(1) THIS appeal arises against the judgment of the High court of Delhi rendered in the Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 637/1992, dated 16/2/1993. In and by the said judgment, the High court has chosen to interfere at the pre-detention stage. Against the respondent the order of detention has been passed on 28/8/198282. The grounds of detention are yet to be served. The High court has chosen to allow the writ petition and quashed the order on three grounds, (1 the grounds of detention are common with those grounds of detention in the case of Vijay Kumar; (2 Vijay Kumar and other accused were advised to be released by the Advisory Board constituted under Section 8 of the Act; and (3 there is relaxation to bring gold of foreign origin up to a certain extent on payment of certain duty.

(2) AGGRIEVED by this judgment, the Administration of the National Capital of Delhi has preferred this appeal. The learned counsel, Mr Nambiar on behalf of the appellant, strongly relies on Additional Secy. to the Govt. of India v. Alka Suhhash Gadia, particularly paragraph 536. On these basis it is submitted that this Court has catalogued the grounds for interference at the pre-detention stage. Not one of the grounds mentioned therein would be applicable to the facts of this case. In other words, the case on hand could not be brought within the ambit of these criteria. As a matter of fact, the same position is reiterated while approving of this ruling in State of T.N. v. P.K.Shamsudeen. Disregarding these principles, the High Court had chosen to embark upon new grounds. By that. a new approach totally unwarranted in cases of preventive detention has been made. It is surprising the High Court should state the ground of detention in the case herein and those of Vijay Kumar are common ignoring the vital fact that the grounds of detention as far as the respondent herein is concerned are yet to be disclosed. This point has been reiterated in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant before the High Court. Then again merely because Vijay Kumar and other detenus had been advised to be released by the Advisory Board that does not mean in the case of the respondent also, the same could be. applied.

(3) LASTLY it is submitted that the court has clearly misunderstood the policy of liberalisation in relation to import of gold which has no bearing whatever in the case of preventive detention. On these grounds, it is submitted that the order of the High Court be set aside.

(4) ON opposing this, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that the case on hand would fall under ground paragraph 3 stated in Alka Suhhash Gadia case. In other words, the order of detention is used for wrong purpose. Besides, it is possible that the High Court could have seen the grounds of detention of the respondent and compared the same with those of Vijay Kumar and came to the conclusion that the grounds were common. In any event, there is long delay in passing the order. Therefore, no interference is warranted.

(5) WE have carefully considered the above arguments. It is needless to state that the law in relation to pre-detention is fully covered by the ruling of this Court reported in Alka Subhash Gadia case . In that decision the following grounds were catalogued

"THE courts have the necessary power and they have used it in proper a cases as has been pointed out above, although such cases have been few and the grounds on which the courts have interfered with them at the pre- execution stage are necessarily very limited in scope and number, viz., where the courts are prima facie satisfied (i) that the impugned order is not passed under the Act under which it is purported to have been passed, (ii) that it is sought to be executed against a wrong person, (iii) that it is passed for a wrong purpose, (iv) that it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds or (v) that the authority which passed it had no authority to do so. The