under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Patna, before the Division Bench of the High Court, is maintainable?

7. We may mention here that clause 15 of the Letters Patent of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras is in iisdem terminis clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Allahabad, Patna, Punjab and Haryana and Madhya Pradesh. It will be useful to read it here:

"15. Appeal from the courts of original jurisdiction to the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction.-And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Madras, Bombay, Fort William in Bengal from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of a revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judg