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1991 Supreme(SC) 514

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
M.Fathima Beevi : S.R.Pandian
Anil Sanjeev Hegde
Versus
State Of Maharashtra
Case No. : 586 of 1989
Date of Decision : 9/25/91

Headnote:

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 - Section,3(2)(ii) - Causing hurt - Terrorist and Disruptive Activities - Court in Terrorists Sessions Case appellant has been convicted Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention hereinafter referred to Act and sentenced to undergo minimum sentence of five years rigorous imprisonment trial court in prefatory part of its judgment has made certain observations regarding lack of evidence to substantiate charge in its entirety said observation as appears in of impugned judgment is reproduced hereunder on behalf of prosecution that there is no such evidence which prosecution could effect that accused committed any terrorist act with intent to adversely affect harmony amongst different of people by means of any weapon like dagger or sword- Therefore second part charge now stands not proved going through charge and conclusion under challenge arrived at by Designated court are at a loss find out as what trial Judge has really meant by above observation- In fact none of learned counsel appearing respective parties also not position to explain that observation –Held, Examination of impugned judgment court find that Judge of Designated court has rested his conclusion on conjectures and presumptions evidently drawing them from his fertile imagination- Further when evidence witnesses meticulously and scrupulously examined and tested court find credibility of testimony of these four witnesses is completely shaken compelling us not to place any reliance on such evidence- In this connation learned senior counsel for appellant placed reliance on judgment of this court reported in which this court after extracting observation made -State of Gujarat has observed differently ratio of decision is that provisions of Act need not be resorted to nature of activities of accused can be checked and controlled under ordinary law of land- It is only in those cases where law enforcing machinery finds ordinary law to be inadequate not sufficiently effective for tackling menace of terrorist and disruptive activities that resort should be had drastic provisions of Act- While invoking a criminal statute such as Act prosecution is duty- bound to show from record documents collected in course of investigation that facts emerging there from prima facie constitute an offence within letter of law counsel for respondent State drew our attention to preamble of Act and evidence of investigating officer and submitted that activities appellant would fall within and such judgment impugned need not be interfered with- Court are unable to see any force in submission of learned counsel for aforementioned reasons strong view that evidence let in by prosecution in proof of these two incidents is not only unreliable and untrustworthy but also do not make out any case constituting necessary ingredients which would attract invocation - Appeal allowed

(1) THE appellant, Anil Sanjeev Hegde, has directed this criminal appeal challenging the correctness and legality of the judgment and order dated 8/08/1989 made by the learned Judge of the Designated Court, Pune in Terrorists Sessions Case No. 3 of 1989 whereunder the appellant has been convicted under S. 3(2)(ii) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and sentenced to undergo the minimum sentence of five years rigorous imprisonment. The trial court in the prefatory part of its judg- ment has made certain observations regarding the lack of evidence to substantiate the charge in its entirety. The said observation as appears in para 2 of the impugned judgment is reproduced hereunder:

"IT is indisputed on behalf of the prosecution that there is no such evidence, which the prosecution could effect that the accused committed any terrorist act, with intent to adversely affect the harmony amongst different S. of the people by means of any weapon like dagger or sword. Therefore, the second part of the charge now stands not proved."

(2) ON going through the charge and conclusion under challenge ar- rived at by the Designated court, we are at a loss to find out as what the trial Judge has really meant by the above observation. In fact, none of the learned counsel appearing lor the respective parties is also not in a position to explain that observation.

(3) BE that as it may, we shall now discuss the evidence let in by the prosecution regarding the two incidents relied upon by the prosecution to make out a case within the ambit of S. 3 of the Act.

(4) THE prosecution has made an abortive and vain attempt to estab- lish its case by examining PWs 2 to 10 of whom PWs 5 to 10 have resiled from their earlier statements and become hostile to the prosecution. The totality of the evidence relied upon covers two incidents which took place on 12/09/1987 and 12/07/1988. PWs 4 and 5 were exam- ined to speak about the earlier incident which is alleged to have taken place on 12/09/1987. We shall first of all examine the veracity of these two witnesses and see whether their evidence inspires the con- fidence of this court. The allegations in respect of this incident are that on 26/09/1987 at about 8.30 p.m. while PWs 4 and 5 were sitting in a hotel by name "Silver Bowl", the appellant came there accompanied by his associates and unleashed a threat by wielding his sword and abus- ing the witnesses in intemperate language. PWs 4 and 5 panicked and took to their heels. It is further alleged that at the exhortation of the ap- pellant, his associates took Public Witness 4 to a nearby petrol pump and gave him four blows with a sword. It is brought in evidence that Public Witness 4 stated be- fore the Investigating Officer that he was assaulted by the appellant alone but not by his associates which version is diametrically opposed to the one given before the court on oath. There is absolutely no record to prove that Public Witness 4 sustained any injury, if so, what kind of injury he sustained. Nothing has come in evidence as to whether any criminal case has been registered in respect of this incident. Public Witness 4 has admitted in the cross-examination that he has been prosecuted for offences such as rob- bery, voluntarily causing hurt and so on. Even though Public Witness 5 has been treated as a hostile witness as he has resiled from his earlier statement, the trial Judge placing reliance upon the judgment reported in Shankar- lal v. State of M.P. has relied upon certain portion of the evidence of this hostile witness as corroborating Public Witness 4s evidence. After going through the entire evidence and the judgment impugned, we are of the view that the prosecution has not at all established this incident, on the other hand, has miserably failed in its attempt.

(5) THE second incident as we have already stated, relates to the incident which is alleg






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