(1) THE only point that is urged in this appeal relates to the third proviso to Section 36(2 which was introduced into the central Excises &: Salt Act, 1944, by the central Excises and Sait and central Boards of Revenue (Amendment) Act, 1978. This Amendment Act also introduced Section 11A into the principal Act but Section IIA was brought into force only on 17/11/1980.

(2) SECTION 36(2 gives to the central government the power to call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which any decision or order has been passed under S. 35 or 35(A) of the principal Act, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to its correctness, legality or propriety and to pass such order thereon as it thinks fit. The second proviso thereto states that "no proceedings shall be commenced under this Ss. in respect of any decision or order (whether such decision or order has been passed before or after the coming into force of this sub-section) after the expiration of a period of one year from the date of such decision or order". The third proviso to Section 36(2 reads thus :

"PROVIDED also that where the central government is of opinion that any duty of excise has not been levied or has been short-levied or erroneously refunded, no order levying or enhancing the duty, or no order requiring payment of the duty so refunded, shall be made under this section unless the person affected by the proposed order is given notice to show cause against it within the time limit specified in Section 11A."

(3) THE time limit specified in Section 11A when there has been a short levy of excise duty, as is, admittedly, the case here, is six months. This is less than the period of one year provided by the second proviso to Section 36(2. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that since Section 11A was not brought into force until 17/11/1980, the time limit for the purposes of a short levy notice under Section 36(2 was not, until 17/11/1980, that provided by Section 11A and that, therefore, the notice with which we are concerned in this appeal was not time-barred.

(4) WE find it difficult to accept the contention. The third proviso to Section 36(2 merely indicates how the time limit for a notice, inter alia in regard to short levy of excise duty, has to be reckoned : it has to be reckoned as indicated in Section 11A. The notice under Section 36(2 is not required to be given under the provisions of Section 11A. That Section 11A was not brought into force until 17/11/1980, is, therefore, of no relevance, particularly considering the fact that it was enacted in 1978 as was the third proviso to Section 36(2 itself.

(5) IN the result, the only point argued on behalf of the appellant must be decided against it. The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.