JUDGMENT

BEG, C.J.I. (Minority view):— I am afraid I am unable to concur with the majority view on the case before us which arises out of the publication of a news item in the Times of India newspaper of 7 January, 1978, on which a notice to show cause why proceedings for contempt of Court be not initiated against the Editor of the newspaper was issued. I think that it is a serious matter if persons in the position of those whose names are given in the offending news item as having subscribed to a document containing a vituperous attack upon a particular judgment of this Court reported in Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. S. Shukla. AIR 1976 SC 1207 are really signatories of this document. The attack is primarily irrational and abusive even if it is partially based on ignorance and the rest on misconception. The view of this Court in that case was that the effect of the Presidential Order under Art. 359 of the Constitution considered there was to disable High Courts from investigating questions relating to violation of the fundamental rights to personal liberty, protected by Article 21, in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Article 21 of the Constitution reads as follows:

"Article 21 - No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."

It is clear beyond the shadow of doubt that what this Article protects is a right of every person in India, whether he is an Indian citizen or not, to be dealt with in accordance with law whenever a question of depriving him of his life or personal liberty by executive authorities arises. The law on the view adopted in A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 SCR 88 which was not questioned by anybody before us on this aspect, was statutory law or "lex" and not "just" so far as preventive detention, the very concept of which seems opposed to normal notions of "jus", is concerned. If the enforcement of rights conferred by Art. 21. was suspended investigation of alleged violations of the statutory protections is in abeyance because the guarantee given the Article 21 is itself that of protection by statutory provision only at least as regards preventive detention.

2. The majority view, that the right to obtain a release on a writ of Habeas Corpus against Executive authorities was suspended, meant no more than that the use of Arts. 32 and 226 only was suspended by the President against these authorities. No question arose at all in that case of depriving anyone of life itself without complying with law. On the other hand, the Attorney General repeatedly said there that criminal and civil laws in general and their protection were not suspended at all. Deprivation of life contrary to law was punishable murder or homicide not amounting to murder just as it was before the Presidential Order which made no difference here. Only the use of Articles 32 and 226 to enforce specified fundamental rights against Executive authorities was suspended by the order under Art. 359, In facts, all the judges of this Court held this. Nevertheless, certain interested persons, with motives which could be presumed to be ulterior and unhealthy, have continued to misrepresent to the public that what the majority of Judges of this Court held was that rights to life and liberty themselves were suspended. No judge had held that Speaking for myself. I would be certainly shocked to hear that any judge or Court had or could have, in the twentieth century, possibly held that. All I can say to anyone who claims that any Judge of this Court has so held is to ask him to show me anything which could possibly have this meaning.

3. It may be that some people go on making assertions about judgments of this Court without reading or understanding them. But, the way in which this has been going on as a part of a consistent scheme to malign the Court and its Judges, shows that their intention is to deliberately shake the confidence of the public in this Court. In an