(1) THIS appeal by special leave is against the judgment and decree of the High court of Allahabad dated 16/11/1976 passed in First Appeal No. 208 of 1957.

(2) THE appellant herein, the State of Rajasthan, filed a suit for decla- ration and permanent injunction against the respondent-Municipal Board, Allahabad on the premises that His Highness the Maharaja of Jaipur was the Muhfidar of 35 acres of land of the identity disclosed in the plaint and in the assertion of that right had all along been realising tehbazari or ground rent from the vendors, itinerants, shopkeepers etc. who were selling articles on shops in the bazar or elsewhere within those 35 acres; but since the Municipal Board had raised a counter claim thereon a declaration was necessary in favour of the State of Rajasthan being the successor of His Highness the Maharaja of Jaipur, and a permanent injunction restraining the Municipal Board, Allahabad from interfering with such right of the appellant to realise dues or ground rent, as the case may be. The appellant was successful in getting the suit decreed before the trial court, but the High court of Allahabad in first appeal reversed that decision insofar as the claim to the collection of tehbazari etc. was concerned, which has led to the instant appeal.

(3) WE have heard learned counsel. Both courts below have found a that the Maharaja of Jaipur was the Muhfidar of 35 acres of land, location and identity of which stands established as per findings of the trial court, it has also been found as a fact that two prominent roads by the name of Zahural Hasan Road and Chintamani Ghosh Road lie in the said disputed area of 35 acres. Now Section 219) of the U.P. Municipalities Act defines the expression "public street" and Section 116-G of the Act declares that all public streets and the pavements, stones and the other materials thereon as also all trees, erections, materials, implements and things existing on or appearing on such street shall vest in and belong to the Board and shall, with all other property which may become vested in the court be under its direction, management and control. The aforesaid two roads having been factually found to be "public streets" within the meaning of Section 219 and thus having vested statutorily in the Board under Section 116-G, the Board gets the power under Section 209 of the Act to sanction user in terms thereof and charge thereon tehbazari under Section 220.

(4) LEARNED counsel for the appellant would have us decide the question of ownership and to interpret the words vesting in order to decide who is the owner of those two streets which have been termed as "public streets" by the High court within the meaning of S. 219) of the Act. After hearing him, we are not persuaded to enter into this controversy and would rather confine to the limited scope of the controversy as to what are the consequences of statutory vesting of a street in the Municipal Board. To say the least, the management and control of such public street gets vested in the Municipal Board. In the exercise of such management and control, it has powers vested in it under S. 209, 210 and 220 to permit projection over streets and drains, levy penalty for construction and projection over streets and drains without permission and further permit use of public street by vendors and others. S. 220 would be useful to be set out here:

"220. Notwithstanding any right or privilege (previously) acquired, accrued, or enjoyed, in a municipality for which bye-laws under sub-head (b) of heading E of S. 226 have been made and are in force, no itinerant vendor, or any other person, shall be entitled to use or occupy any public street or place for the sale of articles or for the exercise of any calling or for the setting up of any booth or stall without the permission of the Board given in accordance with such bye-laws."

(5) THE non-obstante clause superimposes the right of the municipality to re