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2004 Supreme(SC) 1036

2004(6) Supreme 546
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Allahabad High Court)
Arijit Pasayat and Prakash Prabhakar Naolekar, JJ.
Smt. Sudha Rani Garg -Appellant
versus
Sri Jagdish Kumar (Dead) and Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 4963 of 2000
Decided on 8-9-2004
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : A.K. Sanghi, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Gaurav Jain and Ms. Abha Rani Jain, Advocates.

Headnote:Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972-Section 2(2)-Eviction suit on plea that provisions of Rent Act were not applicable as assessment in respect of building came into effect from 1-4-1983 and suit filed on 21-8-1992 was in 10 years-Trial Court accepted tenants plea that 1st assessment indicated as "Q September 1982" and thus date of construction of building was to be taken as 1-7-1982 and dismissed suit-Revisional Court reversed the judgment and High Court confirmed Revisional Court s view-Appeal-Four different dates for determining the date of completion of building-Deeming provision-1st assessment came into effect from 1-4-1983 and it recorded Q Sept., 1982-High Court judgment confirming Revisional Court s order was in order and needed no interference.

       Held : It is not in dispute that the first assessment came into effect from 1.4.1983 and in the relevant column relating to enhancement or reduction of the tax "Q September 1982" is recorded. According to learned counsel for the appellant it means that the completion of the shop has been recorded by the local authority on 1.7.1982. The plea is clearly untenable. A quarter is a period of time, covering in the instant case from 1st July 1982 to 30th September, 1982. It only shows that when assessment was made, construction was completed earlier sometime in the third quarter of September 1982. The quarter started from 1st July, 1982. It cannot mean that the construction of the building was completed by the date. The date of completion of construction can be any date falling between two terminals i.e. 1st July, 1982 to 30th September, 1982. The hypothetical presumption that the first date of the quarter being 1st July 1982 it shall be deemed to be the date of completion of construction has no basis. In case the first three dates are available then the modality for working out the date of completion is provided in the Explanation. As the records go to show, the first assessment came into effect on 1.4.1983. That is the third date provided in the Explanation. Above being the position, the High Court s judgment confirming the Revisional Court s order is in order and needs no interference. (Paras 16 to 18)

       

JUDGMENT

Arijit Pasayat, J.-The tenant is in appeal against the judgment of learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court. It was held by the High Court that the suit filed by respondents 1 to 5 in this appeal (Respondents 3 to 7 before the High Court) has been rightly decreed by the Revisional Court, as the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent, and Eviction) Act, 1972 (in short the Act ) was not applicable to the case.

2. The respondents 1 to 5 filed a suit for ejectment giving notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, (in short the T.P. Act ). The ground set out in the suit was that the tenancy was at will and provisions of the Act being not applicable, the tenant was liable for eviction. The only issue which was taken up by the trial court related to applicability of the Act. Evidence was led. According to the respondents 1 to 5 as the assessment in respect of the building came into effect from 1.4.1983, and the suit was filed on 21.8.1992 the ten years period stipulated in Section 2(2) of the Act had no application, thereby making the Act inapplicable. Tenant on the other hand submitted that in the first assessment of the shop at column 10 it was clearly indicated as "Q September 1982". According to her the date of construction of building has to be taken as 1.7.1982 and, therefore, the period stipulated i.e. 10 years was over. The Trial Court accepted the plea, while Revisional Court reversed it and as noted above the High Court confirmed the Revisional Court s view.

3. In support of the appeal, learned counsel submitted that the Revisional Court and the High Court have not considered the provisions of Section 2(2) in the proper perspective. The burden is on the landlord to prove that the building is exempt from the operation of the Act. There was no specific pleading as to date of construction in the plaint or the date of reporting of the completion of construction. When the assessment clearly indicated that the period was "Q September 1982" the trial Court was right in concluding that the date of completion was 1.7.1982. Though mandated under Section 148, landlords have not reported the date of completion. They cannot be benefited for the lapse.

4. It is submitted that the legislation being a beneficial one the meaning given by the trial Court should have been accepted. It was submitted that in the absence of details which the landlord was to furnish, reference to the Explanation to Section 2(2) as done by the Revisional Court and the High Court has no relevance because the landlord was to prove that he was exempt from the requirements of Section 2(2).

5. In response, learned counsel for the contesting respondents submitted that the Revisional Court and the High Court have taken note of the Explanation correctly and, therefore, there is no infirmity to warrant interference.

6. Section 2(2) of the Act reads as follows:

"2. Exemptions from operation of Act: (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to-

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Except as provided in sub-section (5) of Section 12, sub-section (1-A) of Section 21, sub-section (2) of Section 24, Sections 24-A, 24-B, 24-C or sub-section (3) of Section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed:

Provided that where any building is constructed substantially out of funds obtained by way of loan or advance from the State Government or the Life Insurance Corporation of India or a bank or a co-operative society or the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, and the period of repayment of such loan or advance exceeds the aforesaid period of ten years than the reference in this sub-section to the period of ten years shall be deemed to be a reference to the period of fifteen years or the period ending with the date of actual repayment of each loan or advance (including interest) whichever is shorter.

Explanation I: For the purposes of this sub-section,-

(a)
























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