P.B.GAJENDRA GADKAR, J.

(1) WHAT is the effect of the retrospective operation of s. 31 introduced by the Punjab Pre-emption (Amendment) Act, 1960 (X. of 1960) in the parent Act of Pre-emption (No. 1 of 1913). that is the short question which arises for our decision in these three appeals which have been ordered to be consolidated for the purpose of hearing by this Court. These appeals arise from three pre-emption suits instituted by the respondents against the respective appellants. The respondents case was that the properties in suit had been sold by Aftab Rai on May 31, 1956, for Rs. 10,000.00 to the appellants and it is these sales which they wanted to pre-empt. They alleged that they are the owners of agricultural land in Patti Aulakh and Patti Kode, in Mauza Marahar Kalan, and as such, they had the statutory right to claim pre-emption, under s. 15(c) (ii) and (iii). The appellants resisted this claim on the ground that the respective vendees from Aftab Rai had transferred by exchanges about 2 kenals out of the lands purchased by them and as a result of the said exchanges the appellants had themselves become entitled to pre-empt the said sales under the same statutory provision. Since the appellants had acquired equal status with the respondents who claimed to be the pre-emptors, their claim for pre-emption cannot be sustained. That, in brief, was the nature of the contest between the parties.

(2) THE trial Court held that the exchanges on which the appellants relied bad not been proved and so, it gave effect to the respondents right to pre-empt under s. 15(c) (ii)&(iii). The appellants took the metter before the Additional District Judge in appeal. The lower appellate Court was pleased to admit additional evidence under O.41, r. 27, of the Code of Civil Procedure and held that the exchanges in question had in fact been proved and were, in law, valid. It, therefore came to the conclusion that the appellants acquired equal status with the respondents and so, the respondents claim for pre-emption must fail. That is why the appeals preferred by the appellants were allowed and the respondents suits were dismissed.

(3) THE dispute was then taken up before the High Court of Punjab by the respondents by second appeals. Mahajan, J., who heard these appeals held that the property acquired by exchange in lieu of the part of the property purchased by the vendees did not give the appellants a right to pre-empt. He referred to the fact that exchange of lands was sometimes recognised as conferring on the party the right to pre-empt, but that was where the land exchanged did not form part of the land sold and pre-empted. In the result, the High Court held that the plea made by the appellants was not well-founded in law and so, the respondents were entitled to pre-empt. As a result of this finding, the decrees passed by the lower appellate Court were reversed and the respondents suits were decreed. The appellants then moved the Division Bench by Letters Patent appeals, but these appeals were dismissed. It is against the decrees thus passed by the Division Bench in Letters Patent appeals that the appellants have come to this Court by special leave.

(4) WE have already noticed that both the appellants and the respondents are claiming a right to pre-empt under s. 15(c) (ii) and (iii) of the Parent Act of 1913. On February 4, 1960, the amending Act No. 10 of 1960 was passed. Section 4 of the amending Act has substitituted a new s,15 of the old s. 15 after making substantial changes in the provisions of the earlier section. Clauses (ii) and (iii) of the original s.l5(c) have been deleted, with the result that the claims for pre-emption made both by the appellants and the respondents have ceased to be recognised by the amended provisions. The appellants contend that since the respondents have got a decree for pre-emption in their favour on the provisions of the unamended s.l5, that decree can no lon