ON behalf of Chandrachud, CJI. and Desai, A.P. Sen and Venkataramiah, JJ.

THE transferred case and the appeals connected with it raise important questions which require a careful and dispassionate consideration. The hearing of these matters was concluded four days ago, on Friday, the 26th. Since the judgment will take some time to prepare, we propose, by this Order, to state our conclusions on some of the points involved in the controversy:

(1) The High court acted within its jurisdiction in entertaining the writ petition and in issuing a rule nisi upon it, since the petition questioned the vires of the laws of election. But, with respect, it was not justified in passing the interim orders dated February 12 and 19, 1982 and in confirming those orders by its judgment dated 25/02/1982. Firstly, the High court had no material before it to warrant the passing of those orders. The allegations in the writ petition are of a vague and general nature, on the basis of which no relief could be granted. Secondly, though the High court did not lack the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and to issue appropriate directions therein, no High court in the exercise of its powers under Article; 226 of the Constitution should pass any orders, interim or otherwise, which has the tendency or effect of postponing an election, which is reasonably imminent and in relation to which its writ jurisdiction is invoked. The imminence of the electoral process is a factor which must guide and govern the passing of orders in the exercise of the High courts writ jurisdiction. The more imminent such process, the greater ought to be the reluctance of the High court to do anything, or direct anything to be done, which will postpone that process indefinitely by creating a situation in which, the government of a Stale cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. India is an oasis of denocracy, a fact of contemporary history which demands of the courts the use of wise statesmanship in the exercise of their extraordinary powers under the Constitution. The High courts must observe a selfimposed limitation on their power to act under Article 226, by refusing to pass orders or give directions which will inevitably result in an indefinite postponement of elections to legislative bodies, which are the very essence of the democratic foundation and functioning of our Constitution. That limitation ought to be observed irrespective of the fact whether the preparation and publication of electoral rolls are a part of the process of election within the meaning of Article 329(b) of the Constitution. We will pronounce upon that question later in our judgment.

(2) We are unable to accept the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the Election Commission, or the Chief Electoral Officer or the Electoral Registration Officers have in any manner acted in violation of the Constitution, the Representation of the People Acts of 1950 and 1951, or the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. The Election Commission issued the various directives ex debito justiciae, as steps-in-aid of a fair election. They are being observed faithfully and honestly, and shall be so observed until the deadline mentioned in S. 23(3) of the Act of 1950. The manner in which the directives are being implemented cannot be regarded as unreasonable, in the circumstances of the case.

IT takes years to build up public confidence in the functioning of constitutional institutions, and a single court hearing, perhaps, to sully their image by casting aspersions upon them. It is the duty of the courts to protect and preserve the integrity of all constitutional institutions which are devised to foster democracy. And when the method of their functioning is questioned, which it is open to the citizen to do, courts must examine the allegations with more than ordinary care. The presumption, be it remembered, is always of the existence of bona fides in the discharg