VERY IMPORTANT POINT
Once the father of the heirs (who have inherited the tenancy rights) had availed of the benefit of proviso to Section 12(3) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the said benefit was not available to the paid heirs (of deceased statutory tenant) on committing a further (2nd) default in payment of rent.

Headnote:Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961-Sections 2(i), 12(1)(a) and 13(3) Proviso-Definition of tenant to include heirs of statutory tenant-Default in payment of rent by statutory tenant Badri Lal-First Benefit obtained under Section 12(3)-2nd default by heirs of Badri Lal-High Court again giving them benefit of proviso to Section 12(3) and landlord appealed to Supreme Court-Whether heirs of (statutory) tenant can be deprived of benefit of proviso to Section 12(3) if the heirs father from whom they inherited the tenancy rights had availed of the benefit of proviso of Section 12(3)? (Yes)-Appeal allowed -1985(2) SCC 683 relied on and AIR 1987 SC 242 partly overruled-Time granted to vacate on usual undertaking.
       Held : Mr. U.N. Bachhawat, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant urged that under the scheme of the Act proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act confers one time benefit on the tenant and such benefit is not available once the tenant has already availed of such benefit and it is not open to the heirs of the tenant to avail of such benefit for the second time. Learned senior counsel relied upon a decision of this Court in Gian Devi Anand vs. Jeevan Kumar and Others, 1985 (2) SCC 683, in support of this proposition, we find merit in his submission. (Para 4)
       Under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act having regard to the interpretation clauses as noticed hereinbefore, a tenant remains a tenant so long as the tenancy continues. The thrust, in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 12 is upon any accommodation . Default in payment of rent by a tenant, thus, is in respect of any accommodation. A further default would also be in respect of the same accommodation. Sub-section (3) of Section 12 provides for an exception to the general rule contained in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 that in the event a tenant becomes a defaulter he is liable to be evicted. An exemption granted in favour of a tenant in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 12, if read in conjunction with the proviso appended thereto, must be held to be for one time only. Proviso appended to sub-section (3) of Section 12 controls the main provisions. The exemption contained in sub-section (3) of Section 12, thus, is not extended to a tenant who becomes a defaulter for more than once. It matters not whether such default is made by the original tenant or by his successor inasmuch as the successor-in-interest of the original tenant continues to be a tenant within the meaning of the provisions thereof. By reason of death of the original tenant, a new tenancy is not created. A successor-in-interest of a tenant holds his tenancy right subject to rights and obligations of his predecessor. He does not and cannot claim a higher right than his predecessor. It is now well-settled that a person by reason of inheritance or assignment does not derive any better title than his predecessor, and, thus, the right which the original tenant did not possess cannot be passed on to his successor. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the view that once the father of the respondents had availed of the benefit of proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act, the said benefit was not available to the respondent-tenants on committing a further default in payment of rent. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that A.S. Sulochana s case (supra) is not applicable in the instant case having been rendered under a different statute wherein the right of the landlord to file a suit for eviction was, as indicated hereinbefore, subject to the conditions mentioned therein. We, however, do not subscribe to the general observations made in A.S. Sulachana s case (supra) and to the said extent, it cannot be held to have laid down a good law and is overruled accordingly. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal deserves to be allowed. We, accordingly, set aside the judgment under challenge and restore the decree passed by the trial court. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. After the order was dictated, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent stated that in the event the respondent is required to vacate the premises immediately, he shall be put to great hardship and, therefore, some time may be granted to him to vacate the premises. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant-landlord has no objection for the prayer being granted. We, therefore, direct that the respondent herein shall not be evicted from the premises in dispute till 31st August, 2003 provided the respondent files an undertaking before this Court within four weeks from today. In the event the said undertaking is not filed, this part of the order shall stand automatically vacated and it will be open to the appellant-landlord to execute the decree forthwith. (Paras 14 to 18)

ORDER

The short question that arises for consideration in this case is as to whether the heirs of a tenant can be deprived of the benefit of proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short "the Act") if the heirs father from whom they inherited the tenancy rights had availed of the benefit of proviso of sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act. This question arises in the following factual background.

2. It is not disputed that the appellant herein is the landlord of a shop in the town Neemuch. As far back as in the year 1960, one Badri Lal, father of respondents took the aforesaid shop on rent at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month. It appears that Badri Lal committed default in payment of arrears of rent with the result that the appellant herein brought a suit for eviction on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent. However, father of the respondents claimed benefit of proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act and deposited the arrears of rent. For this reason, the decree for eviction could not be passed against Badri Lal. It appears subsequently Badri Lal died and the respondents herein being the heirs of Badri Lal inherited the statutory tenancy and they became tenant of the said accommodation of which Badri Lal was a tenant. It appears that the respondents also committed default in payment of rent. The appellant herein brought a suit for eviction of the respondents, inter alia, on the ground of bonafide need of the disputed shop as well as on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent. The suit was decreed on both the grounds, and the first appellate court affirmed the trial court s decree. However, the High Court, in a second appeal, set aside the judgment of courts below. Consequently, the suit stood dismissed. It is against the said judgment, the appellant-landlord is in appeal before us.

3. We have heard the learned senior counsel for the parties.

4. Mr. U.N. Bachhawat, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant urged that under the scheme of the Act proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act confers one time benefit on the tenant and such benefit is not available once the tenant has already availed of such benefit and it is not open to the heirs of the tenant to avail of such benefit for the second time. Learned senior counsel relied upon a decision of this Court in Gian Devi Anand vs. Jeevan Kumar and Others, 1985 (2) SCC 683, in support of this proposition. We find merit in his submission.

5. Mr. S.K. Gambhir, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No. 1, on the other hand urged that the Rent Act is a legislation for the benefit of the tenant and, therefore, the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act should be interpreted in such a manner in which the benefit must go to the tenant. According to him, the benefit is available to the individual tenant despite the fact that this benefit has already been availed of by his predecessor-in-interest.

6. Section 2(i) defines tenant which runs as follows:

"tenant" means a person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any accommodation is, or, but for a contract express or implied, would be payable for any accommodation and includes any person occupying the accommodation as a sub-tenant and also any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy whether before or after the commencement of this Act; but shall not include any person against whom any order or decree for eviction has been made."

7. Sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act reads as under:

"12. Restrictions on eviction of tenants.-(1)......

xx xx xx xx xx

(3) No order for the eviction of a tenant shall be made on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1), if the tenant makes payment or deposit as required by section 13:

Provided that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit under this sub-section if, having obtained such benefit once in re

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2003 Supreme(SC) 214

Cases Referred (4)