Important Point
Administrative Tribunal’s jurisdiction is akin to one u/s 11-A of Industrial Disputes Act and jurisdiction to interfere with quantum of punishment could be exercised only when it was found to be grossly disproportionate.

Headnote:Service Law—Karnataka Private Educational Institutions (Discipline and Control) Act, 1975—Section 8—Order of dismissal of respondent No. 3 from service—Respondent was subjected to disciplinary proceedings on an allegation that he assaulted the Principal of Appellant No. 2 by ‘Chappal’ and was found guilty—Tribunal found the charge of misconduct proved but opined that assault was proved one and awarded punishment of withholding three increments in place of order of dismissal—High Court in writ jurisdiction found that punishment imposed by Tribunal could not be given effect to as respondent reached age of superannuation within three months from date of order—Appellant was directed to pay back wages to extent of 60 only accordingly—Appeal—Tribunals jurisdiction was akin to one u/s 11A of Industrial Disputes Act—Jurisdiction to interfere with quantum of punishment could be exercised only when it was found to be grossly disproportionate—Assaulting a superior at a work place amounted to an act of gross indiscipline even if Superior was guilty of provocation—Punishment of dismissal from service could not be said to be wholly disproportionate so as to shock one’s conscience—Only because the Principal of the institution had not been proceeded against, same by itself could not be a ground for not exercising discretionary jurisdiction—Impugned judgment was liable to be set aside.
       Held : The Respondent No. 3 is a teacher. He was charge-sheeted for commission of a serious offence. He was found guilty by the Tribunal. Both the Tribunal as also the High Court, as noticed hereinbefore, have arrived at a concurrent finding of fact that despite grave provocation, the Respondent No. 3 cannot be absolved of the charges levelled against him. It may be true that no departmental disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the Principal of the Institution, but the same by itself would not be a relevant fact for imposing a minor punishment upon the Respondent. It may further be true that the Respondent No. 3 committed the offence under a grave provocation, but as noticed hereinbefore, the Tribunal as also the High Court categorically held that the charges against him were established. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is akin to one under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act. While exercising such discretionary jurisdiction, no doubt it is open to the Tribunal to substitute one punishment by another; but it is also trite that the Tribunal exercises a limited jurisdiction in this behalf. The jurisdiction to interfere with the quantum of punishment could be exercised only when, inter alia, it is found to be grossly disproportionate. This Court repeatedly has laid down the law that such interference at the hands of the Tribunal should be inter alia on arriving at a finding that no reasonable person could inflict such punishment. The Tribunal may furthermore exercises its jurisdiction when relevant facts are not taken into consideration by the Management which would have direct bearing on the question of quantum of punishment. Assaulting a superior at a workplace amounts to an act of gross indiscipline. The Respondent is a teacher. Even under grave provocation a teacher is not expected to abuse the head of the institution in a filthy language and assault him with a chappal. Punishment of dismissal from services, therefore, cannot be said to be wholly disproportionate so as shock one’s conscience. A person, when dismissed from services, is put to a great hardship but that would not mean that a grave misconduct should go unpunished. Although the doctrine of proportionality may be applicable in such matters, but a punishment of dismissal from service for such a misconduct cannot be said to be unheard of. Maintenance of discipline of an institution is equally important. Keeping the aforementioned principles in view, we may hereinafter notice a few recent decisions of this Court. (Paras 15 to 19)
       Indiscipline in an educational institution should not be tolerated. Only because the Principal of the Institution had not been proceeded against, the same by itself cannot be a ground for not exercising the discretionary jurisdiction by us. It may or may not be that the Management was selectively vindictive but no Management can ignore a serious lapse on the part of a teacher whose conduct should be an example to the pupils. This Court has come a long way from its earlier view points. The recent trend in the decisions of this Court seek to strike a balance between the earlier approach of the industrial relation wherein only the interest of the workmen was sought to be protected with the avowed object of fast industrial growth of the country. In several decisions of this Court it has been noticed that how discipline at the workplaces/industrial undertaking received a set back. In view of the change in economic policy of the country, it may not now be proper to allow the employees to break the discipline with impunity. Our country is governed by rule of law. All actions, therefore, must be taken in accordance with law. Law declared by this Court in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, as noticed in the decisions noticed supra, categorically demonstrates that the Tribunal would not normally interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by the employers unless an appropriate case is made out therefor. The Tribunal being inferior to that of this court was bound to follow the decisions of this Court which are applicable to the fact of the present case in question. The Tribunal can neither ignore the ratio laid down by this Court nor refuse to follow the same. (Paras 28 and 29)

Judgment

S.B. Sinha, J.—One Venkappa Gowda, Respondent No. 3 herein, was at all material times a lecturer in Kuvempu Mahavidyalaya, the Appellant No. 2 herein. The said institution is under the management of the Appellant No. 1.

2. The private institutions in the State of Karnataka are governed by the Karnataka Private Educational Institutions (Discipline and Control) Act, 1975, (for short, ‘the Act’).

3. The Respondent No. 3 herein was subjected to a disciplinary proceeding on an allegation that he had assaulted the Principal of Appellant No 2 with a ‘chappal’. He was found guilty of the said charge and dismissed from service. An appeal was preferred by him before the Educational Appellate Tribunal (for short, ‘the Tribunal’) in terms of Section 8 of the said Act. The said Tribunal is constituted in terms of Section 10 thereof. The proceeding before the said Tribunal by a legal fiction is treated to be a judicial proceeding. It is not in dispute that the Appellant No. 2 received grant-in-aid from the State of Karnataka in terms of the Grant-in-Aid Code framed by the Karnataka Collegiate Education Department. Before the Tribunal, the State of Karnataka as also the Director of Collegiate Education were impleaded as parties. A preliminary issue was framed as to whether the departmental proceedings held against the Respondent No. 3 was in consonance with the provisions of Rule 14(2) of CCS (CCA) Rules. While deciding the preliminary issue, it was held that the departmental proceeding was invalid in law. The Appellants, therefore, adduced evidences before the Tribunal to prove the charges against Respondent No. 3. The Tribunal having regard to the pleading of the parties formulated the following questions for its determination.

“1. Whether the respondents 1 and 2 have proved by acceptable evidence that allegation that the appellant had absented from duty unauthorisedly and as to whether his conduct was unbecoming of lecturer?

2. Whether the evidence establishes that the appellant had misbehaved on 18.1.87 and as to whether he had indulged in physical assault upon the Principal?

3. If so, whether the punishment of dismissal imposed upon the appellant is justified in this case and if not what punishment he deserves?”

4. Upon consideration of the evidence adduced before it, the Tribunal held that the first charge had not been satisfactorily proved by cogent and acceptable evidence. As regard the second charge, it was found:

“R.W. 1 has himself stated that he did not permit appellant to sign the attendance register in the morning of 18.9.87. It led to verbal altercation and then turned to heated argument. According to R.W. 1 appellant abused him in the vulgar language as :

(Boli magane, Mudi goobe, Neenyaru nnann Jekijethus)

RW.1 pushed him. This particular part of his evidence is sought to be corroborated to evidence of C.S. Dhanpal. Dhanpal has stated he was present in the chamber of Principal when appellant arrived. He also says that the Principal refused to permit appellant to sign the attendance register. Dhanpal further stated that R.W. 1 told appellant he will not permit him to sign even morning registers if he does not sign afternoon registers. After hearing such talk Vankappagowda replied “It is not a proper conduct of Principal” and rushed towards him The Principal took away the register from Venkappagowda. At that juncture Venkappagowda caught hold of his collar. Simultaneously Principal R.W. 1 pushed Venkatappagowda down which resulted in his fall. After falling down Venkappagowda got up and hit the Principal with a chappal.”

It was held :

Since I am only appreciating facts placed before me, it is but necessary that the facts so projected should be considered collectively and not in isolation. Each fact spoken by the witnesses has woven a web clearly indicating that all was not well between the Principal and the appellant and therefore, incident on 18.9.87 took a violent turn. The evidence has to be weighed according to the norms of r

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2005 Supreme(SC) 1615

Important PointAdministrative Tribunal’s jurisdiction is akin to one u/s 11-A of Industrial Disputes Act and jurisdiction to interfere with quantum of punishment could be exercised only when it was found to be grossly disproportionate.

Cases Referred (11)

Important Point
Administrative Tribunal’s jurisdiction is akin to one u/s 11-A of Industrial Disputes Act and jurisdiction to interfere with quantum of punishment could be exercised only when it was found to be grossly disproportionate.