SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND G.L. OZA, JJ.
Civil Appeal No.3909 of 1986, D/-17-9-1987.
Nand Kishore Marwah and others. Appellants
Versus
Smt. Samundri Devi, Respondent.
U.P. Urban Buildings Act, 1972 - Section 39, 40, 20(2), 2, 24, 24A, 24-B, 24-C, 29(3) - Property - Termination of Tenancy - Decree for Eviction - Plaintiffs suit for ejectment of appellant - Disputed property was let out - Accommodation was for first time assessed for house-tax by Nagar Palika - Suit was filed for eviction after termination of tenancy before trial court and objection was raised that as shop and basement were separately let out tenancy could not be terminated by a single notice and that would be invalid - Whether the provisions of U.P. Urban Buildings Act, 1972 will be applicable to these proceedings in view of fact that although premises - Whether provisions of. Act will be applicable or not and as to whether protection granted to tenants – Held, This clearly indicates that restriction put under S. 20 is to institution of suit itself and therefore it is clear that if provision of this Act applies then no suit for eviction can be instituted except on grounds specified in sub-sections of this Section - Keeping in view language of this section if court examine provisions contained in sub-s. (2) of S. 2 it will be clear that for a newly constructed building provisions of this Act will not apply for 10 years and therefore so far as the restriction under S. 20 is concerned they will not apply and therefore it is clear that within 10 years as provided for in Cl. (2) of S. 2 restriction on institution of suit as provided for in S. 20 cl. (1) quoted above will not be applicable and it is thus clear that during pendency of litigation even if 10 years expired restriction will not be attracted as suit has been instituted within 10 years and therefore restriction as provided for in S. 20 cannot be attracted - Appellant-tenant could not be given advantage of provisions contained in this Act - It is true that court maintained decree for eviction passed by High Court but in view of fact that as appellant has been carrying out business in premises for a long time for it would be proper to permit appellant time to make their arrangements for shifting – Court therefore direct that decree for eviction shall not be executed, on appellant filing a usual undertaking within four weeks, In default respondent shall be entitled to execute decree forthwith - Appeal Dismissed.
Judgement
OZA, J. :- This appeal arises out of a judgment passed by the High Court of Allahabad in Civil Revision No. 83 of 1986 (reported in 1987 All LJ 255) wherein the learned Judge of the High Court allowed the revision petition set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Judge and decreed the plaintiffs suit for ejectment of the appellant. The disputed property was let out on June 25, 1976. The accommodation was for the first time assessed for house-tax by the Nagar Palika, Ghaziabad with effect from October 1, 1976. The suit was filed for eviction after termination of tenancy before the trial court and objection was raised that as the shop and the basement were separately let out the tenancy could not be terminated by a single notice and that would be invalid. The trial court therefore dismissed the suit. The High Court set aside this conclusion of the trial court.
2. The main ground which was before the High Court was as to whether the provisions of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act for short) will be applicable to these proceedings in view of the fact that although the premises were let out in June 1976 but as the assessment was made on October 1, 1976 the provisions of the Act referred to above will not apply for 10 years from October 1, 1976 and therefore the suit could be decreed as the protection available under this Act will not be available to the tenant.
3. High Court after discussing various decisions came to the conclusion that in view of the language of S. 2 sub-cl. (2) Explanation 1, it could not be doubted that period of 10 ,years will commence from the date of assessment i.e. October 1, 1976 that it is in that view of the matter that the learned Judge of the High Court decreed the suit and hence the present appeal.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that apart from the controversy about the date which should be the starting point for computing the period of 10 years in view of the language of Ss. 39 and 40 of the Act, provisions of this Act will be applicable to the present case and therefore a decree for eviction could only be passed. If it could be passed on anyone of the grounds mentioned in S. 20 clause (2) of this Act in support of this contention the learned counsel placed reliance on decisions in Om Prakash Gupta v. Dig Vijendrapal Gupta, (1982) 3 SCR 491 : (AIR 1982 SC 1230 (2)) and Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera, AIR 1985 SC 817.
5. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent contended that the rights of parties will be governed on the basis of the date on which the suit was filed and it was contended that if on the date on which the suit was filed by the respondent the provisions of this Act were not applicable then merely because the proceedings have been pending for all these years it could not be contended that as now 10 years elapsed the decree could not be passed. Learned counsel placed reliance on a decision in Firms Amar Nath Basheshar Dass v. Tek Chand (1972) 3 SCR 922: (AIR 1972 SC 1548) and contended that this is a decision of three Judges Bench which clearly held that if the suit was filed within a period of exemption then the suit could be decreed and the provisions of the Act will not be applicable. Learned counsel further contended that in the decision in Vineet Kumars case on which reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the appellant the Firms Amar Nath Basheshar Dasss case has not been referred to and decision in Vineet Kumars case is a judgment by a Bench of two Judges.
6. It was also contended by learned counsel that as till the matter was pending in the High Court 10 years have not been completed and therefore the High Court passed the decree. Now it could not be contended that as during the pendency of the proceedings in this Court 10 years have elapsed and therefore the appellant-tenant will be entitled to protection of the provisions of S. 20. It was contended that it is well settled that if the rig
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