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2005 Supreme(SC) 239

2005(2) Supreme 1
Supreme Court of India
(From Karnataka High Court)
R.C. Lahoti, CJI, G.P. Mathur & P.K. Balasubramanyan, JJ.
B.P. Achala Anand —Appellant
versus
S. Appi Reddy and Anr. —Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 4250 of 2000
Decided on 11-2-2005
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant in Person : S.N. Bhat, Advocate­ (NP).
For the Respondents : P.R. Ramashesh and Ms. Vandana Jalan, Advocates.

Important point
A deserted wife who has been or is entitled to contest the suit for eviction filed against her husband in his capacity as tenant. The wife too can continue to stay in the tenancy premises exercising her right to residence as a part of right to maintenance subject to compliance with all such obligations including the payment of rent to which the tenant is subject.

Headnote:Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 —Section 21(1)—Eviction proceedings for grounds available under clauses (a) and (h) of Section 21(1)—Tenanted premises were in occupation of appellant, wife of tenant, respondent 2—Due to strained relations between appellant and respondent 2, respondent 2 had discontinued his residence in tenanted premises—Appellant moved an application under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for being impleaded in eviction proceedings so as to defend against the eviction—Tenant, respondent 2 was not serious in contesting the suit—Whether appellant being a deserted wife had a right to be joined as a party to the eviction proceedings—(Yes)—A deserted wife who has been or is entitled to be in occupation of the matrimonial home is entitled to contest the suit for eviction filed against her husband, tenant in the premises—Wife can continue to stay in the tenancy premises exercising her right to residence as a part of right to maintenance—Right comes to an end consequent upon decree of divorce—A decree for dissolution of marriage by divorce based on mutual consent has been passed during pendency of eviction proceedings—Appellant cannot be allowed to prosecute appeal against order of eviction—Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order 1 Rule 10—Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956—Sections 3 and 18—Hindu Marriage Act, 1955—Sections 15, 25 and 27.

       Held : A deserted wife who has been or is entitled to be in occupation of the matrimonial home is entitled to contest the suit for eviction filed against her husband in his capacity as tenant subject to satisfying two conditions : first, that the tenant has given up the contest or is not interested in contesting the suit and such giving up by the tenant-husband shall prejudice the deserted wife who is residing in the premises; and secondly, the scope and ambit of the contest or defence by the wife would not be on a footing higher or larger than that of the tenant himself. In other words, such a wife would be entitled to raise all such pleas and claim trial thereon, as would have been available to the tenant himself and no more. So long as, by availing the benefit of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and Rent Control Legislation, the tenant would have been entitled to stay in the tenancy premises, the wife too can continue to stay exercising her right to residence as a part of right to maintenance subject to compliance with all such obligations including the payment of rent to which the tenant is subject. This right comes to an end with the wife losing her status as wife consequent upon decree of divorce and the right to occupy the house as part of right to maintenance coming to an end. (Para 32)

       A deserted wife in occupation of the tenanted premises cannot be placed in a position worse than that of a sub-tenant contesting a claim for eviction on the ground of subletting. Having been deserted by the tenant-husband, she cannot be deprived of the roof over her head where the tenant has conveniently left her to face the peril of eviction ­attributable to default or neglect of himself. We are inclined to hold - and we do so - that a deserted wife continuing in occupation of the premises obtained on lease by her husband, and which was their matrimonial home, occupies a position akin to that of an heir of the tenant-husband if the right to residence of such wife has not come to an end. The tenant having lost interest in protecting his tenancy rights as available to him under the law, the same right would devolve upon and inhere in the wife so long as she continues in occupation of the premises. Her rights and obligations shall not be higher or larger than those of the tenant himself. A suitable amendment in the legislation is called for to that effect. And, so long as that is not done, we, responding to the demands of social and gender justice, need to mould the relief and do complete justice by exercising our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution. We hasten to add that the purpose of our holding as above is to give the wife’s right to residence a meaningful efficacy as dictated by the needs of the times; we do not intend nor do we propose the landlord’s right to eviction against his tenant to be subordinated to wife’s right to residence enforceable against her husband. Let both the rights co-exist so long as they can. (Para 33)

       We feel that the appellant was rightly in the facts and circumstances of the case — permitted by the High Court to be joined as a party to the proceedings. She was also rightly allowed to contest the suit and deposit the rent in the court for payment to landlord for and on behalf of the tenant-husband. (Para 34)

       However, the case of a divorced wife stands on a little different footing. Divorce is termination of matrimonial relationship and brings to an end the status of wife as such. Whether or not she has the right of residence in the matrimonial home, would depend on the terms and conditions in which the decree of divorce has been granted and provision for maintenance (including residence) has been made. In the event of the provision for residence of a divorced wife having been made by the husband in the matrimonial home situated in the tenanted premises, such divorced wife too would be entitled to defend, in the eviction proceedings, the tenancy rights and rights of occupation thereunder in the same manner in which the husband-tenant could have done and certainly not higher or larger than that. She would be liable to be evicted in the same manner in which her husband as tenant would have been liable to be evicted. (Para 35)

       In the present case, it is admitted by the appellant that on 3.12.1998, that is, during the pendency of these proceedings and while the matter was pending in the High Court a decree for dissolution of marriage by divorce based on mutual consent has been passed. The terms and conditions of such settlement have not been brought on record by the appellant which she ought to have done. It is not the case of Smt. Achala, the appellant that she is entitled to continue her residence in the tenanted premises by virtue of an obligation incurred by her husband to provide residence for her as a part of maintenance. She cannot, therefore, be allowed to prose­cute the appeal and defend her right against the claim for eviction made by the landlord. (Para 36)

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Here are the key legal points from the provided document:

  • A deserted wife who has been or is entitled to occupy the matrimonial home has the right to contest eviction proceedings filed against her husband in his capacity as tenant. This right is based on her residence as part of her right to maintenance, provided she complies with obligations such as paying rent (!) (!) .

  • The scope of the wife's right to contest is limited to pleas and defenses available to the tenant himself. The wife’s right to stay in the premises continues so long as her status as wife is intact and she is occupying the premises, but this right terminates upon divorce (!) (!) .

  • A deserted wife in occupation of the tenanted premises cannot be placed in a worse position than a sub-tenant facing eviction. She is considered to occupy a position akin to that of an heir of the tenant, provided her right to residence has not been terminated. Her rights and obligations are not higher or larger than those of the tenant (!) (!) .

  • The rights of a wife to reside in the matrimonial home are recognized as part of her right to maintenance under personal laws, especially for Hindu wives. This right is also protected under rent control legislation so long as the wife’s status as wife is maintained (!) (!) .

  • The right to residence as part of maintenance can be lost upon divorce, especially if the divorce decree terminates the matrimonial relationship and does not specify continued residence rights. In such cases, the divorced wife cannot contest eviction proceedings on the basis of her previous residence rights (!) (!) .

  • When a divorce decree explicitly provides for the wife's residence in the matrimonial home, she retains the right to defend her occupancy in eviction proceedings, but this right is limited to her status as a spouse and does not extend beyond that (!) .

  • The legal framework recognizes that a wife’s right to residence is an incident of her status and her right to maintenance, and it is not a contractual right. This right is protected as part of her personal law rights and the protections afforded by rent control laws (!) (!) .

  • In cases of divorce or termination of marriage, the wife’s right to residence ceases unless explicitly protected by the terms of the divorce decree or other legal arrangements (!) (!) .

  • The court emphasizes that both the landlord’s right to eviction and the wife’s right to residence can coexist so long as the wife’s status as wife is maintained. However, once her status ends, her right to stay in the premises also ends (!) (!) .

  • The legal position also suggests that legislative amendments are needed to better protect the rights of deserted wives, aligning social justice with legal protections (!) .

  • The court’s authority to mold relief and ensure justice under constitutional provisions allows it to interpret laws dynamically, especially in socially sensitive cases involving gender and social justice (!) .

  • In the specific case, the court dismissed the appeal of the wife, noting that her right to contest eviction was limited after her divorce, and she had not demonstrated a legal obligation for her husband to provide residence as part of maintenance (!) (!) .

  • The court granted the wife a specific period to vacate the premises and deposit rent, emphasizing the importance of compliance with legal and procedural requirements, including filing undertakings and ensuring rent payments (!) (!) (!) (!) .

  • Overall, the legal principles affirm that the rights of a wife to occupy the matrimonial home are grounded in her personal status and maintenance rights, and these rights are subject to termination upon divorce unless explicitly preserved through legal arrangements (!) (!) .

Please let me know if you need further elaboration or assistance with specific legal issues related to this document.


Judgment

R.C. Lahoti, CJI.—Unusual fact situation posing issues for resolution is an opportunity for innovation. Law, as administered by Courts, transforms into justice. “The definition of justice mentioned in Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis (adopted from the Roman jurist Ulpian) states `Justice is constant and perpetual will to render to everyone that to which he is entitled.’ Similarly, Cicero described justice as `the disposition of the human mind to render everyone his due’.1. The law does not remain static. It does not operate in a vacuum. As social norms and values change, laws too have to be re-interpreted, and recast. Law is really a dynamic instrument fashioned by society for the purposes of achieving harmonious adjustment, human relations by elimination of social tensions and conflicts. Lord Denning once said: “Law does not standstill; it moves continuously. Once this is recognized, then the task of a judge is put on a higher plain. He must consciously seek to mould the law so as to serve the needs of the time.2.

2. The facts which are either not disputed, or, are, at this stage, beyond the pale of controversy, may briefly be noticed. The appellant Smt. B.P. Achala Anand (hereinafter ‘Smt. Achala’ for short) was the legally wedded wife of H.S. Anand-respondent No.2. Their relationship got estranged so much so that in the year 1983 H.S. Anand deserted his wife Smt. Achala. The matrimonial home was a tenanted premises owned by respondent No.1 H.S. Anand left behind his wife with the children in the tenanted premises and walked away to reside in a lodge. In the year 1991, proceedings for dissolution of marriage by decree of divorce seem to have been initiated between the estranged couple. On 3/12/1998 the marriage stood dissolved by a decree of divorce based on mutual consent. That was an unhappy ending so far as the matrimonial relationship is concerned. However, what transpired between the couple has given a complex turn to an otherwise simple landlord-tenant litigation which we are called upon to deal with in its appeal.

3. The premises forming part of dispute in the present litigation is situated on the ground floor of a property bearing No. 522, Upper Palace Orchards, Bangalore. H.S. Anand had taken the ground floor of the building on tenancy from the landlord-respondent No.1. The rent of the premises was fixed at Rs. 300/- which was later on revised and enhanced to Rs. 600/- and then to Rs. 700/- (the rate which the Trial Court has found proved on evidence). The ground floor premises consisted of one verandah, one hall, two bedrooms with attached toilet, kitchen, bathroom, another toilet and corridor with overhead water supply and other incidental facilities. The tenant H.S. Anand resided in the premises with his family members including his wife Smt. Achala.

4. The tenanted premises were badly in need of repairs and in April 1991, consequent upon a mutual agreement arrived at between the landlord and the tenant, a major portion of the ground floor-tenanted - premises was handed over by the tenant to the landlord for the purpose of carrying out repairs and the tenant continued to retain and enjoy the verandah,­ one bedroom and an attached toilet. However, the repairs, as were agreed upon, were not carried out.

5. On 28/11/1991, the landlord served a notice upon the tenant H.S. Anand and initiated proceedings for eviction from the suit premises on the grounds available under Clauses (a) and (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control, Act, 1961 (hereinafter “the Act” for short). The tenant was alleged to be in arrears of rent and was, therefore, called upon to clear the same within a period of two months from the date of the service of the notice in this regard. It was also alleged that the landlord and his wife were old-aged couple and now-a-days residing in some adjoining premises not their own and needed bona fide the ground floor premises for their own occupation. The tenant-H.S. Anand appear















































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