D.A.Desai, J.

(1) A tenant under a decree of eviction is the appellant in this appeal by special, leave. Respondent Smt. Maqbool Begum initiated two separate actions being N.C.C.s Nos. 15 and 16 of 1977 in the court of the Prescribed Authority, Nainital, for eviction of two tenants) one being the present appellant and another, one Kishan Chand Pandey, under S. 21(1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Building (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, on the ground that the accommodation at her disposal was insufficient for her family and she needed additional accommodation. Both the cases were consolidated and the prescribed authority held that the landlady bona fide required the premises for her own use and her need was genuine and greater hardship would be caused to her if her application for release of accommodation was rejected. Consistent with these findings the application for release of accommodation was granted in favour of the landlady. After an unsuccessful appeal by the tenant, he moved the High court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Before the High court it was contended that the landlady had purchased the house of which possession was sought, on November 11, 1974, and she commenced the action for release of accommodation within three years of the date of purchase and as such the application was not maintainable in view of the first proviso to subsection (1) of S. 21. Negativing this contention the High court held that there was no bar to the entertaining of application for release of accommodation within three years from the date of purchase of the house but the court would be precluded from awarding possession at any time within three years and that by the time eviction was ordered in the instant case the period of three years had elapsed and the application at inception was maintainable. Accordingly, the writ petition filed by the tenant was dilmissed.

(2) WHEN the tenant moved the petition for special leave to appeal to this court under Article 136 of the Constitution it was contended that the landlady made the application for release of accommodation on 10/09/1977, and as the High court has found that the house from which eviction of the tenant was sought was purchased by the landlady on November 11, 1974, it would be incontrovertible that the application for relea¯e of accommodation was made within three years. It was further contended that the proviso to Ss. (1) of S. 21 enacts a prohibition in that no application can be entertained on the ground mentioned in clause (a) of S. 21(1) of the Act unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of such purchase. It was also contended that the meaning given by the High court to the expression entertained would defeat the beneficial effect of the proviso. The substantial question of law canvassed before the court at the time of granting leave was whether the proviso enacts a prohibition restraining the court from entertaining an application for release on the ground of personal requirement for a period of three years from the date of purchase of the accommodation of which release is sought or it merely inhibits the court from making an order of eviction within three years? As the court was of the opinion that the sabstantial question of law needs authoritative pronouncement from this court becuse it was likely to affect a large number of persons special leave was granted on 15/05/1979.

(3) AFTER the grant of leave the respondent-landlady appeared and moved CMP 12737 of 1979 for revocation of leave on the ground that the accommodation from which tenant was sought to be evicted was purchased by the landlady on 28/07/1974, and not on 11/11/1974, as contended on behalf of the tenant, and the date of purchase being 28/07/1974, was admitted by the tenant in his written statement and yer suppressing this material fact leave was obtained from this court. To substantiate the submission the original sale deed was produced