Important pointEven though accused has a right to move successive bail application, same can be done only if there is change in the fact situation or in law which requires the earlier view being interfered with.

Headnote:(i) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 —Section 439—Successive applications for bail—Though accused had a right to make, Court has duty to consider reasons and grounds on which earlier bail applications were rejected—Court has also a duty to record fresh grounds which persuaded it to take a view different from one taken earlier.
       Held : It is trite law that personal liberty cannot be taken away except in accordance with the procedure established by law. Personal liberty is a constitutional guarantee. However, Article 21 which guarantees the above right also contemplates deprivation of personal liberty by procedure established by law. Under the criminal laws of this country, a person accused of offences which are non bailable is liable to be detained in custody during the pendency of trial unless he is enlarged on bail in accordance with law. Such detention cannot be questioned as being violative of Article 21 since the same is authorised by law. But even persons accused of non bailable offences are entitled for bail if the court concerned comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against him and/or if the court is satisfied for reasons to be recorded that in spite of the existence of prima facie case there is a need to release such persons on bail where fact situations require it to do so. In that process a person whose application for enlargement on bail is once rejected is not precluded from filing a subsequent application for grant of bail if there is a change in the fact situation. In such cases if the circumstances then prevailing requires that such persons to be released on bail, in spite of his earlier applications being rejected, the courts can do so. (Para 17)
       (ii) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 —Section 439—Bail—Order granting bail passed by High Court was set aside in appeal by Supreme Court—Bail granted again by High Court—Doctrine of Judicial discipline though principles of res-judicata were not applicable—In the earlier order High Court considered the evidentiary value of retracted confession and existence of prima facie case—In fresh bail order High Court proceeded to reconsider the very same two questions i.e. existence of prima facie case and evidentiary value of retracted confession and substituted its subjective satisfaction—Reconsideration was without there being any fresh factual or legal basis—Approach of High Court was contrary to record and law—Impugned order was liable to be set aside.
       Held : The principles of res judicata and such analogous principles although are not applicable in a criminal proceeding, still the courts are bound by the doctrine of judicial discipline having regard to the hierarchical system prevailing in our country. The findings of a higher court or a coordinate bench must receive serious consideration at the hands of the court entertaining a bail application at a later stage when the same had been rejected earlier. In such an event, the courts must give due weight to the grounds which weighed with the former or higher court in rejecting the bail application. Ordinarily, the issues which had been convassed earlier would not be permitted to be re-agitated on the same grounds, as the same it would lead to a speculation and uncertainty in the administration of justice and may lead to forum hunting. The decisions given by a superior forum, undoubtedly, is binding on the subordinate fora on the same issue even in bail matters unless of course, there is a material change in the fact situation calling for a different view being taken. Therefore, even though there is room for filing a subsequent bail application in cases where earlier applications have been rejected, the same can be done if there is a change in the fact situation or in law which requires the earlier view being interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. This is the limited area in which an accused who has been denied bail earlier, can move a subsequent application. Therefore, we are not in agreement with the argument of learned counsel for the accused that in view the guaranty conferred on a person under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, it is open to the aggrieved person to make successive bail applications even on a ground already rejected by courts earlier including the Apex Court of the country. (Paras 18 and 19)
       It is already noticed that the impugned order is pursuant to an application for grant of bail made by the respondent within 11 days of the order made by this Court in second of the appeals referred to hereinabove. It is also an admitted fact that during these 11 days no fresh material had come into existence nor has been pleaded by the respondent in the present application for bail before the High Court. A perusal of the impugned order clearly shows that the High Court proceeded to reconsider the very same two questions namely the existence of a prima facie case and the evidentiary value of retracted confession and by substituting its subjective satisfaction practically over ruled the findings of this Court as well as that of the High Court recorded in the earlier orders, without even discussing these findings and as if the case was being argued and considered by the Court for the first time even though the previous orders of this Court as well as that of the High Court were on record. This reconsideration and recording of a new finding was without there being any fresh factual or legal basis. In our opinion, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellants the approach of the High Court in the impugned order to say the least was irresponsible, contrary to records and law. (Paras 33 and 34)
       (iii) Criminal Law—Ratio decidendi—Every judgment must be read as applicable to particular facts proved or assumed to be true—Generality of expression found therein are not intended to be exposition of whole of the law.
       Held : While deciding the cases on facts, more so in criminal cases the court should bear in mind that each case must rest on its own facts and the similarity of facts in one case cannot be used to bear in mind the conclusion of fact in another case (See: Pandurang and Anr. vs. State of Hyderabad (1955 1 SCR 1083). It is also a well established principle that while considering the ratio laid down in one case, the court will have to bear in mind that every judgement must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be true. Since the generality of expressions which may be found therein are not intended to be expositions of the whole of the law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. A case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. See :-
       (1) Quinn vs. Leathem (1901) AC 495
       (2) State of Orissa vs. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra (AIR 1968 SC 647)
       (3) Ambica Quarry Works Vs. State of Gujarat (AIR 1987 SC 1073). (Para 41)

Judgement Key Points

Accused has right to file successive bail applications, but courts must consider reasons for prior rejections and record fresh grounds justifying a different view. [judgement_subject][1000265140006][1000265140016]
Personal liberty under constitutional guarantee can be deprived only by procedure established by law; non-bailable offence accused may be detained pending trial unless bail granted where no prima facie case or facts warrant release. [1000265140016]
Subsequent bail applications permitted only upon change in fact situation, change in law requiring interference with prior view, or where earlier findings obsolete; no bar under res judicata but doctrine of judicial discipline requires weight to higher court findings to avoid forum shopping and uncertainty. [1000265140017][1000265140018]
Courts bound by hierarchical judicial discipline; superior court decisions binding on subordinates unless material change in facts; re-agitation of prior issues on same grounds not ordinarily allowed. [1000265140017][1000265140018]
In bail matters, existence of prima facie case, gravity of offence, and risk of witness tampering must be considered; long incarceration alone insufficient without addressing these. [1000265140006][1000265140013]
Retracted confession of co-accused has inculpatory value at bail stage for assessing prima facie case, even if not substantive evidence at trial; formalities under recording provision and retraction go to weight, not exclusion at prima facie stage. [1000265140023][1000265140024][1000265140025]
Ninth bail application filed 11 days after Supreme Court cancellation of prior bail grant, without new facts or grounds; High Court erred in re-examining same issues (prima facie case and retracted confession evidentiary value) and substituting new findings without fresh basis, ignoring prior orders. [1000265140007][1000265140026][1000265140032][1000265140033][1000265140034]
Prior High Court and Supreme Court orders found prima facie case based on retracted confession, motive, proximity to co-accused, unchallenged charges; no change warranted reconsideration. [1000265140022][1000265140025][1000265140027][1000265140028][1000265140030]
Accused's conduct while on prior bail (witness hostility, threats, interference) and remaining witnesses indicate risk of tampering if released; bail denial serves justice. [1000265140014][1000265140042][1000265140044]
Judgments decided on own facts; similarity in facts does not import conclusions; generality of expressions limited to case facts, not broad law exposition. [1000265140040][1000265140041]
Impugned High Court bail order quashed; bail application dismissed, accused to remain in custody. [1000265140045]

Judgment

Santosh Hegde, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties.

Leave granted in SLP (Crl.) No. 4954 of 2004.

2. These are two criminal appeals challenging an order dated 21.9.2004 made by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 9220 of 2004 which was an application filed by respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) seeking the grant of bail in Sessions Trial No. 976 of 1999 pending before the CBI court. In the said case the said respondent is charged for offences punishable under Sections 302 read with 34, 307 read with 34, 120-B, 302/307 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. This application before the High Court for grant of bail was the 9th application in the series of applications filed by the said respondent for grant of bail. His earlier applications were either rejected by the High Court or when granted by the High Court were set aside by this Court. As a matter of fact, this court in two earlier appeals had set aside the orders of the High Court dated 6.9.2000 and 23.5.2003 granting bail to the said respondent. The said orders of this Court are since reported in the case of Union of India & Anr. vs. Rajesh Ranjan Alias Pappu Yadav 2004 7 SCC 539 (I) and in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan Alias Pappu Yadav & Anr. 2004 7 SCC 528 (II). It is also relevant to note that when his earlier applications were rejected by the High Court the appeals filed by the respondent were dismissed by this Court confirming the refusal of the bail.

3. On 19.8.2000 charges were framed against the respondent and others under Sections 302 read with 34, 307 read with 34, 120-B 302/307 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act which is not challenged.

4. After rejection of four bail applications earlier, the respondent filed a 5th application Crl. Miscellaneous 24068 of 2002 which came to be allowed by the High Court on the sole ground that since the respondent accused was under detention for more than one year, he should be released on bail without going into any other aspect of the case. On 6th of September, 2000 an appeal filed against the said grant of bail came to be allowed by this Court on 25th of July, 2001 on the ground that High Court while granting the bail did not keep in mind the requirement of Section 437(1)(i) of Cr.P.C., however, by the said order this Court held if any fresh application is made by the accused same shall be decided in accordance with law. This case is since reported in the case of Union of India & Anr. vs. Rajesh Ranjan Alias Pappu Yadav (supra I).

5. Taking advantage of the said observations of this Court the respondent-accused herein made another application for grant of bail on 5.11.2001 which was the sixth application for bail, said application came to be dismissed by the High Court. On 5.11.2001 a SLP filed against the said order of dismissal came to be dismissed by this Court on 7.12.2001.

6. The 7th bail application next filed by the accused-respondent also came to be dismissed by the High Court. A SLP filed against the said dismissal was also dismissed by this Court as per its order in SLP (Crl.) No. 1645/2002 on 20.5.2002.

7. On 23.9.2002 the accused-respondent moved the 8th bail application which came to be allowed by the High Court by its order dated 23.5.2003 solely on the ground that the accused-respondent had undergone incarceration for a period of 3 years and that there was no likelihood of the trial being concluded in the near future and appeal filed against the said grant of bail came to be allowed on the ground that the High Court could not have allowed the bail application on the sole ground of delay in the conclusion of the trial without taking into consideration the allegation made by the prosecution in regard to the existence of the prima facie case, gravity of offence, and the allegation of tempering with the witness by threat and inducement when on bail. This Court held since the above factors go to the root of the right of the accused to seek

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2005 Supreme(SC) 104

Important pointEven though accused has a right to move successive bail application, same can be done only if there is change in the fact situation or in law which requires the earlier view being interfered with.

Cases Referred (6)