2001 Supreme(SC) 1509

2001(8) Supreme 56
Supreme Court of India
(From Bombay High Court)
D.P. Mohapatra and Shivaraj V. Patil, JJ.
B.D. Shetty & Ors. —Appellants
versus
M/s. Ceat Ltd. & Anr. —Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 7382 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 5360 of 2001)
Decided on 30-10-2001
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : Sanjay Parikh, R.R. Chandrachud and Ms. Jayana Kothari, Advocates.
For the Respondents : S. Ganesh, Sr. Advocate, Rajan Narain and Ms. Sushma Sharma, Advocates.

Important Points
1. A plain reading and clear understanding of Section 10-A(1)(b) (regarding payment of 75 of subsistence allowance on order of suspension under Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 excludes the delay in completion of disciplinary proceedings on account of stay order granted by a competent court from the mischief of the paid provision. Appellants are entitled to 75 of subsistence allowance.
2. Appellants cannot claim 100 subsistence allowance under Bombay Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Rules, 1959. The employer’s revision against stay order before the Industrial Tribunal is directed to be disposed of within a period of 2 months accordingly.

Headnote:Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946—Section 10A (1)(b)—Payment of subsistence allowance on order of suspension—Interpretation of word “directly” prefixed to words “attributable to”—Difference it makes—Appellants resigned from one Union become member of another Union—Former Union’s Vice-President making criminal allegation against appellants on account of Union rivalry—Case of assault made —Appellants were arrested and later released on bail—Pending Criminal Trial, suspension orders were issued to appellants by respondent employer —Appellants denying allegations of misconduct—Domestic enquiry initiated—Appellants applied for stay to labour court and got the domestic enquiry stayed till disposal of criminal trial—Employer reducing subsistence allowance on ground of delay caused by appellants in getting stay order—Whether the ‘delay’ in completion of disciplinary proceedings is ‘directly’ “attributable to” the conduct of appellants workman u/s. 10-A(1)(b) of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 occasioned on account of such workmen succeeding in getting stay of disciplinary proceeding at the hands of labour Court pendings trial of a criminal case? (No)—Effect—Subsistence allowance be paid @ 75 —Claim of workmen for 100 subsistence allowance—Not justified—Proper course—Direction to Industrial Tribunal to decide on stay of labour Court within 2 months —Appeal allowed accordingly 1991 Lab.I.C. 2066 relied on Bombay Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Rules, 1959—Permitting 100 subsistence allowance are not attracted).

       Held : It is clear from Section 10-A, extracted above, that the employer is required to pay subsistence allowance to a workman suspended pending inquiry at the rate of 50 of wages for the first 90 days and at the rate of 75 of wages for the remaining period of suspension, if delay in completion of disciplinary proceedings is not directly attributable to the conduct of the workman concerned. If a workman is entitled to more beneficial provisions regarding subsistence allowance under any other law in force in any State, then the provisions of such other law shall prevail. (Para 8)

       If under Section 10-A(1)(b) of the Act only the words ‘attributable to’ were used, the position would have been different but the words used ‘directly attributable to’ prefixing the word ‘directly’ to the words ‘attributable to’ makes a drastic difference to emphasis that in order to deny a workman subsistence allowance at the rate of 75 , the delay should be directly attributable to the conduct of such workman in completion of disciplinary proceedings and not that every kind of delay is covered by the said provision. If that was the intention of the legislature there was no need for emphasis by adding the word ‘directly’ and instead they would have simply used the words ‘attributable to’. In the field of interpretation of statutes the courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof with a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. Further, it cannot be said that a word or words used in a statute are either unnecessary or superfluous unless there are compelling reasons to say so looking to the scheme of the statute having regard to the object and purpose sought to be achieved by it. In this view, the use of the word ‘directly’ in the provision has to be given meaning and effect in the context of the said provision under the scheme of the Act. When a workman approaches a competent court bonafidely to protect himself from prejudice likely to be caused by continuing proceedings simultaneously in domestic inquiry as also in the criminal case grounded on the same set of facts and succeeds in getting order from a competent judicial authority staying further proceedings in the disciplinary proceedings till the disposal of the criminal case, it cannot be said that delay on that account in completion of disciplinary proceedings is directly attributable to the conduct of such workman. It cannot be denied that a workman is also entitled for a free and fair trial in the criminal case. Hence, if a workman, in order to protect himself from the prejudice that may be caused by simultaneous proceedings, approaches a competent judicial authority and that authority, on being satisfied, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, stays further proceedings in a domestic inquiry pending a criminal trial, delay caused on that account in completion of domestic inquiry cannot be directly attributable to the conduct of such workman because granting stay of further proceedings in a domestic inquiry does not depend on the pleasure or mere wish of a workman himself. May be, in a given case the court may refuse to stay disciplinary proceedings. It is open to the employer to oppose granting order by a competent court staying disciplinary proceedings on all the grounds available to him. If a workman is to be denied subsistence allowance at the rate of 75 under Section 10-A(1)(b), even in a case where he may have a legal right and a good case on merit to get order from a competent court staying domestic inquiry pending criminal trial, he may be forced to suffer in silence. During the period of suspension he has to support his family and survive to fight or defend his case. It appears, reference to the delay directly attributable to the conduct of the workman in the said provision is obviously to the one where the workman unjustifiably, deliberately or designedly drags on or prolongs the domestic inquiry. To put it in other way, a workman cannot be permitted to take advantage of delay caused by himself in the absence of any order passed by a court. If such a delay is also to be taken as covered by Section 10-A(1)(b) it may amount to in a way putting restraint or clog on the exercise of legal right of a workman to approach a court of law out of fear of losing subsistence allowance at the rate of 75 . It is one thing to say that in a given case there should be no stay of disciplinary proceedings. It is another thing to stay that in case stay is granted there will be delay in completion of disciplinary proceedings, which is directly attributable to the conduct of a workman. Merely because legal proceedings will be pending in a court or before other authority and they take sometime for disposal, may be inevitably, that itself cannot be the ground to deny subsistence allowance to a workman against a statutory obligation created on the employer under Section 10-A(1)(b). One must not lose site of the fact that the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation and the provision of subsistence allowance made is intended to serve a definite purpose of sustaining the workman and his family members during the bad time when he is under suspension pending inquiry. This provision is enacted with a view to ensure social welfare and security. Hence, such a beneficial piece of legislation has to be understood and construed in its proper and correct perspective so as to advance the legislative intention underlying its enactment rather than abolish it. Assuming two views are possible, the one, which is in tune with the legislative intention and furthers the same, should be preferred to the one which would frustrate it. (Paras 11 & 12)

       Held consequently : We are not impressed by the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that once there is delay on account of the conduct of the workman, whatever may be the reason for delay, it is good enough to attract Section 10-A(1)(b) to deny the workman subsistence allowance at 75 after 90 days of suspension. According to him, no distinction can be made to exclude delay caused on account of stay order granted by a court at the instance of workman. He contended that no words can be added or excluded to the said provision to avoid the mischief of it. In our view, a plain reading and clear understanding of Section 10-A(1)(b), as already discussed above, excludes the delay in completion of disciplinary proceedings caused on account of order granted by a competent court from the mischief of the said provision. It is only the delay that is directly attributable to the workman is covered by the said provision. For what is stated above, the question raised in the beginning is answered in the negative. (Para 14)

       But held further the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that looking to the Model Standing Orders appearing in Schedule I appended to the Bombay Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1959, which are more beneficial, the appellants are entitled for 100 subsistence allowance equivalent to their wages, dearness allowance and other compensatory allowance in case inquiry is not completed within the period of 180 days is based on Section 10-A(3) is untenable. The learned senior counsel for the respondent pointed out that Model Standing Orders contained in Schedule I, are the part of Bombay Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1959 and these rules are framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 15 of the Act. Hence, it cannot be said that the said Model Standing Orders come within the meaning of such ‘other law’ covered by Section 10-A(3). He drew our attention to a Division Bench judgment of Bombay High Court in May & Baker Ltd. v. Kishore Jaikishandas Icchaporia (1991 Lab. I.C. 2066) in which it is clearly held that Model Standing Orders were not “other laws”. (Para 15)

       We have every good reason to accept the said view. It is plain from the very language of Section 10-A(3) that the words ‘provisions of such other law’ necessarily refer to the law other than one covered by the very Act and Rules made thereunder. In this view, we reject the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. Similarly, his argument that there is a practice with the respondent to make 100 subsistence allowance if inquiry is not completed within 180 days, and as such the appellants are also entitled accordingly, cannot be accepted in view of the specific provision contained in Section 10-A of the Act. (Para 16)

       Held in addition : In view of submissions made by both learned counsel that the revisional authority may be directed to dispose of the revision petitions pending before the Industrial Tribunal within the given time frame and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we also think it just and appropriate to direct the Industrial Tribunal, Thane, to dispose of the revisions pending before it within two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. It is open to both the parties to urge all the contentions available to them including that there is no need to continue the stay order at this length of time and that no prejudice will be caused to appellants when they have already disclosed their defence in the domestic inquiry. (Para 17)

       However held further : The learned senior counsel for the respondent submitted that in the event we hold against the respondent and reverse the impugned order, the payment of subsistence allowance at the rate of 75 may be ordered prospectively. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the view we have taken, it is not possible to accept the request made on behalf of the respondent that payment of subsistence allowance at the rate of 75 may be ordered prospectively. (Para 18)

       Held finally : In view of the interpretation we have placed on Section 10-A(1)(b) in regard to delay and answered the question in the negative, the impugned order does call for interference. For what is stated above, the impugned order cannot be sustained. We set aside the same and hold that the appellants are entitled for subsistence allowance at the rate of 75 . The appeal is allowed accordingly. The Industrial Tribunal, Thane, shall dispose of the Revision Application (ULP) Nos. 34, 35 and 36 of 1998 within a period of two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. No costs. (Paras 19 & 20)