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2003 Supreme(SC) 1191

2003(8) Supreme 597
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Orissa High Court)
R.C. Lahoti & Ashok Bhan, JJ.
Amrendra Pratap Singh -Appellant
versus
Tej Bahadur Prajapati & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 11483 of 1996
Decided on 21-11-2003
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : V.K.S. Chaudhry, Sr. Advocate, Vivek Raj Singh, Prakash Kr. Singh and A.S. Pundir, Advocates.
For the Respondents : Anoop G. Choudhary, Sr. Advocate, Suresh C. Gupta, Anil Hooda, Guneshwar, Kaushal Yadav, Ranbir Singh Yadav, Advocates.

IMPORTANT POINT
Acquisition of title in favour of a non-trial by invoking the Doctrine of Adverse Possession over the immovable property belonging to a tribal, is prohibited by law and cannot be countenanced by the Court.

Headnote:Constitution of India-Article 244 -Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property (By Scheduled Tribes) Regulations, 1956-Regulations 2, 3, 3A, Para 7D as inserted by Orissa Regulation No. 1/1975-Orissa Merged States (Laws) Act, 1950-Limitation Act, 1963-Article 65, Section 27-Adverse possession-Plea of-Suit property consisting of a piece of agricultural land belonging to persons of a scheduled tribe State of Orissa-Transfer of land in favour of plaintiff not belonging to Scheduled Tribe-Defendants purchased adjoining land from original holders and constructed buildings-Defendants encroached upon some portion of land belonging to plaintiff respondent-Disputes between parties-Defendants denying title of plaintiffs while pleading their title by adverse possession over the suit land-Meaning of transfer of immovable property -Whether acquisition of title in favour of a non tribal by invoking doctrine of adverse possession over immovable property belonging to a tribal, prohibited by law-(Yes).

       Held : The nature of the property, the nature of title vesting in the rightful owner, the king of possession which the adverse possessor is exercising, are all relevant factors which enter into consideration for attracting applicability of the Doctrine of Adverse Possession. The right in the property ought to be one which is alienable and is capable of being acquired by the competitor. Adverse possession operates on an alienable right. The right stands alienated by operation of law, for it was capable of being alienated voluntarily and is sought to be recognized by doctrine of adverse possession as having been alienated involuntarily, by default and inaction on the part of the rightful claimant, who knows actually or constructively of the wrongful acts of the competitor and yet sits idle. Such inaction or default in taking care of one s own rights over property is also capable of being called a manner of dealing with one s property which results in extinguishing one s title in property and vesting the same in the wrong doer in possession of property and thus amounts to transfer of immovable property in the wider sense assignable in the context of social welfare legislation enacted with the object of protecting a weaker section. (Para 22)

       In the land, the ultimate ownership vests in the State on the principle of eminent domain. Tribals are conferred with a right to hold land, which right is inalienable in favour of non-tribals. It is clear that the law does not permit a right in immovable property vesting in a tribal to be transferred in favour of or acquired by a non-tribal, unless permitted by the previous sanction of a competent authority. The definition of transfer of immovable property has been coined in the widest possible terms. The definition makes a reference to all known modes of transferring right, title and interest in immovable property and to make the definition exhaustive, conspicuously employs the expression - "any other dealing with such property", which would embrace within its sweep any other mode having an impact on right, title or interest of the holder, causing it to cease in one and vest or accrue in another. The use of the word dealing is suggestive of the legislative intent that not only a transfer as such but any dealing with such property (though such dealing may not, in law, amount to transfer), is sought to be included within the meaning of the expression. Such dealing may be a voluntary act on the part of the tribal or may amount to a dealing because of the default or inaction of the tribal as a result of his ignorance, poverty or backwardness, which shall be presumed to have existed when the property of the tribal is taken possession of or otherwise appropriated or sought to be appropriated by a non-tribal. In other words, a default or inaction on the part of a tribal which results in deprivation or deterioration of his rights over immovable property would amount to dealing by him with such property, and hence a transfer of immovable property. It is so because a tribal is considered by the legislature not to be capable of protecting his own immovable property. A provision has been made by para 3A of the 1956 Regulations for evicting any unauthorized occupant, by way of trespass or otherwise, of any immovable property of the member of the Scheduled Tribe, the steps in regard to which may be taken by the tribal or by any person interested therein or even suo motu by the competent authority. The concept of locus standi loses its significance. The State is the custodian and trustee of the immovable propery of tribals and is enjoined to see that the tribal remains in possession of such property . No period of limitation is prescribed by para 3A. The prescription of the period of 12 years in Article 65 of the Limitation Act becomes irrelevant so far as the immovable property of a tribal is concerned. The tribal need not file a civil suit which will be governed by law of limitation; it is enough if he or anyone on his behalf moves the State or the State itself moves into action to protect him and restores his property to him. To such an action neither Article 65 of Limitation Act nor Section 27 thereof would be attracted. (Para 24)

       The period upto 6.4.1964, during which the land belonged to the tribals, has to be excluded from calculating the period of limitation. Undoubtedly on 7.4.1964 the land having been sold by a tribal to a non-tribal with the previous permission of the sub-divisional officer, the possession of defendant-respondent No. 1 over the land on and from that date shall be treated as hostile. In the suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant in the year 1970 the period of limitation shall have to be calculated by reference to Article 65 of the Limitation Act. By that time only a period of 6 years i.e. between 1964 and 1970 had elapsed. The suit was not barred by limitation. (Para 26)

       

JUDGMENT

R.C. Lahoti, J.-The suit property consists of a piece of agricultural land situated in Sundergarh area of Mouza Durgapur, Rourkela. Prior to the year 1962, the property belonged to Chand Oram and Pera Oram. Both of them belong to oraon tribe, which is a scheduled tribe in the State of Orissa as notified vide the Constitution Schedule Tribe Order, 1950 issued in exercise of the power conferred by clause (1) of Article 342 of the Constitution of India. On 21.12.1962 Chand and Pera transferred their right and interest in 0.75 decimals of land in favour of one Mangal Singh Manki. The said Mangal Singh Manki was also a person belonging to a scheduled tribe. Mangal Singh Manki, after obtaining the permission of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Pamposh, sold 0.40 decimals of land by a registered deed of sale dated 7.4.1964 executed in favour of one Ratnamani Mohapatra, and on the same day by another registered deed of sale transferred the remaining 0.35 decimals of land to one Harihar Pradhan. On 6.9.1975 Dr. Amarendra Pratap Singh, the plaintiff-appellant purchased 0.195 decimals of land out of 0.40 decimals from Ratnamani Mohapatra. It is this land purchased by the plaintiff-respondent which forms the subject-matter of dispute. This land belonging to the plaintiff has come to be numbered as plot No. 1147/1.

2. According to the plaintiff he raised construction in the year 1965 over 0.05 decimal area out of the land purchased by him. When he proposed to raise construction over the remaining area, he was obstructed in doing so by Harihar Pradhan, the owner of the adjoining land, whereupon the plaintiff got in touch with his predecessor in-title Smt. Ratnamani Mohapatra. It was detected that in the map attached with the Sale Deed dated 6.9.1965 there was some error in description of the land forming the subject-matter of sale. Smt. Ratnamani Mohapatra executed a deed of rectification dated 31.8.1968 in favour of the plaintiff-appellant, after having the land demarcated by Amin.

3. During the course of demarcation proceedings it was found that the defendant-respondent No.1 had also purchased some land under a registered deed of sale dated 25.4.1967 from Chand and Pera and constructed two buildings thereon. However, the defendant-respondent No. 1 who had purchased land plot No. 1119 (new plot No. 957), had also encroached upon some portion of land of plot No. 1147 (new plot No. 956) belonging to the plaintiff-appellant.

4. The dispute between the parties led to the initiation of proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the year 1970 the plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for declaration of title, recovery of possession and issuance of permanent preventive injunction against the defendants. The defendant Nos.1 to 3, who are the principal contesting defendants, denied the title of the plaintiff and pleaded their title by way of adverse possession over the suit land. The Trial Court decreed the suit and directed possession over the suit property to be restored to the plaintiff after demolition of the construction of the defendant No. 1 standing on the suit land. The defendant No. 1 preferred an appeal to the High Court. The High Court found the title of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 to be proved but at the same time held that defendant No. 1 to have been in adverse possession over the property for the prescribed statutory period of 12 years, and therefore held the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 not entitled to a decree in the suit. The High Court reversed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and directed the suit to be dismissed. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff has filed this appeal by special leave.

5. On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant the correctness of the finding as to defendant No. 1-respondent being in adverse possession of the property and having perfected his title by being in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the property for a period exceeding 12 years time was seriously disputed, however,









































































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