IMPORTANT POINT
If the Tribunal fixes a purchase price and issues a certificate under Section 32-G of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, then that certificate would be conclusive proof of purchase and the civil court would then be bound to give effect to the certificate and cannot ignore it.

Headnote:Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948-Sections 4, 32-G-Deemed tenants-Issue of certificate of purchase to tenant purchaser-Whether a decree passed by a Civil Court can be executed if a certificate of ownership has been granted under the provisions of the Act?-(No)-Appellant deposited the purchase price-A certificate had been issued to him-Such a certificate is conclusive evidence of purchase unless it is set aside in Revision-Decree passed by Civil Court holding appellant to be a trespasser held not executable.
Held : The Appellant had already made an application under Section 32-O before the suit was filed by the Respondents 1 and 2. Respondents 1 and 2 were aware that the Appellant had made such an application. The Appellant was pursuing her remedy under the said Act before the appropriate authority. Respondents 1 and 2 were also parties to those proceedings and were contesting those proceedings. These are not questions which could be raised before a civil court. Therefore rightly neither Respondents 1 and 2 nor the Appellant took up this question before the civil court. Even if the question had been raised the civil court could not have decided it. The civil court would have had to refer the issue to the appropriate authority and then abide by its decision. A decree passed without the consideration of the provisions of the said Act must be subject to orders of the appropriate authority in proceedings under the said Act. Thus so long as the certificate stands the decree cannot be executed against the Appellant. It is only if Respondents 1 and 2 succeed in getting the Certificate set aside, in their pending Revision, that they can execute the decree. It would be open for Respondents 1 and 2 to pursue the Revision filed by them against the order dated 23rd November 2000. We realise that a Revision is on limited grounds. We have noticed that the Appellate Authority dismissed the Appeal of Respondents 1 and 2 merely on the ground that this Court had stayed the operation of the decree passed by the civil court. If the revisional authority so desires it may remit the matter back to the Appellate Authority for a decision on merits in accordance with law. We, however, clarify that the decision of the Revisional Authority or the Appellate Authority must be based only on the provisions of the said Act. Findings given by the Civil Court dehors the provisions of the said Act, and any observation made by us on that question cannot be taken into consideration in deciding whether Appellant is a deemed tenant. (Paras 23 & 24)

JUDGMENT

S.N. Variava, J.-This Appeal is against the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 23rd August, 1999.

2. Briefly stated the facts are as follows:

One Narayan Motiwale was the owner of certain pieces of land. He had a son named Dattatraya and a daughter named Tarabai. On the death of Narayan Motiwale, Dattatraya became the owner of the properties. By a registered Settlement Deed dated 12th January, 1927, Dattatraya gave Survey Nos. 21/3, 20 and 20/1 to his sister Tarabai as she was poor and unable to maintain herself. The said Deed of Settlement, inter alia, provided as follows :

"Land bearing No. 21 and the well in the same is given to along with trees and things thereon has been given to your possession for maintenance until life. Therefore you may cultivate the said land by paying the Government assessment for maintenance. After your lifetime the land shall again come to me or to my heirs."

Pursuant to the Deed of Settlement the name of Tarabai was entered in the revenue records as a Kabjedar.

3. Tarabai leased out one piece of land to a tenant in 1968. Dattatraya filed suit No. 362 of 1969 against Tarabai for a declaration that he was the owner of the land in question and that Tarabai had only a limited interest and therefore could not lease out the land. In the meantime the tenant to whom the Tarabai had leased out the land applied for tenancy rights under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, (hereinafter called the said Act).

4. The suit filed by Dattatraya was dismissed. Thereafter Dattatraya filed Appeal No. 450 of 1970. In that Appeal a consent decree was passed on 7th October, 1971. Under the consent Decree Tarabai agreed that she will not lease out any piece of land.

5. In the tenancy proceedings initiated by the lessee by order dated on 13th March, 1971 it was held that the lessee was a deemed tenant under Section 4 of the said Act. The Land Tribunal fixed a price under Section 32G of the said Act. The price was paid by the lessee and that lessee became the statutory owner of the property. Dattatraya was a party to those proceedings. He never challenged the order of the Land Tribunal. That order became final in respect of that lessee.

6. In 1973 Tarabai filed Suit No. 73 of 1973 against Dattatraya claiming that, after coming into force of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the limited rights vested in her had matured into an absolute right. That Suit was dismissed in view of the consent decree passed in Appeal No. 450 of 1970.

7. On 19th January 1977 Dattatraya expired. On 6th September, 1980 Tarabai executed a lease deed in favour of the Appellants. On 7th December 1980 the Appellants gave notice under Section 32-O of the said Act to Tarabai and the Land Tribunal. By this notice the Appellant indicated her intention to purchase the suit land.

8. Respondents 1 and 2 then filed Suit No. 472 of 1981 against Tarabai and the Appellants for a declaration that Tarabai had no authority to lease or create any incumberance on the suit land. They prayed for recovery of possession. Tarabai expired on 5th March, 1982. Thereafter the suit had proceeded only against the Appellants. On 19th February, 1986, the Trial Court decreed the Suit holding, on the basis of the earlier consent decree, that Tarabai had no authority to lease out the suit land. It was held that the lease in favour of the Appellant was not binding on Respondents 1 and 2. It was held that the Appellant was a trespasser.

9. The Appellant preferred an Appeal. This Appeal was allowed on 16th September, 1989. Respondents 1 and 2 filed a Second Appeal, which was allowed by the High Court on 27th June, 1997.

10. On 18th August 1981, the Appellants filed a case under Section 32-O of the said Act. Respondents 1 and 2 opposed this Application. On 22nd April 1988 the Land Tribunal fixed the purchase price under Section 32-G. The Appellants deposited the purchase price immediately. Respondents 1 and 2 filed an Appeal against the Order dated 22nd Apri

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2002 Supreme(SC) 416

Cases Referred (4)