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1970 Supreme(SC) 209

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.N.Grover : J.C.Shah : K.S.Hegde
Commissioner Of Income Tax, West Bengal
Versus
Indian Mica Supply Company Private Limited
Case No. : 2193 of 1966
Date of Decision : 4/16/70
Advocates Appeared: Chagla M.C. : Manchanda S.C. : Mukherjee D.N. : Sachthey R.N. : Sharma B.D.

Headnote:

Income-tax Act, 1922 – Sections 10, 66 – Suit for specific performance – License of Mining – Respondent-company was engaged during previous year, relevant to assessment year 1954-55 in and dealing therein – Madan Lal was one of directors of company – He had taken for himself a lease of mining rights of village Gadi Majladih in district of Hazaribagh for a period of 15 years from 1/04/1928. – Lease was to expire on 31/03/1943 – According to terms of lease lessee had option of renewal for a further period of 20 years on the expiry thereof – Madanlal gave a sub-lease of mining rights to respondent-company with same covenants for renewal for alike period – On expiry of lease lessee refused to renew lease – Madanlal filed a suit for specific performance of contract – Suit was dismissed by subordinate Judge but during pendency of appeal to High court a Compromise was entered into – Held, It is well-settled that it is a question of fact in each whether amount which is claimed as a deductible allowance section 10(2)(xv) of Income-tax Act, 1922, was laid out wholly exclusively for the purpose of the assessees business – If fact-find tribunal comes to conclusion on evidence that expense incurced wholly and exclusively for purpose of the business, then dedsion tribunal cannot be disturbed if there is evidence upon which it ci arrive at such a conclusion – Tribunal, in present case, had clearly found that it was only as a result of the compromise that the respondent became entitled to remain in possession of demised land – Its liability also became ascertained only at that point of time – It cannot be disputed that the respondent in incurring the expenditure had acted in the interest of and for the purpose of its business – Expenditure was not laid out for any purpose other than that of carrying on the business – Deduction was properly admissible under section 10(2)(xv) of the Act and the matter being self-evident the High court was fully justified in declining to accede to the prayer made under section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 – Appeal Dismissed

A.N.GROVER, J.

(1) THIS is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of Calcutta High court refusing to require the Income-tax Appellate jornal to state the case and to refer to it certain questions of law which claimed arose from the order of the tribunal, dated 13/03/1964, to the assessment year 1954-55.

(2) THE respondent-company was engaged during the previous year on 31/12/1953, relevant to the assessment year 1954-55 in and dealing therein. Madan Lal was one of the directors of company. He had taken for himself a lease of mining rights of village Gadi Majladih in the district of Hazaribagh for a period of 15 years from 1/04/1928. The lease was to expire on 31/03/1943. According to the terms of the lease the lessee had the option of renewal for a further period of 20 years on the expiry thereof. Madanlal gave a sub-lease of the mining rights to the respondent-company with the same covenants for renewal for alike period. On the expiry of the lease on 1/04/1943, the lessee refused to renew the lease. Madanlal filed a suit on 15/04/1953, for specific performance of the contract. The suit was dismissed by the learned subordinate Judge but during the pendency of the appeal to the High court a Compromise was entered into. The respondent-company was a party to the appeal as also to the compromise. According to the compromise the lease was to be renewed with retrospective effect from 1/04/1943. The respondent-company had to pay the rent from April 1, 19/03/1953. This amount came to Rs. 42,473.00 which was paid during the Previous year in question as rent for the aforesaid period. The respondent conmpany claimed a deduction in the sum of Rs. 42,473.00 on the ground that it was revenue expenditure and was deductible in the computation of its income for the assessment year 1954-55. The Incometax Officer did not allow the claim. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed only a part of the claim to the extent of Rs. 2,341.00, being the rent payable for one year. According to him, the balance of the rent which had been paid was relatable to the period prior to the said previous year and therefore, it was not deductible. The Income-tax Appellate tribunal qf appeal held that the entire amount of Rs. 42,473.00 was deductible as reverfl expenditure from the business profits of the respondent for the aforesaid assessment year. The tribunal was of the view that after the expiry of the lease on 1/04/1943, and the refusal of the lessor to renew the same the respondent was in the position of a trespasser particularly after the dismissal of the suit for specific performance by the trial court. Until the suit was compromised in the High court in 1953 it could not be said that the respondents liability had become ascertained. In other words, it was only as a result of the compromise in the year 1953, that the respondent became entitled to remain in possession of the land on payment of reat The payment of the sum of Rs. 42,473.00 thus represented revenue expenditur by the respondent.

(3) THE Commissioner of Income-tax applied to the tribunal to state the case and refer the following question of law:

" Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sum of Rs. 40,132.00 was payment of a revenue nature and, as such, allowable j deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 ? "

(4) THE tribunal dismissed the application for reference. The High court also did not accede to the prayer of the present appellant to direct the a case be submitted and the aforesaid question be referred.

(5) IN our judgment the High court was justified in refusing to direct the Appellate tribunal to state the case and refer the question which was sought to be referred. It was perfectly clear that the amount which have been paid by the respondent was an expenditure which was wholly a exclusively incurred for the purpose of carrying on its business. If the compromise had not taken

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