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1993 Supreme(SC) 897

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
J.S.Verma : N.P.Singh : S.P.Bharucha
Ram Chand: Ved Prakash
Versus
Union Of India
Case No. : 1609 to 1622 of 1961
Date of Decision : 9/30/93
Advocates Appeared: Chauhan B.S. : Goswamy N.N. : Mehta Dhruv : Mehta S.K. : Prasad B.K. : Sanghi G.L. : Sen A.K. : Sharma Arun Kumar : Sharma T.C. : Sikka S.N.

Headnote:

Land Acquisition Act - Section 4 – Constitution of India - Article 226 – Acquisition of land - For quashing the land acquisition proceedings – Claim of compensation - According to petitioners, having issued the declarations in respect of several thousand of land, no further for making Of the award or payment of compensation, were taken for more than from date of the declarations under Section 6 of Act awards were made only in - This procedure was adopted only to peg the market value of the lands between - This has inflicted great injury to petitioners inasmuch as compensation has been worked out with reference to the dates of notifications under Section 4 of the Act – Held, Court are of the view. that there was no justification on part of respondents for the delay in completion of the proceedings after the judgment of this court in - There is no explanation except that there were several cases and, as such, in normal course, there was bound to be delay in making of the awards - This may have been acceptable if delay was only in respect of some of the award5 - It is an admitted position that till 1980 no award had been made in respect of any of the acquisitions. As such, the respondents have failed to satisfy that they have performed their statutory duty within a time which can be held to be reasonable - According to us, after the judgment of this court in reasonable time for making the awards was about two years from that date. Beyond two years, the time taken for making of the awards will be deemed to be unreasonable. As such after expiry of the period of two years, some additional compensation has to be awarded to the cultivators. Taking into consideration the interest of the cultivators and the public, instead of quashing the proceedings for acquisition, we direct that the petitioners shall be paid an additional amount of compensation to be calculated at the rate of twelve per cent per annum, after expiry of two years from 23/08/1974, the dale of the judgment of this court in case" till the date of the making of the awards by the Collector, to be calculated with reference to the market value of the lands in question on the date of the notifications under – Petition dismissed

Judgement Key Points

Key Points: - The Court held that there was no justification for delay in completion of proceedings after the 1974 Aflatoon judgment; delays beyond a reasonable time (about two years after the declaration) were unreasonable (!) (!) (!) . - It was held that beyond two years, additional compensation at 12% per annum should be awarded to cultivators, rather than quashing the proceedings, to balance public interest and individual injury (!) (!) . - The 1984 amendments introduced time limits (Section 11-A) for making awards, with lapse of proceedings if not completed within two years from the declaration; provisos do not validate pre-existing inaction but set new deadlines (!) (!) (!) . - The Court emphasized that compensation must reflect market value as of the date of notification under Section 4, not the date of award, to avoid undue pegging; advancement of the notification date may be used to protect just compensation in specific cases (!) (!) . - The Court recognised the need for expeditious conclusion of acquisition and payment of compensation after Section 6 declarations, and that unreasonably delayed proceedings undermine constitutional and statutory mandates (!) (!) .

What is the appropriate remedy where land acquisition proceedings have been delayed beyond reasonable time and compensation pegged to earlier notification dates?

What is the effect of introducing time-limits for awards and declarations (Sections 11-A and 6) on previously pending acquisitions and potential compensation?

What is the proper judicial relief when delays in land acquisition have caused injury to cultivators, and should courts quash proceedings or award additional compensation?


Judgment

N.P. SINGH, J.

(1) WRIT petitions and a Civil have been filed for quashing the land acquisition proceedings, which had been initiated between the years 1959 and 1965 by issuance of notifications under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") but in which no awards were made up to the years 1979-80, although the declarations under Section 6 of the Act had been made in the years 1966 and 1969. The first such notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on 13/01/1959 in respect of 24,000 acres of land. Another notification under Section 4 was issued on 24/10/1961 in respect of 16,000.00 acres of land. One such notification under Section 4 was issued on 23/01/1965. Declarations under Section 6 of the Act were issued on 16/05/1966 and 13/01/1969. The declaration dated 16/05/1966 related to 2,153 Bighas of land, whereas the declaration dated 13/01/1969 was in respect of 88 Bighas. A declaration under Section 6 had been made on 6/12/1966 in respect of 5,898 Bighas of land which is the subject-matter of controversy in other writ petitions,

(2) ACCORDING to the petitioners, having issued the declarations in respect of several thousand Bighas of land, no further sieps, for making Of the award or payment of the compensation, were taken for more than 14 years from the date of the declarations under Section 6 of the Act The awards were made only in the years 1980, 1981 and 1983. This procedure was adopted only to peg the market value of the lands between the years 1959 and 1965. This has inflicted great injury to the petitioners, inasmuch as the compensation has been worked out with reference to the dates of notifications under Section 4 of the Act.

(3) THE power to acquire private property for public use is an attribute of sovereignty and is essential to the existence of a government. The power of eminent domain was recognised on the principle that the sovereign State can always acquire the property of a citizen for public good, without the owners consent. Later, either in the Constitution or in the Act enacted for that purpose, not only this power was recognised, but limitations on exercise of a such power were prescribed, for striking a balance between the interest of the public and the individual.

(4) THE right to acquire an interest in land compulsorily has assumed increasing importance as a result of requirement of such land more and more everyday, for different public purposes and to implement the promises made by the framers of the Constitution to the people of India. But, the Constitution ensures under the second proviso to Article 31-A, that where any law makes provision for the acquisition by the State, of land held by a person, under his personal cultivation, within the ceiling limit, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land "unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof. By Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, clause (f) of Article 19 and Article 31 have been deleted and, as such, to hold property is no more a fundamental right. But, still the mandate under second proviso to Article 31-A continues regarding payment of market value in respect of the land, the subject-matter of acquisition. The Act provides for payment of compensation in respect of the acquisition made, at the market value of the land, as such it is consistent with second proviso to Article 31-A. But in view of Ss. (1 of Section II and Ss. (1 of Section 23, the market value of such land is to be fixed with reference to "the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, Ss. (1", irrespective of the dates on which declaration under Section 6 or award under Section 11 are made or possession is taken under Section 16 of the Act. Prior to coming in force of the Land Acquisition (Amendm








































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