2004 Supreme(SC) 1454

2004(8) Supreme 280
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Orissa High Court)
N. Santosh Hegde & S.B. Sinha, JJ.
Jaya Chandra Mohapatra -Appellant
versus
Land Acquisition Officer, Rayagada -Respondent
Civil Appeal Nos. 7518-7519 of 2004
[@ S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 17869-17870 of 2003]
Decided on 22-11-2004
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Janaranjan Das, S. Mishra and Ms. Moushumi Gahlot, Advocates.
For the Respondent : Mrs. Kirti Renu Mishra, Advocate.

IMPORTANT POINT
There is no bar in filing applications for review successively if same are otherwise maintainable in law.

Headnote:Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as amended by Amendment Act, 1984)-Sections 23 (1A), 23(2) and 28-Notification u/s 4 of the Act was issued on 10-12-1980 and land was acquired-Award was passed on 13-9-1981-Reference Court enhanced compensation in the application filed by appellant by its order dt. 27-11-1990 but statutory benefits contemplated u/s 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 of the Act were not granted-Appeal against order by State was dismissed by High Court and application by appellant for enhancement of solatium @ 30% was allowed-Appellant filed an application for grant of benefit u/s 28 of the Act and Reference Court allowed it by order dated 30-7-1993 and another application u/s 151, 152 C.P.C. and under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. for review of judgment as regards not grant of benefits u/s 23 (1A) and 23(2) of the Act was also allowed by order dt. 8-10-1996-Order attained finality-Execution-Objections u/s 47 C.P.C. allowed holding that Reference Court had no jurisdiction to amend the decree-Revision dismissed by High Court-Appeal-Benefits under the Act had become available to appellant owner of the land-No bar in review exercised by Reference Court-Principle of estoppel by records came into play-Impugned judgment could not be sustained.

       Held : By reason of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the benefits specified therein became available to the owners of the land if the proceedings in relation to grant of or enhancement of compensation were pending before the Collector or Reference Court between 30.4.1982 to 24.9.1984. It is not in dispute that a proceeding was pending during the aforementioned period. In law, there is no bar in filing applications for review successively if the same are otherwise maintainable in law. The Civil Court herein admittedly had not granted to the Appellant the benefit of solatium at the rate of 30% of the amount of enhanced compensation as also the additional amount and interest as contemplated under the Amending Act of 1984. To the said benefits, the Appellant was entitled to in terms of Section 23(1A), Section 23(2) as also Section 28 of the Act. It is one thing to say that the omission to award additional amount under Section 23(1A), enhanced interest under Section 28 and solatium under Section 23(2) may not amount to clerical or arithmetical mistake in relation whereto an executing court will not be entitled to grant relief but it is another thing to say that the grant thereof would be impermissible in law even if the Reference Court on an appropriate application made in this behalf and upon application of its mind holds that the statutory benefits available to the claimant had not been granted to him and pass an order in that behalf by directing amendment of decree. In a case of former nature, an executing court may not have any jurisdiction to pass such an order on the ground that it cannot go behind the decree, but in law there does not exist any bar on a Reference Court to review its earlier order if there exists an error apparent on the face of the record in terms of Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such a jurisdiction cannot be denied to the Reference Court. The Act 68 of 1984 is a beneficial statute and thus, the benefits arising thereunder cannot ordinarily be denied to a claimant except on strong and cogent reasons. (Paras 7 and 8)

       Furthermore, in this case the aforementioned order dated 8.10.1996 has attained finality by reason whereof the original decree stood amended. The Executing Court in view of the decision in Bai Shakriben (supra) itself could not have gone behind the decree. The Executing Court thus proceeded to pass the impugned judgment on a wrong premise. The Executing Court keeping in view its limited jurisdiction could not have gone into the question as to whether the Reference Court was correct in passing the order dated 8.10.1996 amending the decree or not. The Executing Court did not have any jurisdiction to go into the said question. A decree passed by a competent court of law can be suitably amended. A decree, so amended on an application filed by the claimant for review thereof, becomes final. If the State was aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, it could have taken the matter by filing an appropriate application before the High Court. But keeping in view of the fact that the said order was allowed to attain finality, the court could not have permitted the State to reagitate the said question before the Executing Court by filing an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure or otherwise. In a case of this nature, the principle of estoppel by records shall come into play. (Para 12)