(1) THE main issue involved in this batch of appeals by special leave and the connected special leave petitions, directed against various judgments and orders of the Allahabad High court, is as to the constitutional validity of a particular bye-law framed by different Zila Parishads in the State in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 239 (2) (E) (a) of the Uttar Pradesh Kshetra Samiti and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam, 1961, prohibiting the use of any place in default of a licence granted by the Zila Parishad or otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of licence so granted. The impugned bve-law provides that the right to trade in carcass utilisation in the rural area of the respective Zila Parishads shall be put to public auction. Such activities comprise of taking of the carcass of dead animals to a place specified, skinning of the carcass, storage of bones and skins, curing and dyeing of such skins and preparation of leather goods. In Jagat Dhari v. Zila Parishad, Pratapgarh a learned Single Judge struck down the latter part of bve-law 11 framed by the Zila Parishad, Pratapgarh which provided for farming out of the privilege of utilisation and disposal of carcass of dead animals, on the ground that while S. 239(2) (E)(a) of the Act empowers a Zila Parishad to frame bye-laws to regulate or control the offensive trade for maintaining the health, safety and convenience of inhabitants of the rural areas lying within its jurisdiction, by prohibiting the user of any place in default of a licence granted bv the Zila Parishad or otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of a licence, it did not authorise the Zila Parishad to put the right or privilege to carry on such trade to public auction inasmuch as it created thereby a monopoly in favour of an individual or group of individuals. The view expressed in Jagat Dhari case was reiterated by a division bench in Mohammad Jahal v. Zila Parishads. Varanani and Mirzapur and in Suraj Pal v. Zila Parishad, Banda and it held that S. 239(2) (E) (a) and the other provisions of the Act did not confer on the Zila Parishad the power to create a monopoly in the trade of carcass utilisation. In Sura) Pal case, the division bench distinguished the decision of this court in State of Maharashtra v. Mumhai Upnagar Gramodyog Sangh taking a view to the contrary, on the ground that the analogous bye-law framed by the Municipal Corporation of Bombay regulating the trade of carcass utilisation viz. the activity of removing carcass to the prescribed place for the purpose of skinning, dyeing and tanning and also the activity of storing skins, horns and bones were reasonable restrictions within the meaning of Article 19(6) of the Constitution in the context of thickly populated metropolitan city of Greater Bombay where such restrictions was necessary in the interests of the general public for maintaining public health, sanitation and hygiene. It however held that the considerations which weighed with the court in State of Maharashtra v. Mumbai Upnagar Gramodyog Sangh, were of no relevance in determining the reasonableness of the restrictions on such trade in sparsely populated rural areas. The correctness of the decision of the division bench in the cases of Mohammad Iqbal and Suraj Pal following the view in Jagat Dhari case that the impugned bye-law offended against Article 19(1) (g) was open to question. A division bench accordingly referred the matter to a full bench.

(2) THE full bench decision was rendered by the Lucknow bench of the High court in Jaggu v. Zila Parishad, Gonda. The full bench while disagreeing with the earlier decisions of the High Court held that the considerations of public health, safety and convenience were equally relevant to the rural areas and therefore the individuals right to trade in the putrefying carcass of a dead animal which was an obnoxious thing was necessarily subject to the States police power and accordingly it was competent for the Zila Par