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2002 Supreme(SC) 247

2002(2) Supreme 69
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Kolkata High Court)
G.B. Pattanaik, S.N. Phukan and S.N. Variava, JJ.
Narayan Prasad Lohia -Appellant
versus
Nikunj Kumar Lohia & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 1382 of 2002
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12384 of 2000)
Decided on 20-2-2002
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Rakesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate, Manoj Saxena, Ms. Nadira Patharia, Pravir Choudhary, Advocates.
For the Respondents : Kailash Vasdev and K.K.Venugopal, Senior Advocates, S. Singhvi, K.V. Vijayakumar, P.N. Misra, Anil Agarwal, and Ms. Bina Madhavan, Jaideep Gupta and Ms. Neeru Vaid, Advocates.

IMPORTANT POINT
When the composition or the procedure of Arbitral Tribunal is not in accordance with the agreement of the parties then the parties get a right to challenge the award and the challenge can only be provided the agreement of the parties is in conflict with a provision of Part I which the parties cannot derogate.

Headnote:Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996-Sections 4, 5, 10, 11, 16, 34 -Waiver of right to object-Application for setting aside Award alleging Arbitration was by two Arbitrators-Respondent s case that an arbitration by even number of Arbitrators was against statutory provisions of the Act, therefore, void and invalid-Whether acceptable?-(No)-Whether under the Act, a party has a right to object to composition of arbitral Tribunal, if such composition is not in accordance with the said Act, and, if so, at what stage?-Whether Section 10 should be held to be non-derogatory?-(No).

       Held : When the composition or the procedure is not in accordance with the agreement of the parties then the parties get a right to challenge the award. But even in such a case the right to challenge the award is restricted. The challenge can only be provided the agreement of the parties is in conflict with a provision of Part I which the parties cannot derogate. In other words, even if the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure is not in accordance with the agreement of the parties but if such composition or procedure is in accordance with the provisions of the said Act, then the party cannot challenge the award. The words "failing such agreement" have reference to an agreement providing for the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure. They would come into play only if there is no agreement providing for the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure. If there is no agreement providing for the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure and the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with Part I of the said Act then also a challenge to the award would be available. Thus so long as the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure are in accordance with the agreement of the parties, Section 34 does not permit challenge to an award merely on the ground that the composition of the arbitral tribunal was in conflict with the provisions of Part I of the said Act. This also indicates that Section 10 is a derogable provision. Respondents 1 and 2 not having raised any objection to the composition of the arbitral tribunal, as provided in Section 16, they must be deemed to have waived their right to object. (Paras 18 & 19)

       

JUDGMENT

S.N. Variava, J.-Leave granted.

This Appeal is against a Judgment dated 18th May, 2000.

2. Briefly stated the facts are as follows:

The Appellant and the Respondents are family members who had disputes and differences in respect of the family businesses and properties. All the parties agreed to resolve their disputes and differences through one Mr. Pramod Kumar Khaitan. Subsequently, on 29th September, 1996 they agreed that the said Mr. Pramod Kumar Khaitan and one Mr. Sardul Singh Jain resolve their disputes. For the purposes of this Order we are not deciding whether these two persons acted as Arbitrators or Mediators. That is a matter of contention between the parties which we are, at present, not called upon to decide. For the purposes of this order we are presuming that the parties had agreed to the Arbitration of these two persons.

3. The parties made their respective claims before these two persons. All parties participated in the proceedings. On 6th October, 1996 an Award came to be passed by the said Mr. Pramod Kumar Khaitan and Mr. Sardul Singh Jain.

4. On 22nd December, 1997 the 1st Respondent filed an Application in the Calcutta High Court for setting aside the Award dated 6th October, 1996. On 17th January, 1998 the 2nd Respondent filed an Application for setting aside this Award. One of the grounds, in both these applications, was that the Arbitration was by two Arbitrators whereas under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter called the said Act) there cannot be an even number of arbitrators. It was contended that an arbitration by two arbitrators was against the statutory provision of the said Act and therefore void and invalid. It was contended that consequently the Award was unenforceable and not binding on the parties. These contentions found favour with a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court who set aside the Award on 17th November, 1998. On 18th May, 2000 the Appeal was also dismissed. Hence this Appeal to this Court.

5. When this matter reached hearing on 16th January, 2000, the following Order has been passed by this Court:

"Substitution applications are allowed.

A similar question, as is involved in this case, came up before a Bench of this Court in the case of Dodsal Private Ltd. vs. Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1996) 2 SCC 576. In that case this Court felt that the question whether a mandatory provision of the Arbitration Act can at all be waived requires consideration by a larger Bench in view of an earlier judgment of this Court in Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Raymon and Co. (India) P. Ltd. (1963) 3 SCR 209. In the said view of the matter the Bench referred the question to a larger Bench of this Court. It is now noticed that the said Constitution Bench, which was seized of the referred case, did not decide that issue as could be seen from its decision dated 19th July, 1996 in Dodsal Private Ltd. vs. Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi Civil Appeal Nos. 2372-2374 of 1987 [1996 (7) SCALE (SP) 1], but decided the issue on other grounds.

Since that question has not yet been decided and question involved is an important question of law likely to arise in future cases, we feel it appropriate that this issue should be decided by larger Bench, of at least three Hon ble Judges and hence, refer the petitions, namely, SLP (C) 12384 and 13123 of 2000 to a Bench of three Hon ble Judges.

Accordingly, the Registry is directed to place the papers before Hon ble the Chief Justice for suitable orders."

Accordingly, this matter is before this Bench. At this stage we are only deciding the question of law referred i.e. whether a mandatory provision of the said Act can be waived by the parties.

6. It would be appropriate to set out, at this stage, the relevant provisions of the said Act. Sections 4, 5, 10, 11, 16 and 34 read as follows:

"4. Waiver of right to object.-A party who knows that-

(a) any provi





































































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