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1969 Supreme(SC) 361

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.N.Grover : J.C.Shah : V.Ramaswami
M.M.Chawla
Versus
J.S.Sethi
Case No. : 1461 of 1969
Date of Decision : 9/15/69
Advocates Appeared: Agarwal R.P. : Gambhir S.K. : Misra B.C. : Singh Hardev

Advocates:
B.C.MISHRA, HARDEV SINGH, R.P.AGRAWAL, S.K.Gambhir

Headnote:

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Section 14(1), (2) , 2(k) , 6 , 7, 9, 12, 15 , 14, 15(3) and 14(2) - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 106 - Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 - Default in Paying Rent - Order of Ejectment - Whether payment according to contract has been made – Held, Tenant had made no attempt to pay rent which was demanded of him - Subsection (2) of Section 14 enacts that Controller shall not pass an order for recovery of possession of any premises if tenant makes payment or deposit as required by Section 15 - Bar to jurisdiction of Controller arises when tenant pays or deposits interim rent as required by Section 15(3) and an application for fixation of standard rent is not payment or deposit required by Section 15 - In any event by virtue oi" proviso to Ss. (2) of Section 14 Chawla is not entitled to benefit of subsection (2) for he had earlier committed default in payment of rent in respect of premises and a proceeding was instituted against him for recovery of possession - That proceeding was disposed of after he deposited amount of rent due by him - Chawla obtained an order of disposal of proceeding by depositing amount ordered to be deposited by him under Section 15 - That was clearly a benefit which he obtained under Section 14(2) - Plea that "no tenant shall be entitled to benefit under this sub-section" is only directory is without substance - In any event High court was of view that having regard to conduct of Chawla he having committed default previously and having obtained the benefit of Ss. (2) in respect of premises he was not entitled to same benefit in this proceeding - Assuming that the proviso to Ss. (2) of Section 14 is not mandatory on that question Court express no opinion Court is clearly of view that High court having declined to grant benefit of Ss. (2) of Section 14 to Chawla, no case is made out for our interference - Appeal dismissed.

J.C. SHAH, J.

(1) MAN Mohan Chawla was since before 1958 a tenant of certain premises in Delhi belonging to J. S. Sethi. The contractual rent of the premises was Rs. 160.00 per month. Sethi filed a petition under Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 for an order in ejectment against Chawla on the plea that the latter had committed default in paying rent for seven months consecutively pursuent to a direction of the Rent Controller, Chawla deposited the rent claimed, and the amount deposited was paid over to Sethi and the proceeding was disposed of.

(2) CHAWLA again committed default for three consecutive months, and Sethi commenced another proceeding under Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act for an order in ejectment. Chawla denied the claim that he had committed default in payment of rent. He pleaded that he had on 19/03/1963 sent to Sethi Rs. 320.00 by a postal money order which Sethi had refused to accept. Sethi denied that a money order sent by Chawla was brought to him by the postal peon. Chawla also pleaded that the contractual rent was excessive and that the rent of the premises let to him could not exceed Rs. 50.00 per month and prayed that standard rent may be fixed by the Controller. The Controller rejected that contention of Chawla and .passed an order in ejectment. The order of ejectment passed by the Controller was confirmed in appeal by the Rent Control tribunal, and a second appeal to the High court was also unsuccessful. Chawla has appealed to this court with special leave.

(3) IN support of the appeal counsel for Chawla contended : (i) that the Controller was bound to determine the standard rent of the premises in the proceeding instituted by Sethi and since the Controller failed to do so the order in ejectment was illegel : (ii) the court below were in error in holding that Chawla could not obtain the benefit of Section 14(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ; (iii) that the legal presumption arising from the despatch of a postal money order for Rs. 320.00 addressed to Sethi had been ignored by all the courts; and (iv) that Chawla had made a deposit of rent for three months and if that deposit be taken into account Chawla was not in arrears for three consecutive months at the date of the initiation of the proceeding.

(4) NOT much need be said about contentions (iii)and(iv). The forth plea was not raised before the Rent Controller and the Rent Control tribunal ; it was sought to be urged for the first time before the High court and the High court declined to entertain that plea. We have not permitted counsel to raise that plea, for its determination depends upon proof of facts which were never proved.

(5) ALL the courts have held that Chawla had failed to prove his case that a postal money order for Rs. 320.00 sent by Chawla was duly addressed to Sethi and that Sethi refused to accept the postal money order when it was tendered to him. The only evidence in support of that case was a postal receipt for despatch of a money order for Rs. 320.00 to Sethi. It did not bear the residential address of Sethi. Sethi deposed that no one had tendered to him the postal money order. His testimony has been believed. The third contention must therefore fail.

(6) WE may now turn to the first and the second contentions. It is necessary to bear in mind that under the Delhi Rent Act, a proceeding for recovery of rent does not lie before the Controller ; it lies in the civil court. The Controller is authorised to try a proceeding for ejectment or for determination or for determination of standard rent, or for determination of fair rent in respect of a hotel and lodging house.

(7) THE relevant provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 which have a bearing on the two contentions remaining to be determined may first be noticed.

(8) SECTION 2(k) defines "standard rent" as meaning in relation to any premises, "the standard rent referred to in Section 6
















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