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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
G.N. Ray, K. Ramaswamy
HINDALCO INDUSTRIES LTD., APPELLANT
Versus
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS, RESPONDENTS.
Civil Appeal No. 7452 of 1993
decided on December 16, 1993.
Railways Act 24 - Section 36 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 195 – Circumstances evidence - . Dealing with discretionary power of licensing authority - Challenged as being arbitrary - Question therefore is whether Railway Rate Tribunal has committed any error of law in confining relief only from date of judgment. Section 36 of Act provides that complaint that a railway administration is charging for carriage of any commodity between two stations a rate which is unreasonable is levying any other charge which is unreasonable may be made to Tribunal and Tribunal shall hear and decide any such complaint in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter - Section 38 confers on Tribunal that it "shall have powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908" for purposes of taking evidence on oath, enforcing the attendance of witnesses, etc. including the power to review and shall be deemed to be a civil court for all purposes of Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Held, There lies a distinction between administrative authorities exercising discretionary jurisdiction and the court or quasi-judicial Tribunal deciding - In the latter case discretion has been given to the court or Tribunal to mould ancillary relief - Discretion is to be exercised with circumspection consistent with justice, equity and good conscience, keeping always given facts and circumstances of the case - Undoubtedly there was delay in constitution of the proper Tribunal, to discharge its function under the Act and thereafter there would be consequential delay in disposal of cause - These cannot be characterized to be the court causing hurt to the litigant but of inevitable incidents of adjudication and that by itself is not a ground to grant or ought to be granted the relief asked for. Nevertheless, if as stated earlier Tribunal feels that the relief may be just and equitable, it is always open to Tribunal to grant it which includes power to refuse to grant the relief. In this case while holding that the continued levy of freight rate on Bauxite at old distance is unreasonable and directed to charge the freight on the basis of the actual distance only Tribunal granted the relief from date of judgment - Therefore it being a discretionary relief and the Act having left that discretion to Tribunal it appears to have felt that it would be just to give relief from the date of judgment to meet the ends of justice - Appellant is not as of right entitled to the relief - No doubt the statute postulates that the relief cannot be granted anterior to the date of the complaint - That dose not mean that the Tribunal is always bound to grant relief from the date of the complaint. By operation of sub-section (2) of Section 38 the Tribunal has been invested with the discretion to grant such relief as is warranted - Bad faith, dishonesty - those, of course, stand by themselves, unreasonableness, attention given to extraneous circumstances, disregard of public policy, and things like that have all been referred to as being matters which are relevant for consideration - Discretion must be exercised reasonably. A person entrusted with discretion must direct himself properly in law - +He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to the matter that he has to consider - If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said to be acting unreasonably - Appeal is dismissed
JUDGMENT
K. RAMASWAMY, J. - Special leave granted.
2. The appellant-company manufactures Aluminium metal and its semis. The principal raw material is Bauxite. The appellant has its Bauxite mines at Amarkantak, District Sahdol in Madhya Pradesh. It consigns the ore at Pandra road for carriage to Renukoot siding through the railway route via Katni-Murwara-Singrauli covering South Eastern Railway from Pandra Road to Katni-Murwara, a distance of 217 km; Central Railway Katni-Murwara to Singrauli 407 km and Eastern Railway via Singrauli to Renukoot 90 km; in total 714 km. Later, Katni-Murwara to Balli, a new railway line was laid connecting Singrauli. The Bauxite ore was being carried from Pandra Road via Katni-Murwara-Balli-Singrauli to Renukoot railway siding. The distance though was reduced to 568 km the freight charges for physical distance of 714 km at the rate of Rs. 13.75 per quintal per km was continued to be charged and later was increased to Rs. 16.75 per quintal per km with effect from December 1, 1986, the consequential inflated rate was at 55%. The appellant, therefore, laid the complaint under Section 36(b) of the Railways Act 24 of 1989, for short the Act, seeking :
(i) to declare that the rates at present charged for Bauxite from Pandra Road to Renukoot on an inflated distance of 714 km is wholly unjust and unreasonable;
(ii) to direct the Railways to charges reasonable rates on the basis of the actual distance of 568 km; and
(iii) to give such other relevant relief as the Tribunal deems fit in the circumstances of the case.
3. Though the respondent-Railways justified the levy of the freight charges at 714 km distance the Railway Rate Tribunal by its judgment dated March 3, 1992 declared that, "the continued levy on freight rate for the movement of complainants traffic in Bauxite from Pandra Road to Renukoot for a distance of 714 km by inflating the distance between Katni and Singrauli by 55% is unreasonable; and the respondent shall levy the freight charges for the complainants traffic on the basis of the actual distance only. This order will take effect from the date of the order". The respondent allowed the order to become final. The appellants, though had the main relief, filed this appeal seeking the relief from the date of the complaint, namely March 10, 1987.
4. Mr. K. K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel for the appellant contended that the Tribunal having found that the imposition of rate on the inflated distance being unreasonable, ought to have granted the relief from the date of the complaint. It is admitted by the Railways that the corum to decide the complaint was not filled by appointing either the Chairman or the Member of the Tribunal from November 11, 1987 to May 18, 1991 and the resultant delay in adjudication. The finding that there is no proof of hurt by the appellant is not a relevant circumstance to deny the relief to the appellant. He placed strong reliance on Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. ((1947) 2 All ER 680).
5. The question, therefore, is whether the Railway Rate Tribunal has committed any error of law in confining the relief only from the date of the judgment. Section 36 of the Act provides that. "[a]ny complaint that a railway administration - (a) ... (b) is charging for the carriage of any commodity between two stations a rate which is unreasonable; or (c) is levying any other charge which is unreasonable, may be made to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall hear and decide any such complaint in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter". Section 38 confers on the Tribunal that it "shall have the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908" for the purposes of taking evidence on oath, enforcing the attendance of witnesses, etc. including the power to review and shall be deemed to be a civil court for all purposes of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Tribunal "shall also have the power to pass such interim a
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