ORDER

1. The appellant was inducted in 1949 as a tenant on the ground floor admeasuring 408 sq. ft. of the premises known as Bharat Building, at 8, Darya Ganj, Delhi on monthly tenancy at a rent of Rs 15 excluding electricity and water charges. Notice was issued to the appellant determining the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and, therefore, action was initiated under Section 5(1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 for short the Act for eviction of the appellant from unauthorised occupation. The appellant filed Writ Petition No. 2391 of 1983 in the Delhi High Court. The Division Bench summarily dismissed it on October 28, 1983. Thus this appeal, by special leave.

2. Shri R.K. Jain, learned senior counsel for the appellant contends that the respondent-Corporation being a public authority, before initiating the action under Section 5 of the Act, is enjoined to assign reasons which must be just and germane for the purpose of its exercise and its reasonableness must be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. He further contends that unless the public authority justifies its action taken under Section 5(1) of the Act before determining the tenancy under Section 106 of the T. P. Act, it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. We find no force in the contention. This Court in Hari Singh v. Military Estate Officer (1972) 2 SCC 239: (1973) 1 SCR 515 by a Bench of seven Judges upheld its constitutional validity and retrospectivity and held that : (SCR p. 521 : SCC p. 244, para 10)

"The scheme of the 1971 Act is that it confers power on Estate Officer to issue notice to persons who are in unauthorised occupation of any public premises to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made. Unauthorised occupation under the Act in relation to any public premises means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever."

3. Similar contention on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution was raised on the ground that when the Delhi Rent Control Act provides remedy for ejectment on specific grounds and fixity of tenancy rights, giving blanket power to the public authorities under the Act is violative of Article 14. In Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank (1990) 4 SCC 406 this Court by a Constitution Bench, in a slightly different connotation, dealt with the similar contention in paragraphs 68 and 69 of its judgment and held that the scope of the provisions of the Public Premises Act cannot be cut down on the basis of the apprehension that the corporations like the nationalised banks or L.I.C. which are trading corporations and cannot be prescribed from buying the property in possession of the tenants at a low price and then evicting the tenants after terminating the tenancy and selling the property at a much higher value because the value of property in possession of tenants is much less as compared to vacant property. The consequence of giving overriding effect to the provisions of the Public Premises Act is that premises belonging to companies and statutory bodies referred to in clauses (2) and (3) of Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act would be exempted from the provisions of the Rent Control Act. The actions of these companies and statutory bodies while dealing with their properties under the Public Premises Act will not have to be judged by the standard that they would not act as private landlords and their actions would be informed by reason and guided by public interest. Therefore, this Court had negatived the possibility of taking action against the tenants for letting out for higher rent or selling the property at a higher value.

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