1. Complaint under Sections 498A, 406 IPC and Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act filed; jurisdiction challenge to quash proceedings when cause of action arose outside the court's jurisdiction. (Para 2 , 3 )
Back
Next 
2004 Supreme(SC) 884
2004(6) Supreme 207
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Madras High Court)
Arijit Pasayat and C.K. Thakker, JJ.
Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. -Appellants
versus
Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr. -Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 904 of 2004
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4573/2003)
Decided on 17-8-2004
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, Sr. Advocate, T.G. Narayanan Nair, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Subramonium Prasad, S. Nanda Kumar, M. Yogesh Kanna, Anuj Kumar and Rakesh K. Sharma, Advocates.
IMPORTANT POINT
Ordinary venue for trial of a crime is the area of jurisdiction in which, on evidence, facts occur and which alleged to constitute the crime.
Headnote:Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-Sections 177 and 178-Cognizance of offences u/s 498-A and 406 IPC by Magistrate in complaint case-Petition to quash complaint and proceedings that concerned Magistrate had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain complaint-Venue and place of trial-Ordinary venue for trial of crime is the area in which, on the evidence, facts occur which alleged to constitute crime-Continuing offence as distinguishable to one which is committed once for all-Complainant left house of accused husband on account of alleged dowry demands-No allegation of any demand or commission of any act constituting offence at Chennai-Logic of Section 178(c) Cr.P.C. relating to continuance of offence could not be applied-No cause of action arose within jurisdiction of Court where complaint was filed-Expression "cause of action"-Concerned Magistrate at Chennai had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter-Proceedings were liable to be quashed and complaint to be returned to be filed in appropriate Court if so chosen. (Paras 10 to 12, 16 and 20)
Legal Category Hierarchy
- crime and sentencing
-
practice and procedure
- criminal procedure
Table of Contents
2. Appellants contend no cause of action arose, so court lacked jurisdiction; respondent argues offences were continuing under Section 178(c), giving the court jurisdiction. (Para 4 , 6 , 7 )
3. Proceedings quashed, complaint returned to complainant, appeal allowed. (Para 20 )
4. Whether a court can take cognizance of an offence when no part of the cause of action arose within its local jurisdiction?
No. The court held that where no part of the cause of action arose within the local jurisdiction, the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and proceedings must be quashed. (Para 13 , 20 )
5. What constitutes 'cause of action' in criminal proceedings under Section 177 of the Code?
Cause of action is a bundle of facts giving rise to the right to enforce legal inquiry. In criminal cases, it refers to the place where the offence was committed, as per Section 177 of the Code. (Para 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 )
6. Can continuing offences be tried in a court where the cause of action partially arose elsewhere, under Section 178(c)?
Yes. Where an offence is continuing and continues in more than one local area, it may be inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any such local area under Section 178(c) of the Code. (Para 4 , 7 , 9 , 12 )
7. What is the ordinary rule for the place of inquiry and trial under Section 177 of the Code?
Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed, subject to exceptions in Sections 178 to 186 of the Code. (Para 8 , 9 , 11 )
8. Did the High Court err by not adjudicating the jurisdictional question at the preliminary stage under Section 482?
Yes. The High Court erred by not considering rival stands on jurisdiction and not recording findings, instead deferring the legal parameters to post-trial adjudication under Section 482 of the Code. (Para 5 , 6 )
JUDGMENT
Arijit Pasayat, J.-Leave granted.
2. Appellants call in question legality of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court whereby the appellants prayer for quashing proceedings in CC 3532 of 2001 on the file of the Court of XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate Saidapet, Chennai, by exercise of powers under-Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the Code ) was rejected. Background facts sans unnecessary details are as follows:
3. Respondent No.2 as complainant filed complaint in the Court of the concerned magistrate alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the IPC ) and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (in short the Dowry Act ). The magistrate directed the police to investigate and after investigation charge-sheet was filed by the police. When the matter stood thus, the appellants filed an application under Section 482 of the Code before the High Court alleging that the concerned magistrate has no jurisdiction even to entertain the complaint even if the allegations contained therein are accepted in toto. According to them, no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court. The complaint itself disclosed that after 15.4.1997, the respondent left Nagercoil and came to Chennai and was staying there. All the allegations which are per se without any basis took place according to the complainant at Nagercoil, and therefore, the Courts at Chennai did not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. It was further submitted that earlier a complaint was lodged by the complainant before the concerned police officials having jurisdiction; but after inquiry no action was deemed necessary.
4. In response, learned counsel submitted that some of the offences were continuing offences. The appellant No.1 had initiated proceedings for judicial separation, the notice for which was received by her at Chennai and, therefore, the cause of action existed.
5. The High Court unfortunately did not consider rival stands and even did not record any finding on the question of law raised regarding lack of jurisdiction. It felt that legal parameters were to be considered after a thorough trial after due opportunity to the parties and, therefore, the factual points raised by parties were not to be adjudicated under Section 484 of the Code.
6. In support of the appeal Mr. T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, learned senior counsel, submitted that the approach of the High Court is clearly erroneous. A bare reading of the complaint would go to show that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Court where the complaint was filed. Therefore, the entire proceedings had no foundation.
7. In response, learned counsel for respondent No.2-complainant submitted that the offences were continuing in terms of Section 178(c) of the Code, and therefore. The Court had the jurisdiction to deal with the matter.
8. Section 177 of the Code deals with the ordinary place of inquiry and trial, and reads as follows:
"Section 177 : ORDINARY PLACE OF INQUIRY AND TRIAL:
Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed."
9. Sections 177 to 186 deal with venue and place of trial. Section 177 reiterates the well-established common law rule referred to in Halsbury s Laws of England (Vol. IX para 83) that the proper and ordinary venue for the trial of a crime is the area of jurisdiction in which, on the evidence, the facts occur and which alleged to constitute the crime. There are several exceptions to this general rule and some of them are, so far as the present case is concerned, indicated in Section 178 of the Code which read as follows:
"Section 178: PLACE OF INQUIRY OR TRIAL
(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or
(b) where an offence is committed partly in one loca
