ORDER

1. The appellants tenancy was permitted to be terminated under clauses 13(2) and 13(3)00 of the Central Province and Berar Letting of House and Rent Control Order, 1949, for short the Order for ejectment from the demised premises on the ground that he was a habitual defaulter. A decree for eviction ensued which had become final by dismissal of the SLP in limine by this Court. Objections raised in the execution at the instance of his sons were overruled. Thereafter, the appellant filed the W.P. No. 1370 of 1984 in the High Court of Bombay challenging the constitutional validity of sub-clause (ii) of clause 13(3), which was dismissed in limine on June 18, 1984. Thus this appeal by special leave.

2. Section 2 of C.P. & Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 reads thus:

"The Provincial Government may, by general or special order which shall extend to such areas as the Provincial Government may, by notification, direct, provide for regulating the letting and sub-letting of any accommodation or class of accommodation whether residential or non-residential, whether furnished or unfurnished, and whether with or without board, and in particular-

(a) for controlling the rents for such accommodation either generally or when let to specified persons or class of persons or in specified circumstances;

(b) for preventing the eviction of tenants or sub-tenants from such accommodation in specified circumstances, etc. etc."

Clause 13(3)(ii) of the Order provides that:

"A landlord who seeks to obtain permission under sub-clause (1) shall apply in writing to the Controller in this behalf that the tenant is habitually in arrears with the rent."

3. The Controller defined under clause 2(1) means an officer appointed to exercise the power of the Controller under this Order.

4. Shri G.L. Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel contends that a reading of these clauses do indicate that the Controller is a subordinate executive authority, who has been invested with judicial power to give permission to determine tenancy for ejectment on the ground of habitually in arrears. The words habitually in arrears should have been defined but it was not done. Its construction is varied on subjective decision of the court and can vary from court to court. Therefore, the word "habitually in arrears" being vague and indefinite, and exercise of the power having been entrusted to an officer not judicially trained to construe the provision of the Act, it would lead to unbridled exercise of power without guidelines, offending Article 14 of the Constitution. We find no force in the contention. It is well settled that the legislative scheme may employ words of generality conveying its policy and intention to achieve the object set out therein. Every word need not be defined. It may be a matter of judicial construction of such words or phrases. Mere fact that a particular word or phrase has not been defined is not a ground to declare the provisions of the Act itself or the order as unconstitutional. The word habitual cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It is a matter of judicial construction and always depends upon the given facts and circumstances in each case. As to when an inference that a tenant is habitually in arrears disentitling him to the protection of the Order could be drawn is a question of fact in each case. But on that ground or circumstance itself, the provision of the Act cannot be declared to be ultra vires. Further contention that sub-clause (i) of clause 13(3) gives a discretion to the Rent Controller, to permit the defaulting tenant to deposit the arrears for a period of three months within a specified time, while clause 13(3)(ii) gives no discretion and that would render the latter clause arbitrary, is also without force. It is true that a right is given to the landlord to make an application under clause 13(3)(i) for permission to determine the tenancy when the tenant was in arrears for a period of three months in which event the discretion has