IMPORTANT POINT
Although Court has power to extend time u/s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 but in cases of wilful or gross default Court may refuse to extend time or if lenient, as in this case, it should be on heavy costs as indicated by Apex Court in the case.

Headnote:West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 -Sections 13 and 17-Suit for possession on ground of non-payment-Deliberate default of non-payment of rent-Tenant moving application u/s. 17-High Court allowed though tenant had no sufficient cause for not depositing rent-Appeal against -Whether Court has power to extend time u/s. 17 of Act? (Yes)-But even if Court has power, in case of gross default Court may refuse to extend time (Paras 13, 14)-The word shall in Section 17(2B) means "may" (Para 15)-Whether order of High Court be set aside? (No, the leniency should be on heavy costs? (Para 16)-Appeal disposed of accordingly.
Held : We are unable to accept Mr. Mukherjee s submission that the Court has no power to extend time under Section 17 of the said Act. The said Act is a beneficial legislation. Such a statute has to be liberally construed so as to ensure that the statutory purpose is fulfilled and not frustrated. Prior to its amendment Section 17 provided that a tenant could, within the time provided in sub-section (1) of Section 17, deposit or pay the amount to the landlord and that if he fails to deposit the Court shall order the defence against delivery of possession to be struck off. Thereafter, by the Amendment Act, subsections (2A) and (2B) of Section 17 were added. At the same time Sections 17A to 17D were added. Undoubtedly, sub-section (2B) of Section 17, read by itself, conveys an impression that it is mandatory in nature. However, sub-section (2B) of Section 17 cannot be read in isolation. Sub-section (2B) of Section 17 has to be read along with sub-section (2A) of Section 17 and Sections 17A to 17D. Sub-section (2A) of Section 17 gives a Court the power to extend time on an application by the tenant. The Court can permit the tenant to deposit or pay in instalments on terms as may be fixed by the Court. The wordings of sub-section (2A) of Section 17 are wide. They show that a tenant could make an application for extension of time on more than one occasion. The Court has power to enlarge time on each of such applications. The second or third application will obviously be filed beyond the time provided in Section 17(1). As the Court has power to extend time on each such application it is clear that the word "shall" used in sub-section (2B) of Section 17 means "may". If the submissions of Mr. Mukherjee were to be accepted then it would lead to absurd results. This can best be illustrated by way of examples. If an application had been made by a tenant for extension of time to make deposit beyond time and even if the defence had been struck off, under Section 17A the tenant could make another application within a period of 30 days and on such an application the order striking off the defence "shall" be set aside by the Court. Similarly even though a decree may have been passed after the defence was struck off, the Court could under Section 17B set aside the decree. But if an application for extension of time was pending on the date the Amendment Act came into force, then neither Section 17A nor Section 17B would apply and on the arguments of Mr. Mukherjee the Court would be helpless to extend time. The Legislature could not have intended that Court must first strike out the defence and then under Section 17A set aside the order. A conjoint reading of Sections 17(2A) and (2B) along with Sections 17A to 17D shows that the Legislature intended to give benefit to the tenants. To be noted that Section 17(2B) and Sections 17A to 17D use the word "shall". A conjoint reading of these Sections makes it very clear that the word "shall", used in all these Sections, necessarily means "may". A conjoint reading shows that a Court has power to extend time. Of course the power would have to be judicially exercised. We, therefore, confirm the view taken in Ghosh s case and in Khemka s case. On the facts of this case, it does appear to us that the Respondent did not have sufficient cause for not depositing the amount of rent for such a long period of time. However, as the High Court has exercised its discretion, we do not propose to interfere. However, in our opinion, on the facts of this case, the leniency which has been shown to the Respondent should be on heavy costs. Considering the cost of litigation today, in our view, the Respondent should pay in both these Appeals cost fixed at Rs. 50,000/- (i.e. Rs. 25,000/- in each Appeal). The same should be paid within a period of 6 weeks from today. If such cost is paid this Appeal shall stand dismissed with no further Order as to costs. If, however, the said sum of Rs. 50,000/- or any part thereof is not paid within the period aforesaid, then the Appeal shall stand allowed and the impugned Judgment dated 2nd June, 1998 shall stand set aside and the Order of the trial Court dated 4th September, 1997 shall stand revived. The Appeals stand disposed of accordingly. (Paras 14, 15, 16 and 17)

JUDGMENT

S.N. Variava, J.-These two Appeals are against the common Judgment dated 2nd June, 1998 in two Revision Applications filed by the Appellant (herein) before the High Court of Calcutta. Both the Appeals are being disposed of by this common Judgment as the facts are similar and the law point is the same.

2. Briefly stated the facts are as follows:

One Smt. Maya Lata Dey was the owner of a building containing six shops in 7B, Kabi Tirtha Sarani, P.S. Watgunge, Calcutta - 700023. The Appellant was a tenant in one shop and the Respondent was a tenant in two of the shops. On 12th March, 1993 the Appellant bought the building from the said Smt. Maya Lata Day by a registered sale deed. A letter dated 1st April, 1993 was sent by the landlady, Smt. Maya Lata Dey, to all the tenants intimating them that she had sold the building to the Appellant and that they should attern tenancy to the Appellant and pay rent to the Appellant.

3. The Respondent filed, against Smt. Maya Lata Dey and the Appellant, Title Suit No. 307 of 1993 in the Court of the Munsif at Alipore for specific performance of an alleged oral Agreement to Sell. The Respondent claimed that there was an earlier Agreement to Sell between Smt. Maya Lata Dey and himself and that thus the property could not have been sold to the Appellant. After filing the suit for specific performance the Respondent did not pay any rent to the Appellant. The Appellant, therefore, filed a Suit No. 215 of 1993 for recovery of arrears of rent. That suit came to be decreed on 19th August, 1993.

4. Thereafter the Appellant filed two suits, each for possession of a shop, damage, mesne profit and injunction against the Respondent. The suits were filed under Section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the said Act). The Respondent filed applications under Section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code for stay of the suits on the ground that his suit for specific performance of contract was pending. The applications were dismissed. On 22nd December, 1995 Suit No. 307 of 1993 filed by the Respondent was dismissed. We are told that an Appeal has been filed against the order of dismissal and that the said Appeal is pending.

5. On 23rd April, 1996 the Respondent filed applications, under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, praying that he be allowed to deposit all arrears of rent along with statutory interest thereon in accordance with Section 17(1) of the said Act. In the said application he contended that he had been advised by his lawyer that he should not pay rent as that would affect his suit for specific performance which was then pending and that now that the suit for specific performance was dismissed he was tendering the rent. It must be mentioned that along with the applications the Respondent deposited all arrears of rent. The applications were opposed by the Appellant. The learned Additional District Judge rejected the applications. However, both the Appeals filed by the Respondent were allowed by the impugned Judgment dated 2nd June, 1998.

6. When this matter reached hearing on 21st November, 2001 this Court observed as under:

"It is conceded that the tenant did not deposit the amount of arrears of rent within one month from the date of service of writ of summons under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 nor made an application within that time for extension of time under sub-section 2(A) and 2(B) of Section 17. An application by tenant, seeking extension of time, made beyond one month, for condoning the delay in deposit which too was made beyond one month, was rejected by the Trial Court but allowed by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The High Court, while dong so, relied on an observation made by this Court in M/s. B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. vs. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick and Anr. (1987 (2) SCC 407) vide para 15, which reads as under:

".......... then the court surely has the further discretion to condo

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2002 Supreme(SC) 313

IMPORTANT POINT Although Court has power to extend time u/s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 but in cases of wilful or gross default Court may refuse to extend time or if lenient, as in this case, it should be on heavy costs as indicated by Apex Court in the case.

IMPORTANT POINT
Although Court has power to extend time u/s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 but in cases of wilful or gross default Court may refuse to extend time or if lenient, as in this case, it should be on heavy costs as indicated by Apex Court in the case.