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1991 Supreme(SC) 150

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R.M. Sahai, T.K. Thommen
PRAKASH WAREHOUSING CO., APPELLANT
VERSUS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY AND ANOTHER, RESPONDENTS.
Civil Appeal No. 2589 of 1978,
decided on March 13, 1991.

Headnote:

Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 - Section 105-F – Constitution of India - Article 227 - No evidence – Appeal against conviction – Jurisdiction - By the impugned judgment High Court has confirmed the order of eviction made against appellant principal occupant of two go downs belonging to Corporation - Original occupant of & Co. had granted to appellant a in respect of these premises and subsequently by a deed of assignment assigned all it rights title and interest in the premises in of appellant had in the meantime by agreement permitted respondent 2 to store goods in the premises - Appellant thereafter requested the Corporation to recognize it as the principal occupant of the premises by means of a formal agreement – Held, Sub-letting as such, without more, is not a ground for eviction under clause (a)(ii). What attracts eviction in terms of that provision is sub-letting which is contrary to the terms or conditions of occupation - Appellate office has found that occupation of premises by respondent appellant was well known to the Corporation; the terms and conditions of that occupation were closely by Corporation before recognizing the transfer of rights and interest from the previous principal occupant to appellant and it was on that basis and with that knowledge that the Corporation authorized the occupation of the premises by the appellant in terms of the agreement - In such circumstances, whatever right of occupation which respondent 2 enjoyed under the appellant must be deemed to have been incorporated as a term of the authority granted by the Corporation in favor of the appellant - Appellate officer has categorically found that there was no evidence whatsoever to indicate that the circumstances in which the premises had been occupied by respondent 2 had in any manner, or at any time, altered so as to affect the terms or conditions under which the appellant was recognized as principal occupant - Corporation is, accordingly on the facts found stopped from having recourse to the ground falling under clause (a) (ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 105-B - As stated by the High Court, this was the only ground on which eviction was sought, and that ground, as found by the appellate officer, has not been established - specific ground upon which eviction was sought, as seen in the order of the enquiry officer and as categorically found by High Court, was one of sub-letting contrary to the terms or conditions of occupation. No other ground, as the High Court says, was relied upon by the Corporation. In the circumstances, the Commissioner (or his delegate) must be understood to have restricted the scope of the enquiry to the ground falling under clause (a) (ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 105-B for the purpose of invoking the summary power of eviction vested in him under the statute - Appeal is allowed

JUDGMENT

THOMMEN, J. - This appeal arises from the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 983 of 1972 setting aside the order made by the appellate officer (the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court Bombay), under Section 105-F of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (the Act), whereby he allowed the appellants appeal against the order of eviction made against it under Section 105-B of the Act by the enquiry officer, acting in terms of Section 68 of the Act as a delegate of the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, respondent 1; hereinafter "the Corporation".

2. By the impugned judgment, the High Court has confirmed the order of eviction made against the appellant, the principal occupant of two godowns belonging to the Corporation. The original occupant of the godowns, Glenfield & Co., had on October 1, 1963 granted to the appellant a licence in respect of these premises and subsequently by a deed of assignment dated August 13, 1966 assigned all it rights, title and interest in the premises in favour of the appellant. The appellant had in the meantime by agreement dated March 27, 1964 permitted respondent 2 to store goods in the premises. The appellant thereafter requested the Corporation to recognise it as the principal occupant of the premises by means of a formal agreement. This request was at first rejected by the Corporation on the ground that Ghatge and Patil (Transport) Pvt. Ltd., respondent 2, had been already in occupation of the premises. Sub-sequently the Corporation examined the terms and conditions of the agreement dated March 27, 1964 (as renewed from time to time) upon which respondent 2 was allowed to occupy the premises, and after satisfying itself as to those terms, the Corporation transferred the occupancy right from Glenfield & Co. to the appellant on the appellant executing a formal agreement dated June 17, 1967. The Corporation was thus fully award of the terms and conditions of occupation of the premises by respondent 2, and with the full knowledge of those terms, the appellant was recorded in the Corporations books as the principal occupant in the place of Glenfield and Co. Respondent 2 was thus understood and accepted by the Corporation to be in occupation of the premises under the appellant. All this was in 1967.

3. A notice dated July 25, 1969 terminating tenancy purportedly in terms of the agreement dated June 17, 1967 was served on the appellant. This was followed by an enquiry under the Act which commenced in 1970 and resulted in the order of eviction dated January 6, 1971. The order of eviction refers to the appellant as the principal tenant and respondent 2 as a sub-tenant. The enquiry officer, acting as a delegate in terms of Section 68 and exercising the power of the Commissioner under Section 105-B, ordered eviction of the appellant on the ground of subletting the premises. She held that the appellant had sub-let the premises contrary to the terms or conditions of occupation and had thus become and unauthorised occupant liable to be evicted from the premises.

4. The enquiry officer, on inspection, found that respondent 2 was in occupation of the premises as a sub-lessee. She noticed the terms and conditions of the agreement dated March 27, 1964 under which the premises had been allowed to be occupied by respondent 2. She concluded that the appellant had, by reason of sub-letting contrary to the terms or conditions of occupation, become liable to be evicted in terms of Section 105-B. Accordingly, she passed an order of eviction against the appellant.

5. This order was, on appeal, set aside by the appellate officer. On appreciation of the evidence on record, including the terms of the relevant agreements, the appellate officer held that the agreement dated March 27, 1964, under which respondent 2 occupied the premises, had been well known to the Corporation, and the Corporation, having satisfied itself as to the full implication and sig











































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