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1960 Supreme(SC) 189

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
S.K.Das : J.L.Kapur : K.Subba Rao : M.Hidayatullah : N.Rajagopala Ayyangar : S.R.Dass
State Of U.P.
Versus
H.H.Maharaja Brijendra Singh
Case No. : 131 of 1956
Date of Decision : 8/26/60
Advocates Appeared: Lal C.P. : Limaye V.M. : Sanyal H.N. : Shukla S.S. : Udayarathnam E.

Important Points

Inclusion of an Act in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, read with Article 31-B, protects it from being declared void for violating fundamental rights, including those previously secured under Section 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935.

Subject

Constitutional Law - Land Acquisition

Act Referred

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: Art.133(1), Art.132, Art.31(b), Art.226, Art.14
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT: S.299(2)
LAND ACQUISITION ACT: S.23(2)
UTTAR PRADESH LAND ACQUISITION REHABILITATION OF REFUGEES ACT: S.7, S.5, S.7(2), S.9, S.11(1)

Headnote

(A) U.P. Land Acquisition (Rehabilitation of Refugees) Act, 1948 - Section 11(1) - Constitution of India - Article 31-B and Ninth Schedule - Government of India Act, 1935 - Section 299(2) - Compensation for land acquisition - Validity of provisos restricting market value - Inclusion of an Act in the Ninth Schedule protects it from being deemed void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or abridges rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution - Rights previously secured under Section 299(2) of the Government of India Act are substantially the same as fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution and are thus protected by Article 31-B. (Para 5)

(B) Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 - Effect of subsequent amendment - An Act included in the Ninth Schedule cannot be deemed void or ever to have become void on the ground of inconsistency with fundamental rights, regardless of prior judicial findings of unconstitutionality. (Para 6)

Facts of the case:
A property owner challenged the acquisition of land under a state land acquisition act, specifically contesting two provisos in the compensation section. These provisos limited the market value to the lower of the date of notification or a specific date in 1939, or the actual price paid if the land was purchased within a specific timeframe. The High Court had declared these two provisos invalid but refused the writ of certiorari.

Findings of Court:
The court found that the inclusion of the Act in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, read with Article 31-B, saves the Act from being declared void on the grounds of violating rights that were previously secured under the Government of India Act, 1935, as those rights are now part of the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution.

Issues: Whether the provisos to the compensation section of the land acquisition act were unconstitutional due to contravention of the Government of India Act, 1935, and whether the subsequent inclusion of the Act in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution cured such unconstitutionality.

Ratio Decidendi: The protection provided by Article 31-B for Acts listed in the Ninth Schedule extends to rights that were essentially fundamental rights under the Government of India Act, 1935. Consequently, the Act cannot be deemed void based on a contravention of Section 299(2) of the Government of India Act once it is included in the Ninth Schedule.

Result: Appeal allowed.

Legal Category Hierarchy

  • constitutional law
    • fundamental rights
      • right to property (Para 5, 6)
      • ninth schedule (Para 5, 6)
    • constitutional amendments (Para 5, 6)
  • administrative law
    • land acquisition
      • compensation (Para 2, 5)

Advocates:
C.P.LAL, E.UDAYARATHNAM, H.N.SANYAL, S.S.SHUKLA, V.M.LIMAYA

Table of Contents

1. Land acquisition under U.P. Land Acquisition (Rehabilitation of Refugees) Act, 1948 — Challenge to the constitutionality of compensation provisos under Section 11(1). (Para 2 )

2. Whether provisos to Section 11(1) of the Act are unconstitutional under Section 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and if subsequent constitutional amendments validate them. (Para 2 , 5 , 6 )

3. Inclusion of the Act in the Ninth Schedule via Article 31-B protects it from challenges based on rights previously secured under Section 299 of the Government of India Act. (Para 5 , 6 )

4. Acts included in the Ninth Schedule are protected by Article 31-B from being deemed void on grounds of inconsistency with fundamental rights, including those derived from the Government of India Act. (Para 5 , 6 )

5. Appeal allowed — High Court judgment declaring the provisos to Section 11(1) void set aside — Parties to bear their own costs. (Para 7 )

6. Does Article 31-B of the Constitution protect Acts included in the Ninth Schedule from challenges based on the Government of India Act, 1935?

Yes. The court held that the protection under Article 31-B extends to rights previously secured under Section 299 of the Government of India Act, as these are essentially fundamental rights incorporated into Part III of the Constitution. (Para 5 )

7. Can a subsequent constitutional amendment validate a legislative provision that was unconstitutional at the time of its enactment?

Yes, if the amendment specifically saves the Act from being deemed void. Under Article 31-B and the Ninth Schedule, an Act cannot be deemed void or ever to have become void on the grounds of inconsistency with fundamental rights. (Para 6 )

J.L.KAPUR, J.

(1) THIS is an appeal against the judgment and order of the High court of Allahabad on a certificate granted under Arts. 132 and 133(1)(c) of, the Constitution. The respondent herein was the petitioner in the High court in one of the petitions which were filed in that court covering the question which has been raised before us. The appellants before us were the respondents in the High court.

(2) THE respondent was the Ruler of the State of Bharatpur, now a part of Rajasthan, and is the owner of the property in dispute known as Kothi Kandhari Jadid in Agra. On 28/01/1950, the Agra Improvement Trust-hereinafter called the Trust passed a resolution under s. 5 of the U.P. Land Acquisition (Rehabilitation of Refugees) Act, 1948, (U.P. XXVI of 1948)-hereinafter called the Act-for the acquisition of the property in dispute and expressed its willingness to act as ` builder ` within the meaning of the provisions of the Act. The government declared the Trust as the ` builder ` on 6/05/1950, and an agreement was entered into on 6/11/1950, in terms of the Act, which was published on 6/01/1951. The Trust deposited a sum of Its. 57,800 being the estimated cost of the acquisition on 27/02/1951, and a notification under s. 7 of the Act was published in the U.P. Gazette on 21/07/1951. By sub-s. (2) of s. 7, upon the publication of the notification, the land acquired was to vest absolutely in the State. After the respondent was served with a notice calling upon him to appear before the Compensation Officer at Agra, he filed certain objections challenging the propriety of the acquisition and the vires of the Act. It was also alleged that the Collector, without deciding the matter, proceeded to take possession. The respondent, thereupon, filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the Allahabad High court for a writ prohibiting the appellants from acquiring his land or interfering with his rights. This petition was dismissed by the High court on 2/02/1954. But certain findings were given to which the appellants have taken objection. In its judgment the High court observed :- ` In these petitions the prayer is that the court may be pleased to grant a writ, direction or other suitable order prohibiting the State government from acquiring the petitioners land or interfering with their rights in any other manner, and to grant such other suitable relief as the court may deem fit. At the hearing, however, learned counsel for the petitioners stated more Specifically that the relief which the petitioners sought was a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the State governments Notification under section 7 of the Act made on 11/07/1951, or, in the alternative, the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Compensation Officer in calculating the compensation payable to them under the Act to disregard the two provisos of Ss. (1) of Section 11 of the Act The respondent submitted in the High court that the Act contravened the provisions of Art. 31(2) and was not saved by the provisions of Art. 31(5) of the Constitution and that the Act infringed Art. 14 of the Constitution and several other contentions were also raised. The relevant provision of the Act which requires consideration is s. 11 which runs as follows:11. (1) Whenever any land is acquired under section 7 or 9 there shall be paid compensation the amount of which shall be determined by the Compensation Officer, in accordance with the principles set out in clauses first, second and third of Ss. (1) and Ss. (2) of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Provided that the market value referred to in clause first of the said Ss. shall be deemed to be the market value of such land on the date of publication of the notice under section 7 or 9, as the case may be, or on the first day of September, 1939, whichever is less: Provided further that where such land has been held by the owner thereof under a purchase made before the first day of April, 1948, but after th





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