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1994 Supreme(SC) 1273

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
BEFORE K. RAMASWAMY AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.
V. LAKSHMANAN
Versus
B.R. MANGALAGIRI AND OTHERS.
Civil Appeal No. 4542 of 1984 {From the Judgment and Order dated 3-11-1983 of the Madras High Court in A. No. 911 of 1977}
Decided on 13-12-1994
Advocates appeared:
S. Balakrishnan, Advocate, for the Appellant; S. Sivasubramanium, Senior Advocate (S. Srinivasan, Advocate, with him) for the Respondent.

Advocates:
S.BALAKRISHNAN, S.SIVA SUBRAMANIAM, S.SRINIVASA VARMA

Headnote:

Orissa Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1975 - Electricity (Supply) Act, 2003 - Section 78-A - State of Orissa Orissa Act 9 of 1982 – Constitution Of India - Article 12 - Services - Scheduled Tribes - Two appeals require decision of one common question, namely, whether Orissa State Electricity Board, hereinafter Board, was required to comply with requirements of Orissa Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) before Board had resolved to implement provisions of Act in its meeting - This date is material because it is prior to this date that benefit of Act was sought for and allowed by Orissa High Court on being approached by two members of Scheduled Castes who are respondent No. 1 in both appeals, which have been filed by affected service holders of general category and State – Held, Board had started acting in accordance with provisions of Act - Question is whether this course of action can be said to have conferred a right on members of Schedu led Castes/ Scheduled Tribes, so much so. as to get it enforced through a Court of law - As to this, court would observe that fact that provisions of Act were acted upon by Board fell short of provisions of Act having become a condition of services of employees of Board - For this. according to us. a formal decision of Board was required, which as already noted, was taken in the meeting held - Before that date employees were not clothed with any legal right to demand observance of provisions of Act – Court is constrained to hold that impugned judgments of High Court are not sustainable and same are therefore, set aside - It is. however. made clear that if any of Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes employee of Board had been given benefit of provisions of Act even before decision of the Board their services would not be in any way adversely affected because of this judgment of ours and they would continue to enjoy benefits conferred on them – Appeal Allowed.

ORDER

1. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras dated 3-11-1983 made in Appeal No. 911 of 1977. The appellant-plaintiff had entered into an agreement with respondents on 23-8-1972 to purchase their 6 acres 76 cents of the land situated in Bhavani Village for a consideration of Rs 2,75,000 and paid Rs 50,000 as earnest money (stated as advance in the agreement). He undertook to have the sale deed registered within six months i.e. on/or before 23-2-1973. Time is, thereby, the essence of the agreement. The appellant had taken possession of the land and levelled the land and applied for permission for sanction of layout. The Gram Panchayat, Bhavani, refused to grant sanction. Thereafter, the appellant got issued a notice on 20-2-1973, calling upon the respondents to return the earnest money of Rs 50,000 and also Rs 15,000 said to be the expenditure incurred by them towards development which liability was denied by the respondents in their reply notice wherein they also claimed to have forfeited the earnest money for default committed by the appellant in the performance of his part of the agreement. The appellant laid OS No. 108 of 1973 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Erode, on 13-3-1973 which the trial court decreed on 30-4-1977. On appeal, as stated earlier, the High Court reversed the decree and dismissed the suit.

2. It is contended by Shri Balakrishnan, learned counsel for the appellant, that, admittedly, Respondent 3 B.R. Srinivasan was a minor on the date of the agreement of sale. When the appellant orally had asked the 4th respondent/guardian to obtain permission from the Court for effectuating the sale deed, the mother as natural guardian of the 3rd respondent had refused to obtain permission on the ground that it was not necessary to obtain the permission of the Court. When the title was defective, no one would be prepared to purchase the land covered by the agreement of sale and, therefore, the High Court was not right in dismissing the suit of the appellant. It is also contended that the amount of Rs 50,000 being an advance and not an earnest money, the whole amount cannot be forfeited unless the respondents proved that they had suffered damages which is a necessary condition to forfeit the advance amount. That amount only could be forfeited. No evidence was adduced to prove that the respondents had suffered damages. Subsequent sale made by the respondents pending the appeal was only a device adopted to deny the refund of the advance money paid by the appellant. The High Court had committed grievous error of law in allowing the appeal. We find no force in both contentions.

3. The facts of the case and the conduct of the appellant lead us to conclude that the appellant is not justified in seeking to nor is he entitled to recover from the appellants Rs 50,000 paid by him. No doubt in the agreement it was stated that the amount was advance and not earnest money. Earnest money is a part of the purchase price. The nomenclature or label given in the agreement as advance is not either decisive or immutable. The appellant, after he had entered into the agreement, admittedly, had taken possession of the land and levelled the land for the purpose of making it into plots for sale to the third parties, in terms of the agreement. Admittedly, the appellant failed to obtain the sanction of the layout plan as the Gram Panchayat refused to sanction it. Thereafter, the appellant having found it difficult to effectuate the sales to third parties, he invented an excuse to get over the agreement and pitched upon the plea of oral request said to have been made to the respondents to obtain sanction of the court to alienate the share of the minor and of their refusal. Thereby, they were not willing to perform their part of the agreement and had refused to execute the sale deed. There is no truth in it. The agreement of sale fell through due to the default committed



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