2002(4) Supreme 349
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Kolkata High Court)
D.P. Mohapatra & K.G. Balakrishnan, JJ.
Jhareswar Prasad Paul & Anr. -Appellants
versus
Tarak Nath Ganguly & Ors. -Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 170 of 1996
With
Criminal Appeal No. 171/1996
Decided on 8-5-2002
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : T.C. Ray, Sr. Advocate, H.K. Puri, S.K. Puri, Rajesh Srivastava, Ujjwal Banerjee, Ms. Anindita Gupta, Advocates.
For the Respondents : Gobind Das, Sr. Advocate, G.S. Chatterjee, Raja Chatterjee, Ms. Aruna Mukherjee and Rajender Pd. Saxena, Advocates.
Held : The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts of law. Since the respect and authority commanded by the courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the democratic fabric of society will suffer if respect for the judiciary is undermined. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been introduced under the statute for the purpose of securing the feeling of confidence of the people in general for true and proper administration of justice in the country. The power to punish for contempt of courts is a special power vested under the Constitution in the courts of record and also under the statute. The power is special and needs to be exercised with care and caution. It should be used sparingly by the courts on being satisfied regarding the true effect of contemptuous conduct. It is to be kept in mind that the court exercising the jurisdiction to punish for contempt does not function as an original or appellate court for determination of the disputes between the parties. The contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the question whether there has been any deliberate disobedience of the order of the court and if the conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed such disobedience is contumacious. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is alleged by the applicant. The court has to consider the direction issued in the judgment or order and not to consider the question as to what the judgment or order should have contained. At the cost of repetition be it stated here that the court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, which alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If the judgment or order does not contain any specific direction regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it will be better to direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the order instead of the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order. If this limitation is borne in mind then criticisms which are sometimes levelled against the courts exercising contempt of court jurisdiction "that it has exceeded its powers in granting substantive relief and issuing a direction regarding the same without proper adjudication of the dispute" in its entirety can be avoided. This will also avoid multiplicity of proceedings because the party which is prejudicially affected by the judgment or order passed in the contempt proceeding and granting relief and issuing fresh directions is likely to challenge that order and that may give rise to another round of litigation arising from a proceeding which is intended to maintain the majesty and image of courts. Judging the case in hand on the touchstone of the principles noted above, we find that the directions issued by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment in effect dealt with by the court and specific direction has not been issued while disposing of the writ petitions/appeals then the appropriate course was to leave it to the parties (writ petitioners) to agitate the matter before the competent forum. Further the question of entry of holders of ex-cadre posts, like the writ petitioners, into an existing cadre is a matter of policy which the Government has to decide. Be it noted here that on consideration of the matter the High Court held that no action for contempt of court need be taken against the respondents in the writ petition for deliberate disobedience of the judgment or order passed by the High Court. Thereafter it was not open to the Court to pass any order granting substantive relief to the applicants (writ petitioners) on the plea that the question raised was also a part of their grievance in the writ petition. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are constrained to hold that the judgment/order passed by the High Court was without jurisdiction. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The judgment/order under challenge is granted substantive reliefs not covered by the judgment/order passed in the original proceeding. In the judgment no direction was issued by the High Court that the writ petitioners will be admitted to the cadre of Upper Division Clerks/Assistants in the Directorate. As noted earlier, they have all along been holding the posts of Clerk-cum-Cash Collector which are ex-cadre posts. Entry of such persons into the cadre of Upper Division Clerk/Assistants has to be considered taking into account various aspects of the matter. It is one thing to say that the benefits under the Government Order may be extended to the writ petitioners also and extending benefits of the Government Order to the writ petitioners is one thing and directing their entry into the existing cadre of Office Assistants is a different thing. Such a dispute can only be determined on consideration of all relevant aspects of the matter and cannot be and should not be ordered in the summary proceeding for taking action for contempt of court. If the High Court felt that the grievance of the writ petitioners relating to the question of their entry into the cadre of Upper Division Clerks/Assistants has not been set aside. The petition filed by the writ petitioners for taking action for contempt of court against the respondents is dismissed. (Paras 12, 13 and 14)
Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points:
The power to punish for contempt of court is a special jurisdiction vested under the Constitution and statutes, intended to uphold the dignity and majesty of courts (!) (!) .
Contempt proceedings should be exercised with caution and sparingly, focusing primarily on whether there has been deliberate disobedience of a court order and whether the conduct is contumacious (!) (!) .
The jurisdiction is not meant for re-judging the merits of the original case or for entering into questions not directly dealt with or decided in the original judgment or order (!) .
If the original judgment or order does not contain specific directions on a matter, courts should direct parties to seek clarification from the court that disposed of the original matter, rather than exercising contempt jurisdiction to address issues not explicitly decided (!) (!) .
In cases where a contempt petition seeks to enforce a substantive benefit or relief, the court must ensure that such relief was explicitly granted in the original judgment or order; otherwise, granting such relief in contempt proceedings may be without jurisdiction (!) (!) .
Directions issued in contempt proceedings should be confined to ensuring compliance with the specific terms of the original order; issuing new substantive directions or reliefs without proper adjudication can be improper and may lead to jurisdictional issues (!) (!) .
The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to maintain respect for the judiciary and ensure compliance with court orders, not to decide new disputes or issues unrelated to the original order (!) (!) .
In the case at hand, the court found that the directions issued in the contempt proceedings were beyond the scope of the original judgment, which did not explicitly order the treatment of ex-cadre posts as part of a particular cadre or the preparation of a common seniority list (!) (!) .
The court emphasized that questions of policy, such as entry into a cadre, are within the domain of governmental decision-making and should not be determined in contempt proceedings or summary judgments (!) .
Consequently, the court held that the High Court's order was without jurisdiction, and the appeals were allowed. The substantive reliefs granted in the contempt order were not supported by the original judgment or proceedings (!) .
The petitioners' grievances related to their entry into a specific cadre and the preparation of a seniority list could not be decided in a contempt proceeding but required proper adjudication in appropriate forums (!) .
The judgment underscores the importance of limiting contempt proceedings to their proper scope and avoiding the issuance of directions or reliefs not explicitly or necessarily derived from the original order (!) (!) .
These points encapsulate the principles and findings from the case, emphasizing the limits and purpose of contempt jurisdiction and the importance of adhering to the scope of original judgments.
JUDGMENT
D.P. Mohapatra, J.-In these appeals filed by special leave the appellants have challenged the judgment/order dated 11.11.1992 passed by the High Court at Calcutta in the contempt proceeding, Civil Rule No. 2197(W)/88, holding inter alia, that the respondents have not complied with the order dated 29.2.1988 of the Court effectively and in appropriate manner.
2. The relevant facts of the case giving rise to the proceeding may be stated thus :
3. The respondents, 27 in number, were holding posts of clerk-cum-cash collector in the Directorate of Dairy Development, Government of West Bengal. They filed writ petition No. CO 8793(W) of 1984 raising a grievance that though they have been holding the posts since long and have been doing clerical work similar to those of lower division clerks in the department they have not been given the benefit provided under the Government Order No. 3868-F dated 31.3.1984. In the said Government Order it was ordered, inter alia, that members of the Lower Division Clerical cadre will be entitled to promotion to the Upper Division Clerical cadre on the ratio of 1 : 1 and the order was applicable to Lower Division Clerks/ Assistants in all Government Departments and Directorates including the Directorate of Dairy Development. The further grievance of the writ petitioners was that they were denied the benefit of promotion and consequent financial benefits envisaged under the aforementioned Government order merely for the reason that designation of the posts held by them was clerk-cum-cash collector and not Lower Division Clerk/Assistant. It was the case of the petitioners that the duties discharged by them are similar to those of the Lower Division Assistants and in addition to such duties they also do the work of collection of cash. Therefore, there was no justification, to deny them the benefits of the aforementioned Government order. The petitioners sought the following reliefs in the writ petition :
(a) A writ in the nature of Mandamus do issue directing the respondents and each one of them to show cause as to why the incumbents in the post of Clerk-cum-Cash Collector including the petitioners under the Directorate of Dairy Development, Government of West Bengal should not be taken into account in the preparation of common seniority List amongst the Lower Division Clerical Cadre under the said Directorate.
(b) A writ in the nature of Mandamus do issue directing the respondents and each one of them to act in accordance with law and to promote the Lower Division Clerical Cadre to the Upper Division Clerical Cadre in terms of the Government order dated 31.3.1984 being No. 3868-F in terms of the common seniority list prepared in accordance with law taking the petitioners into account.
(c) A writ in the nature of Mandamus do issue directing the respondents and each one of them to show cause as to why the posts of Clerk-cum-Cash Collectors should not be considered as belonging to the Lower Division Clerical Cadre under the Directorate of Dairy Development, Government of West Bengal.
(d) Rule Nisi be made absolute if the respondents fail to show adequate cause.
(e) An order of injunction do issue restraining the respondents, particularly the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 from giving effect or any further effect to the Government order dated 31.3.1984 being No. 3868F issued by the Assistant Secretary, Department of Finance till a common seniority list in the Lower Division Clerical Cadre under the Directorate of Dairy Development, Government of West Bengal is prepared taking the posts of Clerk-cum-Cash Collector as constituent of the said Cadre.
(f) Direction be given upon the respondents to prepare the Common seniority and/or Gradation List in the Lower Division Clerical Cadre under the Directorate of Dairy Development taking the posts of Clerks-cum-Cash Collectors as belong to the said cadre and thereaft
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