Judgment

CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. :- Ganoba had four sons, Raoji, Ramchandra, Narsoba and Shanker. Raoji, Narsoba and Shanker died in that order. Shanker died in 1951. Vasant and Yaswant, defendant Nos. 4 & 5 are Raojis sons. Ramchandra is the first defendant and his sons are Manik and Moti, defendant Nos. 2 and 3. Narsoba died leaving behind him two widows Subabai and Kadubai. Shanker died leaving behind him a widow Aaubai.

2. We may mention here that at the time of death of Raoji, Narsoba and Shanker, the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 was not applicable to the parties, as they were residents of the erstwhile native State of Hyderabad. In 1961 Kadubai the widow of Narsoba adopted Dattu. Aaubai, the widow of Shanker adopted Vilas. Soon after the adoptions, Dattu and Vilas filed the suit, out of which the present appeal arises for partition and separate possession of their shares in the joint family properties. Defendants 4 and 5 were the main contestants of this suit. Among several pleas raised by them, they also claimed that in 1956 there was a partition between Ramchandra on the one hand and defendants 4 and 5 on the other. However, the question of partition was not put in issue and, as we shall presently see, the evidence in regard to the partition was also scanty. The factum of the two adoptions was disputed. It was also claimed that after the death of Narsoba and Shanker the properties devolved on defendants 1 to 5 by survivorship and the plaintiffs were not entitled to claim any share in the properties. S. 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 barred the plaintiffs from claiming any share in the properties. It is not necessary to pursue the course of the suit in the lower Courts. It is enough if we refer to the conclusions arrived at by the High Court. The High Court upheld the truth and validity of the adoptions. The High Court further took the view that the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 applied to the parties, that the widows succeeded to the shares of their husbands, Narsoba and Shanker and that the two plaintiffs, on adoption, succeeded to the shares of Narsoba and Shanker. On the question whether there was a partititon in 1956, the High Court noticed that there was no issue in regard to the question of partition and concluded that defendants 4 and 5 had not put the question in issue as their case in regard to the partition was not tenable.

3. We may straightway say that the High Court was in error in holding that Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 applied to the parties. The Act was made applicable to the earstwhile Hyderabad State long after the death of Narsoba and Shanker. The real question, therefore, is whether S. 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act precludes the plaintiffs from claiming any share in the joint family properties. S. 12 is as follows :

"An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family :

Provided that-

(a) the child cannot marry any person whom he or she could not have married if he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth;

(b) any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth;

(c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption."

4. We are concerned with proviso (c) to S. 12. The introduction of a member into a joint family, by birth or adoption, may have the effect of decreasing the share of the rest of the members of the joint family, but it certainly does not involve any question of divesting any per