2004 Supreme(SC) 164

2004(2) Supreme 323
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Karnataka High Court)
Doraiswamy Raju & Arjit Pasayat, JJ.
K. Kunhambu -Appellant
versus
Smt. Chandramma and Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 899-900 of 2004
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 1395-1396 of 2001)
Decided on 10-2-2004
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : P. Krishnamoorthy, Sr. Advocate, Romy Chacko, Advocate.
For the Respondents : V.R. Reddy, Sr. Advocate, P.R. Ramasesh and Sanjay R. Hegde, Advocates.

IMPORTANT POINT
When the lands in question were let only for running a Saw Mill and the same was not for any purposes related to Agriculture or for cultivation, grant of occupancy rights under Section 45 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, in respect of the lands, held unjustified.

Headnote:Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961-Sections 2(A)(18), (34), 45 and 48A-Occupancy Rights-Claim of-Lease of land for purpose of running a Saw Mill-In the Lease Deed executed in favour of appellant, it has been specifically stated that purpose of lease of land in dispute was for running a Saw Mill-Conspicuous omission or any mention to permit cultivation of any portion of land in dispute by the lessee-One of the clauses stipulated that the lessees are liable to keep Coconut Trees in leasehold property in proper condition and use only the usufructs of the trees-Rent fixed also was a monthly rental-Appellant filed Form No.7 Application under Section 48A before Taluk Land Tribunal, for grant of occupancy rights-Tribunal granted occupancy rights in their favour holding that claimants were in lawful possession and cultivation of said lands as on 1-3-1974-First respondent, owner of lands filed Writ Petition challenging the orders-Whether the lands in question fall within the definition of land in Land Reforms Act-(No)-Exclusive user of land for non-agricultural purposes has inevitable consequence of excluding such land from purview of very definition of land .

       Held : The lands were let only for running a Saw Mill and the other terms and conditions also per se would indicate at any rate that the same was not for any purposes related to Agriculture or for cultivation. After the appellant purchased the Saw Mill as a going concern also, under yet another Registered Lease Deed dated 12.9.1969 the appellant obtained the lease once again for running the Saw Mill in that place under the name and style of Gokulam Industries and Saw Mill . It is common knowledge and even judicial notice to some extent can also be taken of the fact that the Saw Mill requires vast extent as appurtenant area also besides the actual mill building for stacking wood and timer etc. before and after sawing. The relevant clauses in this lease deed as well, and the fact that monthly rental was alone stipulated - not annual or to be payable in kind or a share of the produce, go to establish that the purpose of the lease was merely commercial and industrial and not agricultural or even for any cultivation. Instead of usual assessment to land revenue, the lands were also found to have been subjected only to Municipal Property Tax. A solitary extract which appears to have been produced relating to one year - 1969 showing the raising of Paddy on an extent of 1-58 acres in Survey No. 70/8 and 1 acre 24 cents in Survey No. 70/1 without any permission of the owner and that too in contravention of the lease cannot by any means be considered either relevant or reasonably sufficient to characterize or treat the land or the lease to be for cultivation or agricultural purposes. The varying and nebulous stand projected as to alleged cultivation through 2nd respondent also would belie their claims to be more borne out of desperateness to grab the land rather than to be real. The consistent and overwhelming material disclosing the continuous use of the land at all times for running the Saw Mill notwithstanding a baseless or alleged winding up and closure of Saw Mill business, found to be false and incorrect and absence of any concrete material to show actual and regular or continuous personal cultivation confirms the position that the lands in question were all throughout being put to non-agricultural purposes only for decades and that the claims on behalf of the appellant to the contrary have been rightly rejected by the High Court. (Para 7)

       That apart, it could be seen from the definition of Land in the Act that though it comprehends in the first part land actually cultivated or cultivable, the later exclusionary part of the definition, "but does not include house site or land used exclusively for non-agricultural purposes" makes it abundantly clear that the actual and exclusive user for non-agricultural purposes, even the land otherwise cultivable or capable of being used for any purposes related to agriculture as enumerated therein, would stand excluded and fall outside the purview of the said definition in Section 2(A)(18) of the Act. When the land in question is itself not land as defined for the purposes of the Act, there is no scope or room for falling back up on the so called object or aim of the legislation to extend the provisions of the Act to areas specifically left outside it against the express legislative mandate and will, policy and intention. In addition thereto, the facts specifically disclosed and categorically found by the High Court on the basis of the materials on record would equally belie the claim of the appellant being a tenant as defined in Section 2(A)(34) of the Act. (Para 8)