ORDER

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal by special leave arises from the decision of a Single Judge of the High Court of Calcutta dated 24-9-1991 in Matter No. 686 of 1991. The first respondent was appointed as a Transport and Handling contractor by the West Bengal State Consumers Federation. Certain differences and disputes arose between them. Consequently, when they approached the Registrar under the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 1983 (for short "the Act"), the Registrar, by his proceedings dated 8-10-1989 appointed an arbitrator to decide the disputes. Since the arbitrator had not decided the reference within one year, as envisaged under Section 96 of the Act, the first respondent approached the High Court under Sections 5, 11 and 12 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for termination of the arbitration and appointment of another arbitrator. After revoking the appointment of the third respondent Devi Prasad Lehari as an arbitrator, the High Court appointed another arbitrator by the impugned order. The learned Single Judge proceeded on the premise that since Section 96 empowers the Registrar to extend time only up to one year to enable an arbitrator to make the award, and the arbitrator had failed to make the award within the extended one year period, the Registrar became functus officio to extend further time. So, the arbitrator was left with no power to make the award. Resultantly, the first respondent was entitled to invoke the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, by operation of Section 46 thereof.

3. The question is whether the view of the High Court is correct and the arbitration proceedings before the third respondent stood abated and whether the civil court has power to terminate his nomination and to appoint in his place another arbitrator?

4. Shri Santosh Hegde, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, contended that the power of the Registrar under Sections 95 and 96 of the Act should be read with the rules made under the Act. Rule 178 empowers the Registrar to withdraw the arbitration proceedings to decide himself or to appoint any other arbitrator, which would indicate that on expiry of the period of one year prescribed under Section 96, the power of the Registrar is not exhausted and the first respondent was not left without any remedy. The provisions of the Arbitration Act would be applicable only when the parties have agreed for such a reference. Since the agreement does not provide for such an option, appointment made under Section 46 of Arbitration Act is illegal. The Act is a special law which provided a complete procedure including right of appeal which is inconsistent with the Arbitration Act. So Section 46 of the Arbitration Act does not apply.

5. It is contended for the respondent that the view of the High Court is sustainable from a reading of the provisions of the Act and the scheme under the Arbitration Act. Though the contract does not expressly empower the appointment of an arbitrator by the civil court under the Arbitration Act, by necessary implication and by operation of Section 46 of the Arbitration Act, the statutory arbitration became operational. The arbitrator appointed by the Registrar having failed to make the award within one year, he became non- , functional. Since the limitation prescribed under Section 96 is mandatory, the Registrar is left with no power to extend further time. The Registrar, thereby, became functus officio. Consequently, the arbitration proceedings before the third respondent stood abated. The party cannot be left without a remedy. The only remedy is as provided under the Arbitration Act.

6. The diverse contentions give rise to the questions: (1) Whether on expiry of the outer limit of one year prescribed under Section 96(5) and (6) of the Act, the Registrar became functus officio to deal with the dispute and consequently the third respondent ceased to have any power to arbitrate the dispute or the said proceedings stood abated? (2) Whether the party is left without