(1) WE have pronounced judgment today in CA Nos. 2620-64 of 198V. For the reasons recorded therein these transferred cases have to be dismissed. We may, however, briefly deal with the controversy involved in these cases.

(2) BIHAR and orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 (the Bihar Act) was amended by Act 4 of 1974 thereby incorporating "any money payable to the State Bank of India" within the list of Public Demands set out in Schedule I to the Bihar Act. In these transferred cases the only point argued before us was that the Bihar Legislature had no legislative competence to enact law providing for recovery of bank dues as arrears of land revenue.

(3) WE may refer to the facts relating to Transferred Case No. 40 of 1989. Harish Tara Refractories (P) Ltd., had entered into several agreements with the State Bank of India, Main Branch, Ranchi. The case of the bank is that there were various dealings and transactions between the parties and large sums of money became due and payable by the company. According to the bank the admitted liability of the company as on 1/10/1979 was Rs. 31,18,993.55. Since the repayment of the loan was not made despite repeated demands the Manager of the bank sent a requisition for a certificate under the Bihar Act for recovery of the outstanding loan amount together with interest. The Certificate Officer issued a certificate under S. 4 and 6 of the Bihar Act. The certificate was challenged by the company by way of writ petition before the Calcutta High court, inter alia, on the ground that the Bihar Legislature had no legislative competence to enact the law permitting recovery of the bank dues as arrears of land revenue. It was argued that the Bihar Act was a legislation relating to banking in respect of which only Parliament can make law under Entry 45, List I, Seventh Schedule, Constitution of India. Suhas Chandra Sen, J. dealt with the points raised before him in a lucid manner with utmost clarity. The learned Judge referred to the judgment of a division bench of the Calcutta High court in N.C. Mukherjee and Co. v. Union of India and came to the conclusion that the provisions of the Bihar Act and of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913 were almost identical and as such the Certificate Officer under the Bihar Act was exercising the judicial powers of the State. The learned Judge followed the judgment of this court in State of Bombay v. Narothamdas Jethabai and held as under:

" Administration of justice; constitution and organisation of all courts, except the Supreme court and the High court has now been brought under Entry 11-A of the Concurrent List. It is no more the exclusive power of the State Legislature to legislate on these matters. But administration of justice is certainly a subject on which the State Legislature can legislate. In view of the interpretation given to this phrase by the Supreme court, this power must necessarily include the power of enlarging or diminishing the jurisdiction of the courts. The Bihar Legislature by the Amending Act 4 of 1974 has merely enlarged the jurisdiction of the Certificate Officer so as to enable the State Bank of India and other banks specified in the Schedule to take recourse to the speedier remedy provided under the Bihar and orissa Public Demands Recovery Act. Possibly, this was done to enable the banks to avoid the proverbial laws delay and to realise their claims speedily by the expeditious remedy provided by that Act. Whatever may be the reason for passing this legislation, there cannot be any doubt that the amendment clearly comes under Entry 11-A of the Concurrent List. The Amending Act 4 of 1974 has merely brought a dispute relating to money payable to the State Bank of India within the jurisdiction of the Certificate Officer. In effect, what has been done is to enlarge the jurisdiction of the revenue court." The learned Judge dealt with the argument that the impugned provision of the Bihar Act was in rela