IMPORTANT POINT
Technical objections should not come in doing full and complete justice between parties.

JUDGMENT

Thakker, J.-Leave granted.

2. The appellant herein being aggrieved by the order passed by the District Judge, Davangere on 24th August, 2002 in Misc. Case No. 32 of 2000 rejecting the applications of the appellant and confirmed by the High Court on 4th February, 2003 in Civil Revision No. 4523 of 2002 has approached this Court.

3. The case of the appellant is that his father made an application for grant of land under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The respondent also made a similar application for the grant of the same land. By an order dated July 12, 1990, the Tehsildar rejected the application of the father of the appellant and allowed the claim of the respondent. The father of the appellant, therefore, preferred an appeal being Misc. Appeal No. 51 of 1990 in the Court of District Judge, Shimoga. The appeal was pending. During the pendency of the appeal, the father of the appellant expired on June 13, 1994. The appellant was not aware about the pendency of Misc. Appeal No. 51 of 1990 in the Court of District Judge, Shimoga. In September, 1994, the appellant received a letter from the advocate engaged by his father appearing in appeal that the appeal had come up for hearing. Immediately, therefore, the appellant contacted the advocate and informed him about the death of his (appellant s) father. An application was made on December 20, 1994 under Order 22, Rule 3 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code ) by the appellant and his brothers for bringing them on record as legal representatives of deceased Hanumanthappa. In the affidavit to the said application, it was stated by the appellant that he came to know about the pendency of the appeal through the counsel only when the appellant received a letter from him. It was also stated that if the application would not be allowed, great hardship, inconvenience and loss would be caused to the appellant.

4. The learned District Judge, however, rejected the application on April 8, 1996 holding that the application filed by the appellant was time barred and no prayer for setting aside abatement had been made nor an application for condonation of delay was filed and hence the application was liable to be rejected.

5. The appellants, hence, again made applications in 1996 for setting aside abatement, condonation of delay and bringing heirs or deceased Hanumanthappa on record but the Court rejected the prayers by an order dated August 24, 2002.

6. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred Civil Revision Petition before the High Court and by a cryptic order, the High Court rejected the petition observing that no grounds were made out by the petitioner to admit the revision. The said order is challenged in the present appeal.

7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that too technical view has been taken by the District Court in rejecting the applications for bringing the appellant and his brothers on record, setting aside the abatement and refusing to condone delay. It was submitted that the appellant was not aware about the pendency of appeal instituted by his father in the District Court. It was only when the advocate engaged by his father addressed a letter that the appellant came to know about the pendency of appeal. Immediately, therefore, the appellant contacted the advocate and filed an application by invoking the provisions of Order 22, Rule 3 as also Section 151 of the Code. By considering the facts and circumstances, particularly, unawareness on the part of the appellant about the pendency of appeal, the District Court ought to have granted the prayer by substituting the appellant and his brothers as heirs and legal representatives of the deceased on record and disposed of the appeal on merits. In not doing so, an error of law as well as of jurisdiction has been committed by the Court. I