Delhi Development Authority vs Vijaya C. Gurshaney With Nanak Chand

Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

2003 Supreme(SC) 808

2003(6) Supreme 274
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Delhi High Court)
S.N. Variava & H.K. Sema, JJ.
Delhi Development Authority - Petitioner
versus
Mrs. Vijaya C. Gurshaney & Anr. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1995
With
Civil Appeal No. 5424 of 1999
Decided on 26-8-2003
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Mukul Rohtagi, Additional Solicitor General, V.B. Saharya, Advocates for M/s Saharya & Co., Advocates.
For the Respondents : P.N. Ramalingam, Nikhil Nayyar, Ms. Lalita Kohli, Anubhav Kumar, Advocates for M/s Manoj Swarup and Co. Advocates.

Headnote:Transfer of Property Act, 1882-Perpetual lease deed of plot purchased in public auction held by appellant-Respondent applied for mutation of plot in her name on basis of letters of administration obtained on a Will executed by lessee in her favour-Appellant required respondent to pay 50% of unearned increase as per terms of perpetual lease deed as transfer was not in favour of blood relation-High Court allowed writ of respondent for a direction for mutation of property on basis of letters of administration-Appeal-High Court failed to advert to terms and conditions stipulated in perpetual lease deed and impugned order did not refer to relevant issues-Terms of lease provided that lessee could not sell, transfer or part with possession of whole or part of property except in certain conditions-Respondent had failed to comply with any of those conditions-Impugned judgment being contrary to terms and conditions of lease was unsustainable.
       Held : In this case the alleged will is executed on 26th October, 1977. Ram Dhan died on 18th September, 1978. Letters of Administration were granted on 7th May, 1980. Admittedly, the respondent is not related to the deceased - Ram Dhan. The High Court clearly erred in holding that merely because Letters of Administration are granted the appellants cannot inquire into the true nature of the transaction. It is settled law that a Testamentary Court, whilst granting Probate or Letters of Administration does not even consider particularly in uncontested matters, the motive behind execution of a testamentary instrument. A Testamentary court is only concerned with finding out whether or not the testator executed the testamentary instrument of his free will. It is settled law that the grant of a Probate or Letters of Administration does not confer title to property. They merely enable administration of the estate of the deceased. Thus, it is always open to a person to dispute title even though probate or Letters of Administration have been granted. (Para 8)
       Further held : Furthermore, clause 4, 5 and 8 of the lease deed, as extracted, envisage that the lessee cannot sell, transfer or part with the possession of the whole or any part of the commercial plot except with the previous consent of the lessor in writing, with a rider that the lessor can refuse the transfer. It is also provided in proviso to clause 4(b) that in the event of sale or foreclosure of the mortgaged or charged property, the lessor shall be entitled to claim and recover the 50% of unearned increase in the value of the plot. It is further provided in clause 8 that in the event title of lessee in the plot is transferred in any manner whatsoever the transferor and the transferee shall within three months of the transfer give notice of such transfer in writing to the lessor. The respondent herein has not complied with any of the conditions stipulated in the lease agreement and, therefore, it was within the competence of DDA to invoke the terms and conditions stipulated in the lease agreement by charging 50% of unearned increase in the value of the plot. The letters dated 19-6-1992 and 17-9-1992, impugned in the Writ Petition before the High Court, were in the terms of invoking of clauses 4, 5 and 8 of the lease agreement and policy decision and guidelines of DDA as noticed above. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court runs contrary to the terms and conditions stipulated in the lease agreement and the same is unsustainable. It is accordingly set aside. (Para 11)

JUDGMENT

Sema, J.-These two appeals are being disposed of by a common judgment. Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1995 has been preferred against the judgment dated 10-5-1994 passed by the High Court in C.W.P. No. 3696 of 1992 and Civil Appeal No. 5424 of 1999 is preferred against the order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, dated 1-4-1998 passed in Revision Petition No. 933 of 1997. Since the facts of both the appeals are identical, we are taking the facts from Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1995.

2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts leading to the filing of the present appeal arises under the following circumstances:-

One Ram Dhan (since deceased) had purchased a plot No. D-3, Community Centre, Narayana, in the public auction held by the Delhi Development Authority (hereinafter the DDA ) on 25-5-1969. The perpetual lease deed of the plot was executed between Ram Dhan and the President of India on 17-2-1972. On 18-9-1972, Ram Dhan died without any construction on the plot. The respondent herein - Mrs. Vijaya C. Gurshaney, seems to have applied for grant of Letters of Administration to the District Judge, Delhi, on the strength of a Will, said to have been executed by Ram Dhan on 26-10-1977 in her favour. It appears that the District Judge granted Letters of Administration on 7-5-1980. Thereafter, the respondent had applied to DDA for substitution of her name in place of deceased Ram Dhan. DDA issued show cause notice for non-construction on plot within the specified time, which was replied by the respondent by her letter dated 11-12-1982 requesting DDA for mutation of her name in place of Ram Dhan on the strength of the alleged Will, whereupon DDA asked the respondent to produce the relevant documents for further consideration. DDA by its letter dated 12-8-1985 asked the respondent to pay 50% of unearned increase as per terms and conditions stipulated in the perpetual lease deed as the transfer was not in favour of blood relation of Ram Dhan, whereupon the respondent seems to have agreed to pay 50% of unearned increase to DDA. DDA, thereafter, by its letter dated 19-6-1992 asked the respondent to pay Rs. 6,51,020/- towards 50% of unearned increase in the value of property. By another letter dated 17-9-1992, DDA demanded payment of the aforesaid amount failing which would result in cancellation of the lease. Aggrieved by the aforesaid two letters, the respondent filed a Writ Petition, inter-alia, for quashing of the aforesaid letters. The respondent further sought a direction that the plot be transferred in her name without payment of any unearned increase and that the mutation be made in the records of DDA. Alternatively, the respondent prayed that in case the respondent is liable to pay 50% of unearned increase it should be calculated on the basis of the value or the rate of land prevalent as on 13-5-1980 when the respondent applied for transfer of the leasehold rights of the plot in her favour. The High Court, on hearing the parties, came to the conclusion that since the petitioner (respondent herein) had obtained the Letters of Administration in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the question as to what considerations prevailed upon the deceased Ram Dhan to bequeath his plot to the respondent herein is irrelevant. The High Court was of the view that the moment the Administrator grants Letters of Administration on the basis of a Will the respondent is entitled to all the rights the deceased had vested in him at the time of his death. The High Court further held that the grant of Letters of Administration is a judgment in-rem and a conclusive proof of the existence and genuineness of the Will and its effect cannot be nullified except by proceedings for revocation of the Letters of Administration.

3. Parties are heard at length. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned ASG appeared on behalf of the appellant. Mr. Nikhil Nayyar, learned counsel appeared on behalf of the respondent

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