1. Appeal against conviction for contempt under Section 12, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, following construction activities after the expiry of a time-limited ad-interim injunction. (Para 1 , 2 )
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1995 Supreme(SC) 408
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A. M. AHMADI. C. J., S. P. BHARUCHA AND K. S. PARIPOORNAN, JJ.
N. Rathinasabapathy and others, Appellants
Versus
K. S. Palaniappa Kandar and others
Civil Appeal No. 1667 of 1986.
Decided on 22-3-1995.
Important Points
Contempt of court cannot be established when a party resumes activities after the expiration of a time-limited injunction that was not extended by the court. Compliance with the specific duration of an order does not constitute a violation of its spirit or intention.
Subject
Contempt of Court - Civil Contempt
Act Referred
Headnote
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - Section 12 - Construction - Violation Of Courts Order - Contempt Of Court - Order was communicated to appellants stated that injunction was limited to period of three weeks - Indisputably, period of three weeks for which injunction was granted was not extended by Court - After expiry of period of three weeks, since there was no extension of injunction, appellants proceeded with construction and completed same - High Court, holding appellants guilty of contempt – Held, With respect to High Court court find it difficult to comprehend how blame could be laid at doors of appellants - There is no doubt that operation of injunction was limited to three weeks - Appellants showed respect to order of Court by stopping construction as soon as injunction order was received - After expiry of three weeks when they did not receive any order continuing injunction, they proceeded with construction - As such it is difficult to understand how it can be said that appellants had shown disrespect to order passed by Court - There was, therefore, absolutely no violation of Courts order - Court, therefore, fail to understand how appellants can be hauled up for contempt – Court is clearly of opinion that there was no disrespect intended or shown and there was no contempt - Impugned order of High Court cannot, therefore, be allowed to stand - Court set aside impugned order of High Court and discharge notice for contempt – Appeal Allowed.
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2. High Court contended that resuming construction after a time-limited injunction expired violated the spirit and intention of the court's order. (Para 2 )
3. The court observed that since the injunction was explicitly limited to three weeks and not extended, resuming construction after expiry does not constitute disrespect or violation. (Para 3 )
4. Resuming an activity after the expiry of a time-limited injunction, where no extension is granted, does not constitute contempt of court. (Para 3 )
5. Appeal allowed, High Court order set aside, and notice for contempt discharged. (Para 4 )
6. Does resuming an activity after the expiry of a time-limited injunction constitute contempt of court?
No. If an injunction is limited to a specific period and is not extended by the court, proceeding with the activity after that period expires does not constitute a violation of the order or contempt of court. (Para 3 )
7. Can a party be held in contempt for violating the spirit of an order if the literal terms of the order have expired?
No. When an order is explicitly limited to a specific duration, it ceases to exist after that period. Acting after the expiry is not a violation of the spirit or intention of the order. (Para 3 )
8. What is the legal effect of a time-limited ad-interim injunction that is not extended by the court?
A time-limited ad-interim injunction is effective only for the specified period. Once that period expires without an extension, the restriction is no longer in existence. (Para 2 , 3 )
JUDGMENT
This appeal is directed against the order passed by the High Court of Madras in Contempt Application No. 140 of 1985 whereby the Court came to the conclusion that the appellants herein had committed contempt of Court under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. 1971 and sentenced each of the appellants to undergo simple imprisonment for two weeks. The matter arose out of an ad-interim injunction issued by the Court in the following terms:
"Interim injunction for three weeks. Notice three weeks."
2. The order which was communicated to the appellants also stated that the injunction was limited to the period of three weeks. Indisputably, the period of three weeks for which the injunction was granted was not extended by the Court. After the expiry of the period of three weeks, since there was no extension of the injunction, the appellants proceeded with the construction and completed the same. The High Court, while holding the appellants guilty of contempt observed as under:
"In the instant case, the respondents waited for three weeks from the date of the order, after service of notice in this application and indulged thereafter in continuing the construction without giving any respect to the order of this Court, as if it had been effective only for the period of three weeks from the date of pronouncement of the order. This shows gross violation of the spirit and intention of the order culminating in the commission of contempt of Court by the respondents herein."
3. With respect to the High Court we find it difficult to comprehend how the blame could be laid at the doors of the appellants. There is no doubt that the operation of the injunction was limited to three weeks. It is nobodys case that it was extended thereafter. The appellants showed respect to the order of the Court by stopping the construction as soon as the injunction order was received. After the expiry of three weeks when they did not receive any order continuing the injunction, they proceeded with the construction. As such it is difficult to understand how it can be said that the appellants had shown disrespect to the order passed by the Court. On the contrary, they showed respect by not proceeding with the construction as soon as the injunction order was received and they continued with the construction only after its period expired. Therefore, the High Court was wrong in stating that the appellants committed gross violation of the spirit and intention of the order "as if it had been effective only for a period of three weeks from the date of pronouncement of the order." There is no question of the order being in existence after the expiry of three weeks. The expression as if used in the abstracted part of the order is totally unwarranted because indisputably, it was effective only for a period of three weeks. There was, therefore, absolutely no violation of the Courts order. We, therefore, fail to understand how the appellants can be hauled up for contempt under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. We are clearly of the opinion that there was no disrespect intended or shown and there was no contempt whatsoever. The impugned order of the High Court cannot, therefore, be allowed to stand.
4. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order of the High Court dated 2nd May, 1986 and discharge the notice for contempt. No costs.
Appeal allowed.
For Citation: 1995 Cri. LJ 3622
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