Judgment

S.P.BHARUCHA, J.

(1) IN Ramanathan Chettiar v. Assistant Controller of Estate Duty a division bench of the Madras High court, upon a writ petition, held that Section 34(1(c) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, was not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was held that there was no discrimination brought about by Section 34(l)(c) between the members of a Mitakshara joint Hindu family and the members of a Dayabhaga family.

(2) EVEN so, upon a writ petition, another division bench of the Madras High court in, V. Devaki Ammal v. Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, held Section 34(1(c) to be discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The latter division bench noted the judgment of the earlier division bench. Indeed, it quoted therefrom. It went on, however, to consider the validity of Section 34(1(c) for the following reasons:

"IF Section 34(1(c) is construed as a provision for aggregation of the benefits accrued to each of the lineal descendants on the death of the deceased, then on the principle laid down in that case the validity of the section has to be upheld. In fact, the learned counsel for the petitioner, wanted us to construe Section 34(1(c) in the same manner and quash the order of the respondent on the ground that the clubbing of the sons share with that of the deceased in this case is not warranted under Section 34(1(c). But the Revenue very strenuously contends that the object of Section 34(1(c) is to club the coparcenary interest of lineal descendant also with the coparcenary interest of the deceased so as to form one whole estate and that the validity of the section has to be considered in that light. As a matter of fact, the respondent in this case has construed Section 34(1(c) in the manner suggested by the revenue and has clubbed the half share of the son with the half share of the deceased father so as to form one estate and had applied the rate applicable to such combined estate in his assessment orders and it is that order which is being challenged before us. We, therefore, proceed to consider the question of the validity of Section 34(l)(c) on the basis of the wider interpretation which the Revenue has adopted."

(3) WE are at a loss to understand how, once one division bench of a High court has held a particular provision of law to be constitutional and not violative of Article 14, it is open to another division bench to hold that the same provision of law is unconstitutional and violative of Article 14. Judicial discipline demands that one division bench of a High court should, ordinarily, follow the judgment of another division bench of that High court. In extraordinary cases, where the latter division bench finds it difficult, for stated reasons, to follow the earlier division bench judgment, the proper course is to order that the papers be placed before the learned chief justice of the High court for constituting a larger bench. Certainly, where one division bench has held a statutory provision to be constitutional it is not open to another division bench to hold otherwise.

(4) IT is more strange that the latter Division bench here should have reconsidered the constitutionality of Section 34(1(c) because, as what is quoted above shows, the successful party before the earlier Division bench, the Revenue, canvassed a wider interpretation of that provision.

(5) THE later judgment of the Madras High court is under challenge in the first appeal.

(6) IT must be immediately stated that, upon writ petitions, the provisions of Section 34(l)(c) have been held to be constitutional and not violative of Article 14 by the Kerala High court in T.R. Jayasankar v. Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, the A. P. High court in N. Krishna Prasad v. Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Komanduri Seshamma (Smt) v. Appellate Controller of Estate Duty and N.V. Somaraju v. Govt. of India ; the Punjab High court in Hari Ram v. Assistant C