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1987 Supreme(SC) 709

SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND G.L. OZA, JJ.
Civil Appeal Nos. 689-90 of 1987, D/- 8-9-1987.
Krishnan Nair and another etc., Appellants
Versus
Ghouse Basha, Respondent.

Advocates:
A.T.M.SAMPATH, Sanjay Parikh, Sudarsh Menon

Headnote:

Tamil Nadu Buildings Act, 1960 – Section 10(3)(a)(iii), 12(1)(f) - Partnership Act, 1932 - Section 4 - Partnership - Business - Order Of Eviction - Landlords contention of bona fide requirement of premises in question for business of his sons and maintained order of eviction - Sons went into partnership with others and two of sons are partners - They jointly hold half shares - From evidence it appears that sons used to take active part even before partnership started in leather business, carried on by father - Thereafter, partnership firm with other partners carried on business - Partnership deed was silent as to what role sons of landlord would perform in this - Whether requirement of premises by landlord for occupation of partnership firm in which he was a partner would tantamount to occupation by landlord - Application for eviction under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of Act was liable to be dismissed solely on ground that landlord has chosen to file this application to accommodate a partnership firm in which his sons and some strangers are partners and it is not in conformity with provisions of S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of said Act – Held, Court observed that if deed of partnership had excluded son expressly or impliedly from management of firm of business and had made him a sleeping partner it could not be held that accommodation was needed directly and substantially for his occupation byway of his business - Firm is carrying on business in premises in respect of which eviction was asked for said firm - But here there is no evidence that sons were sleeping partners - On contrary, there is evidence that they were in leather business and had carried on business previously before shifting to premises - Court felt that they should not express any opinion in that regard, but doubt was expressed as to whether requirement of premises by landlord for occupation of partnership firm in which he was a partner would tantamount to occupation by landlord - It appears that attention of this court was not drawn to earlier decision referred to hereinbefore - In any event, court had no occasion to express any opinion where sons are active partners in a partnership firm whether such business carried on by sons would not come within provisions of S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of Act - Appeal dismissed.

Judgement

SABYASACHI MUKHARJI,J. :- This is an appeal by the tenant against the judgment and order of the High Court of Tamil Nadu. By the aforesaid judgment the High Court upheld the landlords contention of bona fide requirement of the premises in question for the business of his sons and maintained the order of eviction passed by the courts below. So far as the question of bona fide need is concerned it has been upheld by the courts below and that finding is not assailed before us. But what was contended was that the application itself under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, hereinafter called the Act was not maintainable as the requirement of the land was not for the landlord or members of his family as such but for two sons who were running a leather business in partnership with strangers. The deed of partnership was examined by the High Court but it is, however, not before us. It appears from the evidence that previously the father and the two sons used to carry on leather business from long time. The sons went into the partnership with others and two of the sons are partners. They jointly hold half the shares. From the evidence it appears that the sons used to take active part even before the partnership started in the leather business, carried on by the father. Thereafter, the partnership firm with the other partners carried on the business. We must proceed on the basis that the partnership deed was silent as to what role the sons of the landlord would perform in this. The only question which was urged before us was that the application for eviction under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act was liable to be dismissed solely on the ground that the landlord has chosen to file this application to accommodate a partnership firm in which his sons and some strangers are partners and it is not in conformity with the provisions of S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the said Act. Partnership, as is well settled has a compendious way of describing those who constitute the firm under S. 4 of the Partnership Act. Now, if that is the position, in our opinion, if a person carries on a business along with other partners and it was the other partner who actually carried on the business the position perhaps would have been entirely different. If the same were only sleeping partners that would have been different. On the contrary, here having regard on the past conduct of the sons and having regard to the shares this was their only application where sons were carrying on the business along with other partner. If that is the position in our opinion under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act as the sons and members of the family carrying on the business in terms of the section will be entitled to the benefit of eviction.

2. Our attention was drawn to a decision of this Court in D. N. Sanghavi & Sons v. Ambalal Tribhuvan Das, (1974) 3 SCR 55 : (AIR 1974 SC 1026) where the meaning of the expression his business under S. 12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 came up for consideration. The said section was in pari materia with the present section. Therefore this court held that the meaning of the expression his business under S. 12(1)(f) of the said Act is to be determined by the examination of the object of the Act and setting of the phrase his business. There Dwivedi, J. speaking for the court found that before the partnership, it was stated that the father was to run the shop. Father died during the pendency of the suit and neither of these two passages nor anywhere else in the facts during the pendency had stated that on the terms of the partnership they were entitled to manage the partnership business or even that would also occupy the suit accommodation along with his other partners on obtaining possession from the appellant was not stated that the other partners have agreed to shift the business. The court observed that if the deed of partnership had excluded the son expressly or impliedly from the


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