Back
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
G.L.Oza : K.Jagannatha Shetty
Annapoorani Ammal
Versus
G.Thangapalam
Case No. : 2635 of 1989
Date of Decision : 5/1/89
Advocates Appeared: Anjani : Mani K.K. : Padmanabhan S. : Ramamurthi J. : Ramkumar K. : Vaigai R.
Civil Procedure Code – Section 100 - Right to agree to convey property – Tenant - Exercised jurisdiction - Mother of appellant died - Respondent filed suit from which present appeal arises viz. Suit against petitioner appellant for conveyance of property by petitioner in favor of respondent on ground of a Yadast which was for first time produced with suit and is alleged to have been written by mother of petitioner which is marked as Ex. A-11 in favor of respondent - This document provided that respondent could get conveyance of property in suit from petitioner after paying sale price for registration expenses - This Yadast was on a plain piece of paper which is neither stamped nor registered nor attested - It is also significant that although this document is alleged to have been written even before sale deed of property itself was executed in favor of appellant but this document was not even mentioned in notice which was served by respondent on present appellant before this suit nor there is any reference anywhere in any earlier correspondence nor there is a mention of this document in sale deed which apparently is of a date subsequent nor there is any mention of it in rent agreement to which present respondent himself is a party – Held, A perusal of this S. clearly indicates that High court had jurisdiction to interfere only when a substantial question of law is involved and even then it is expected that such a question shall be so framed although court is not bound by that question as proviso indicates - There may be some other substantial questions of law which may need decision and which can be so decided - After going through judgment of High court in this appeal Court find that there is no substantial question of law and much less a question of law on basis of which learned Judge exercised jurisdiction under S. 100 and interfered with findings of fact - Only reason on basis of which High court exercised jurisdiction under S. 100 is what has been said by learned Judge himself - AS already stated its failure to consider evidence of Public Witness 2 as well as its wrong surmise that Ex. B-16 series contained signatures has affected validity of finding rendered by it - It is well known that Public Witness 2 is scribe of a document which has been found to be forged by lower appellate court and therefore a person who can go to the extent of manufacturing a document to suit one of the parties to the litigation, in our opinion, cannot be said to be an independent witness and lower appellate court was right in discarding his testimony - Unfortunately High court felt that he was an independent witness - Judge felt that signatures on Ex. B-16 is a mere surmise but this inference itself appears to be nothing but imagination as signatures prove receipt of a notice from Tuticorin Municipality for collection of house tax - This all in opinion of learned Judge was a substantial question of law which called for interference and it is clear that on such questions which have no substance and which could not be said to be even question of law interference by High court in second appeal could not be justified - At best two questions on which High court chose to interfere quoted above could be said to be questions of appreciation of evidence - Appeal is allowed
Judgment
G.L. OZA, J.
(1) LEAVE granted. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
(2) FACTS necessary for this appeal are, that the petitioner appellant-original defendant purchased the suit property by registered sale deed dated 27/12/1950 executed by Asirvada Nadar, Ponnammal and Devadasan in favour of the present petitioner appellant for a consideration of Rs. 7,000.00 . On January 4, 1951 the present respondent executed a rent agreement in favour of the present appellant for the building acknowledging her as her landlady Rs. 80.00 per month.
(3) IN 1963 the mother of the appellant by name of Ramalakshmi Ammal died. In 1974 the respondent filed the suit from which the present appeal arises viz. Suit No. 79 of 1974 against the petitioner appellant for conveyance of the property by the petitioner in favour of the respondent on the ground of a Yadast which was for the first time produced with the suit and is alleged to have been written by the mother of the petitioner on 24/12/1950 which is marked as Ex. A-11, in favour of the respondent. This document provided that respondent could get conveyance of the property in the suit from the petitioner after paying the sale price of Rs. 7,000.00 and Rs. 1,000.00 for registration expenses. This Yadast (so-called agreement) was on a plain piece of paper which is neither stamped nor registered nor attested. It is also significant that although this document is alleged to have been written on 24/12/1950 even before the sale deed of the property itself was executed in favour of the appellant but this document was not even mentioned in the notice which was served by the respondent on the present appellant before this suit nor there is any reference anywhere in any earlier correspondence nor there is a mention of this document in the sale deed dated 27/12/1950 which apparently is of a date subsequent to 24/12/1950 nor there is any mention of it in the rent agreement dated 4/01/1951 to which the present respondent himself is a party.
(4) BY judgment dated 8/11/1978 the trial court (Sub-Judge) relying on this Yadast decreed the suit filed by the respondent.
(5) ON appeal the Additional District Judge after detailed examination of all the facts and evidence came to the findings of fact that the present petitioner acquired title to the property on the basis of the sale deed which is a registered document in her favour and this property was leased out to the respondent under a rent agreement. It also held that as the mother of the petitioner was not a party to the sale deed she had no right to agree to convey the property or to ask the daughter to convey the suit property in favour of the respondent.
(6) THE plaintiff respondent was not a party to the sale deed (transferor) but is only a stranger who became a tenant under the rent agreement, In fact the sale deed was executed by some other person and therefore this Yadastcould not be said to be an agreement to reconvey the property as apparently both the parties to the Yadast one making the commitment to recovery and another in whose favour the commitment is made, are not parties at all to the original transaction of sale. The learned Additional District Judge also came to the conclusion that this document was not genuine and is a forged document which is invalid and was just got up for the purposes of this suit and it has seen the light of the day for the first time after 23 years after the date on which it purports to have been executed and for all these 23 years it was never referred to also. The learned appellate court also felt that the suit for specific performance was barred as it was filed more than 20 years after the alleged Yadasf (agreement).
(7) THE learned Judge of the High court in second appeal by the impugned judgment interfered with the findings of fact arrived at by the lower appellate court which was the final court of facts and went on at length to reassess the evidence and not onl
An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers
Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance
Scan Me!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :
Back to top
