ORDER

1. The dispute in this appeal is if the appellant a manufacturing unit and employing more than twenty persons set up in 1959 was liable to pay Employers Special Contribution under Chapter V-A introduced as "Transitory Provisions" by Amendment Act of 1951 in the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (referred to as ESI Act) for the period 1960 to 1973.

2. Section 73-A added by the Amending Act required an employer to make special contribution of such percentage not exceeding 5% of the total wage bill of the employer as the State Government specified from time to time. According to sub-section (4) of Section 73-A the contribution fell due as soon as the liability of the employer to pay wages accrued and Section 73-D empowered the opposite parties to recover the special contribution payable by the employer as if it were an arrear of land revenue. Chapter V-A remained in force from November 24, 1951 to July 1, 1973. Since the appellants unit was established in 1959 and it had the requisite number of employees the provision of the Act were applicable to it. In January 1976 the respondent issued notice to the appellant that it was covered under the Employees State Insurance Act with effect from January 1, 1960 and as the factory was located in a place where the provisions of the ESI Act had been extended it was required to pay employers special contribution. The appellant denied any obligation to pay any contribution. The opposite party after considering the reply of the appellant informed it by letter dated March 12, 1976 that the appellant was liable to pay special contribution as the factory premises of the appellant were situated in non-implemented area (sic) and that non-compliance of the direction to deposit the money shall force the opposite party to take recovery proceedings in accordance with law. Since the payment was not made and the appellant went on reiterating its stand in the reply to show-cause notice and claimed that no amount was payable, the opposite party initiated proceedings to recover the amount as arrears of land revenue. These proceedings were challenged by way of writ petition which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge in limine. The order was affirmed in appeal as well. The Division Bench held that the claim of the appellant that the provisions of the Act had not been extended to the locality where the appellants mill was situated was without any substance. It found that the appellant did not raise this factual controversy clearly nor it established it affirmatively. Even in this Court no material could be placed to prove that the finding was erroneous.

3. The learned counsel urged that the provisions of the Act having been repealed, in 1973 the opposite parties could not have initiated proceedings in 1976. This submission was raised in the High Court as well. But it was repelled as liability under Chapter V-A having accrued when the Act was in force it was not effected in absence of any provision to the contrary in the repealing Act. The High Court relied on Section 6 of the General Clauses Act in this regard. It provides that where an Act is repealed and unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or law acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. The learned counsel for appellant could not show any provision from which it could be gathered that the provisions in the Act at the time of repeal indicated that the legislature intended otherwise than what is provided in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently urged that the proceedings for recovery were barred by time. He urged that by virtue of Section 29(2) the provision of the Limitation Act applied to Employees State Insurance Corporation Act and, therefore, any suit or proceedings for recovery initiated after three years from the date it became due could not be recovered. The learned counsel, however, could not point out any pr