IMPORTANT POINT
It is settled law that appointments made contrary to the rules are merely fortuitous and do not confer benefit of seniority on the appointees over and above the regular/substantive appointees to the service.

JUDGMENT

Arun Kumar, J.-This appeal is directed against a judgment dated 13th July, 1998 of a Division Bench of the High Court dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellants herein challenging a final seniority list issued by the State Government of Bihar whereunder the appellants who are direct recruits to the Bihar Forest Service were shown junior to the private respondents who are promotees in the service. The appellants were appointed as Assistant Conservators of Forests (ACFS) to the Bihar Forest Service (hereinafter called the service ) as direct recruits in pursuance of advertisement issued by the Bihar Public Service Commission on 24th July, 1985 for filling 40 permanent posts of Assistant Conservators of Forests in the service. According to the appellants the process of direct recruitment was completed on 8th June, 1987. However, the appointment orders with respect to the direct recruits were issued only on 14th December, 1987. The appellant state that at the relevant time the cadre strength of the post of Assistant Conservator of Forests was only 172 and the promotees were already occupying more than 50% posts. Their quota being only 50% of the posts. We may note here that it is not in dispute that the quota of promotees and direct recruits was 50% each at the relevant time.

2. It appears that while all the formalities with regard to recruitment of direct recruits were completed by 8th June, 1987, a Departmental Promotion Committee was constituted on 20th June, 1987 to consider candidates for promotion to the posts of Assistant Conservator of Forests from the feeder posts of Range Officers. Other Departmental Promotion Committees for the same purpose were held on 2nd July, 1987 and 17th October, 1987. Two notifications dated 6th October, 1987 and 23rd November, 1987 were issued whereby promotees were appointed to the posts of Assistant Conservator of Forests. The notification regarding appointment of direct recruits was issued only on 14th December, 1987 i.e. after the appointments of the promotees had been notified. This gave an edge to the promotees in the matter of seniority over direct recruits. A tentative seniority list was issued on 7th March, 1989 while the final seniority list showing the appellants who are direct recruits as juniors to the promotees was issued on 24th July, 1989. The appellants challenged this final seniority list by filing a Writ Petition in the High Court. The said Writ Petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court on 3rd April, 1996. In a Special Leave Petition filed against the said judgment this Court by order dated 2nd September, 1996 remanded the matter back to the High Court with a direction that the High Court should give fresh decision after hearing all parties.

3. After the remand order passed by this Court, the petitioners in the writ petition (who are appellants herein) filed an application for amendment of the writ petition on 28th November, 1996 in the High Court. Several points were sought to be raised in the amendment application. The amendment was allowed on 25th May, 1997. None of the parties filed any fresh counter affidavit in reply to the amended writ petition. As a matter of fact no reply was filed to the amendment application by any of the respondents. Ultimately the High Court passed the impugned judgment on 13th July, 1998 dismissing the writ petition. Apart from rejecting the case of the appellants on merits, the High Court has laid much stress on the aspect of delay on the part of the appellants in challenging the promotions of the respondents. In the original writ petition the appellants had not challenged the appointments of the promotees/respondents as such. They had only challenged the final seniority list. Absence of challenge to the appointments of the respondents i.e. promotees in the writ petition is another ground which weighed with the High Court in dismissing the writ petition.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties on thi