2004 Supreme(SC) 127

2005(1) Supreme 775
Supreme Court of India
(From Jharkhand High Court)
N. Santosh Hegde, S.N. Variava, B.P. Singh, H.K. Sema & S.B. Sinha, JJ.
Pratap Singh —Appellant
versus
State of Jharkhand & Anr. —Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 210 of 2005
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3749 of 2001)
Decided on 2-2-2005
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : Amarendra Sharan, Additional Solicitor General, P.S. Mishra, Sr. Advocate, Alok Kumar, Manu Shankar Mishra, Tathagat Harsh Vardhan, Sishir Pinaki, Amitesh Chandra Mishra, Upendra Mishra, Dhrub Jha, Himanshu Shekhar, Ansul, Krishnanand Pandeya, Devashish Bharuka, Mrs. Sudha Gupta, Ms. Maharukh Adenwala, Trideep Pais, Nikhil Nayyar, Advocates.

Important points1. The reckoning date for the determination of the age of the juvenile is the date of an offence and not the date when he is produced before the authority or in the Court.2. The Juvenile Justice (Care and ­Protection of Children) Act, 2000 would be applicable in a pending proceeding in any Court/authority initiated under the 1986 Act and is pending when the 2000 Act came into force and the person had not completed 18 years of age as on 1.4.2001.

Headnote:(i) Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000—Sections 2 and 20—Juvenile Justice Act, 1986—Sections 2(e), 2(h), 18, 26 and 32—Juvenile—Definition—Date for determining the age of juvenile—Whether the date of occurrence will be the reckoning date for determining the age of the alleged offender as Juvenile offender or the date when he is produced in the Court/competent autho­rity—Held, the reckoning date of a juve­nile is the date of an offence and not the date of production—Relevant date for the applicability of the Act is the date on which the offence takes place—Law laid down in Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, (1982) 2 SCC 202 : Approved—Arnit Das v. State of Bihar, (2000) 5 SCC 488 : Overruled.

       Per H.K. Sema, J. for Himself and on behalf of N. Santosh Hegde, S.N. Variava and B.P. Singh, JJ.

       Held : Having noticed the conflicting views in Arnit Das vs. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 488 and Umesh Chandra Vs. State of Rajasthan (1982) 2 SCC 202, this matter has been referred to the Constitution Bench by an order dated 7.2.2003. (Para 6)

       Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of 2000 Act defines “juvenile in conflict with law” means a juvenile who is alleged to have committed an offence. The notable distinction between the definitions of 1986 Act and 2000 Act is that in 1986 Act “juvenile in conflict with law” is absent. The definition of delinquent juvenile in 1986 Act as noticed above is referable to an offence said to have been committed by him. It is the date of offence that he was in conflict with law. When a juvenile is produced before the competent authority and or court he has not committed an offence on that date, but he was brought before the authority for the alleged offence which he has been found to have committed. In our view, therefore, what was implicit in 1986 Act has been made explicit in 2000 Act. (Para 12)

       The legislative intendment underlying Sections 3 and 26 read with the preamble, aims and objects of the Act is clearly discernible. A conjoint reading of the Sections, preamble, aims and objects of the Act leaves no matter of doubt that the legislature intended to provide protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of neglected or ­delinquent juveniles and for the adjudication thereof. Interpretation of Sections 3 and 26 of the Act are no more res-integra. Sections 3 and 26 of the 1986 Act as quoted above are in pari materia with Sections 3 and 26 of the Rajasthan Children Act, 1970 (Raj. Act 16 of 1970). A three-Judge bench of this Court in Umesh Chandra (supra) after considering the preamble, aims and objects and Sections 3 and 26 of the Rajasthan Act, held that the Act being a piece of social legislation is meant for the protection of infants who commit criminal offences and, therefore, such provisions should be liberally and meaningfully construed so as to advance the object of the Act. (Para 19)

       As already noticed the decision rendered by a three-Judge bench of this Court in Umesh Chandra (supra) was not noticed by a two-Judge bench of this Court in Arnit Das (supra). We are clearly of the view that the law laid down in Umesh Chandra (supra) is the correct law and that the decision rendered by a two-Judge bench of this Court in Arnit Das (supra) cannot be said to have laid down a good law. We, accordingly, hold that the law laid down by a three-Judge bench of this Court in Umesh Chandra (supra) is the correct law. (Para 20)

       Per S.B. Sinha, J.

       The definition of ‘Juvenile’ under the 1986 Act, of course refers to a person who has been found to have committed offence but the same has been clarified in the 2000 Act. The provisions of 1986 Act, as noticed hereinbefore, sought to protect not only those juveniles who have been found to have committed an offence but also those who had been charged therefor. In terms of Section 3 of the 1986 Act as well as 2000 Act when an enquiry has been initiated even if the juvenile has ceased to be so as he has crossed the age of 16 and 18 as the case may be, the same must be continued in respect of such person as if he had continued to be a ­juvenile. Section 3 of the 1986 Act therefore cannot be given effect to if it is held that the same only applied to post delinquency of the juvenile. The field covered by the Act includes a situation leading to juvenile delinquency vis-a-vis commission of an offence. In such an event he is to be provided the post delinquency care and for the said purpose the date when delinquency took place would be the relevant date. It must, therefore, be held that the relevant date for determining the age of the juvenile would be one on which the offence has been committed and not when he is produced in court. (Paras 86 and 87)

       (ii) Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000—Sections 2, 3, 16, 20 and 69—Juvenile Justice Act, 1986—Sections 2(e), 2(h), 18, 26 and 32—Applicability of the Act of 2000 to proceedings initiated under 1986 Act—Whether the Act of 2000 will be applicable in the case a proceeding is initiated under 1986 Act and pending when the Act of 2000 was enforced w.e.f. 1.4.2001—Held, provisions of 2000 Act would be applicable to those cases initiated and pending trial/inquiry for the offences committed under the 1986 Act provided that the person had not completed 18 years of age as on 1.4.2001.

       Per H.K. Sema, J. for Himself and on behalf of N. Santosh Hedge, S.N. Variava & B.P. Singh, JJ.

       Held : The striking distinction between the 1986 Act and 2000 Act is that under the 1986 Act a juvenile means a male juvenile who has not attained the age of 16 years and a female juvenile who has not attained the age of 18 years. In the 2000 Act no distinction has been drawn between the male and female juvenile. The limit of 16 years in 1986 Act has been raised to 18 years in 2000 Act. In the 2000 Act wherever the word “juvenile” appears the same will now have to be taken to mean a person who has not completed 18 years of age. (Para 29)

       Thus, even where an inquiry has been initiated and the juvenile ceases to be a juvenile i.e. crosses the age of 18 years, the inquiry must be continued and orders made in respect of such person as if such person had continued to be a juvenile. Similarly, under Section 64 where a juvenile is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment at the commencement of the 2000 Act he would, in lieu of undergoing such sentence, be sent to a special home or be kept in a fit institution. These provisions show that even in cases where a mere inquiry has commenced or even where a juvenile has been sentenced the provisions of the 2000 Act would apply. Therefore, Section 20 is to be appreciated in the context of the aforesaid provisions. (Paras 30 and 31)

       The proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court referred to in Section 20 of the Act is relatable to proceedings initiated before the 2000 Act came into force and which are pending when the 2000 Act came into force. The term “any court” would include even ordinary criminal courts. If the person was a “juvenile” under the 1986 Act the proceedings would not be pending in criminal courts. They would be pending in criminal courts only if the boy had crossed 16 years or girl had crossed 18 years. This shows that Section 20 refers to cases where a person had ceased to be a juvenile under the 1986 Act but had not yet crossed the age of 18 years then the pending case shall continue in that Court as if the 2000 Act has not been passed and if the Court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, shall forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile. In this connection it is pertinent to note that ­Section 16 of the 2000 Act is identical to Section 22 of the 1986 Act. Similarly Section 15 of the 2000 Act is in pari materia with Section 21 of the 1986 Act. Thus, such an interpretation does not offend Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India and the juvenile is not subjected to any penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted on him under the 1986 Act. (Paras 32 and 33)

       S.B. Sinha, J. [Concurring Judgment]

       In terms of the 1986 Act, a person who was not juvenile could be tried in any court. Section 20 of the Act of 2000 takes care of such a situation stating that despite the same the trial shall continue in that court as if that Act has not been passed and in the event, he is found to be guilty of commission of an offence, a finding to that effect shall be recorded in the judgment of conviction, if any, but instead of passing any sentence in relation to the juvenile, he would be forwarded to the Board which shall pass orders in accordance with the provisions of the Act as if he has been satisfied on inquiry that a juvenile has committed the offence. A legal fiction has, thus, been created in the said provision. A legal fiction as is well-known must be given its full effect although it has its limitations. (Para 90)

       Thus, by reason of legal fiction, a person, although not a juvenile, has to be treated to be one by the Board for the purpose of sentencing which takes care of a situation that the person although not a juvenile in terms of the 1986 Act but still would be treated as such under the 2000 Act for the said limited purpose. The Act provides for a beneficent consequences and, thus, it is required to be construed liberally. (Para 92)

       However, as would appear from the provisions of the Act of 2000 that the Scheme of the 2000 Act is such that such a construction is possible. The same would also be evident from Section 64 which deals with a case where a person has been undergoing a sentence but if he is a juvenile within the meaning of the 2000 Act having not crossed the age of 18, the provisions thereof would apply as if he had been ordered by the Board to be sent to a special home or the institution, as the case may be. Section 20 of the Act of 2000 would, therefore, be applicable when a person is below the age of 18 years as on 1.4.2001. For the purpose of attracting Section 20 of the Act, it must be established that: (i) on the date of coming into force the proceedings in which the petitioner was accused was pending; and (ii) on that day he was below the age of 18 years. For the purpose of the said Act, both the aforementioned conditions are required to be fulfilled. By reason of the provisions of the said Act of 2000, the protection granted to a juvenile has only been extended but such extension is not absolute but only a limited one. It would apply strictly when the conditions precedent therefor as contained in Section 20 or Section 64 are fulfilled. The said provisions repeatedly refer to the words ‘juvenile’ or ‘delinquent juveniles’ specifically. This appears to be the object of the Act and for ascertaining the true intent of the Parliament, the rule of purposive construction must be adopted. The purpose of the Act would stand defeated if a child continues to be in the company of an adult. Thus, the Act of 2000 intends to give the protection only to a juvenile within the meaning of the said Act and not an adult. In other words, although it would apply to a person who is still a juvenile having not attained the age of 18 years but shall not apply to a person who has already attained the age of 18 years on the date of coming into force thereof or who had not attained the age of 18 years on the date of commission of the offence but has since ceased to be a juvenile. (Paras 94 and 95)

       (iii) Indian Penal Code, 1860—Sections 364A, 302/201 rw/s 120-B—Criminal conspiracy—Causing death by poisoning—On the basis of FIR lodged on 31.12.1998, stating that appellant was one of the conspirators, he was arrested—On production, CJM assessed age of appellant to be around 18 years old—On 28.2.2000 a petition was filed on behalf of appellant claiming that he was minor on the date of occurrence—Case transmitted to juvenile Court—Appellant was produced in Juvenile Court on 3.3.2000—Juvenile Court assessed age of appellant by appearance to be between 15 and 16 years—ACJM on examining school leaving certificate came to a finding that appellant was below 16 years of age as on 31.12.1998—Appeal—High Court held reckoning date is the date of production of the accused before the Court and not the date of occurrence of the offence—It was further held that for determining the age of juvenile, provisions of 1986 Act would apply and not 2000 Act—Matter referred to the Constitution Bench—Whether the date of occurrence will be the reckoning date for determining age of alleged offender as Juvenile Offender—(Yes)—Whether Act of 2000 will be applicable in the case a proceeding initiated under 1986 Act and pending when the Act of 2000 was enforced—(Yes, to limited extent).